Study in the Psychology of Ethics

David Irons

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

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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS

A STUDY

IN

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS

BY

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PREFACE.

FROM the close relation which necessarily exists between ethics and psychology, it is evident that a systematic discussion of the psychology of conduct must render invaluable aid in the solution of purely ethical questions. It is true that psychology alone cannot give a final decision on ethical problems, but it is also true that the particular form which these problems assume is in many cases determined by the assumptions which are made in regard to the psychological principles of action. These assumptions, unfortunately, are too often accepted without an adequate investigation of the facts, and needless confusion is thus introduced into ethics. It may be urged, perhaps, that ethics is not responsible for this state of affairs, since it must build upon the basis which psychology supplies. This principle, that the verdict of psychology must

be accepted in psychological matters, may be sound in theory, but it cannot be put in practice at the present time, since modern psychology has devoted very little attention to the active side of human nature. In these circumstances it seems imperative that students of ethics should undertake an independent examination of that department of psychology which concerns them most intimately.

The present inquiry into the psychological basis of ethics has developed from a study of a class of mental facts which has been much neglected—namely, those phenomena which are usually classed together under the ambiguous term 'emotion.' The theory of emotion which is advanced in the following pages was briefly stated in the January number of 'Mind,' 1894, at the close of an article on "Professor James's Theory of Emotion." In that article the final contention was that emotion must be regarded as an ultimate mental fact which can best be described as 'feeling-attitude.' This view was elaborated in a series of papers which appeared two years later in 'The Philosophical Review.' Ultimately, this theory was found to lead on inevitably to a general standpoint in regard to the principles of human conduct. When this wider question emerged, the inquiry as a whole assumed the character of a study in the psychology of ethics.

The first half of the book covers the same ground as the articles in 'The Philosophical Review.' The criticism of current theories of emotion has been revised, but has not been materially altered. The chapters on "The Nature of Emotion" and "The Primary Emotions" have been amended, enlarged, and largely rewritten. The second half of the book deals with the primary principles of action and with the ethical significance of results attained throughout. The discussion of the notion of Worth, which appears in the concluding chapter, embodies some of the results of an article on "Natural Selection in Ethics" which was published in 1901 in 'The Philosophical Review.'

My obligations to different writers in ethics and psychology have been acknowledged, as far as possible, in the text. I desire, however, to express my special obligations to Professor James of Harvard. In the actual preparation of this volume I have received valuable criticisms and suggestions from Mr Norman Smith of the University of Glasgow. I am also indebted to Dr Albert Lefevre of Cornell University for the assistance he has rendered in reading the proofs.

D. I.

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INTRODUCTION.

THIS investigation is an attempt to ascertain the general principles affecting human conduct. It is undertaken in the hope that results will be attained which will throw light on current ethical problems. The present state of psychology seems to afford sufficient justification for an inquiry of this sort. The psychology of cognition has always obtained more than its relative share of attention, and in recent years the intellectualistic bias has received support and encouragement from the spread of experimental psychology, since cognition lends itself most readily to experimental treatment. This one-sided development has profoundly influenced the whole structure of the science. One evidence of its influence is the general tendency towards Presentationism. The best example of this point of view in its extreme form is Professor Münsterberg's earlier position, as stated in *Die Willenshandlung*. Münsterberg assumes at the outset that the only irreducible mental element is sensation, and that sensation is characterised by quality, intensity, and

feeling-tone. Consequently pleasure-pain is simply one property of sensation among others, and will is a mere complex of sensations. The self is necessarily excluded from psychology, since it is not an object which can be presented. Presentationism is not always carried to its logical conclusion in this manner, and usually appears in a modified form. Pleasure-pain is recognised as an 'element' of mind co-ordinate with sensation, though will and the self are still looked upon as products of strictly metaphysical speculation. Even when Presentationism is explicitly disavowed, the intellectualistic bias manifests itself in other ways. Those who maintain that the will is an ultimate aspect of mind are apt to identify it with attention; those who assert that the self is a necessary psychological postulate tend to regard it mainly as the subject of knowledge. In either case it is evident that the preoccupation with cognition has brought the intellectual side of human nature into undue prominence.

A tendency towards intellectualism is of course compatible with a recognition of the existence of other aspects of mind in addition to cognition. It may show itself merely in the failure to investigate fully the facts which pertain to the reactive side of mind. At all events, whether intellectualism is responsible for the result or not, these facts have been neglected. The best proof of this assertion is the commonly accepted doctrine that the tendencies to seek pleasure and avoid pain are the only principles of human conduct. The clearest and most unambiguous expression of opinion on this subject

comes from Professor Ward: "Whatever be the variety in the sources of pleasure, whatever be the moral or conventional estimate of their worthiness, if a given state of consciousness is pleasant we seek to retain it, if painful to be rid of it. We prefer greater pleasure before less, less pain before greater. This is, in fact, the whole meaning of preference as a psychological term."[1] This is the *tabula rasa* view of mind applied to conation, as every student of Condillac will recognise. The mind has no essential conative character. So far as tendency to reaction is concerned, it is at the beginning 'a sheet of white paper.' It must be marked by hedonic experience before action can take place, and its pleasures and pains determine its activity absolutely. The *tabula rasa* hypothesis has been found inconsistent with the facts of cognition; it can be shown to be at variance with the phenomena of conduct. When we bear in mind the wealth and variety of the facts which a study of human conduct brings to light, we are forced to the conclusion that the human being as such has a very complex character which expresses itself in a multitude of reactions. Human character is so complex that the individual must gradually discover his essential nature by observing the way in which he reacts on different occasions. This would not be the case if his tendencies were purely hedonic.

It is obvious that ethics, no less than psychology, has been seriously handicapped by this inadequate treatment of the principles of conduct. Ethical writers have been forced to supply the deficiency by

[1] Encyclopædia Britannica, xx. p. 71.

their own efforts, and this is true of the utilitarians as well as of their opponents. The work, however, has necessarily been done in an unsystematic manner, often indeed without a full appreciation of its significance. The results, too, though usually true to fact, have necessarily been at variance with the results of psychology. This undesirable state of affairs can be remedied only by a systematic inquiry into the principles of conduct. In the following pages an effort will be made to prepare the way for such an investigation.

The general standpoint which will be adopted has already been partially indicated. It may be well, however, to give a more definite statement on this subject in advance, though the full argument will of course come later. The general point of view can be summed up in the statement that man will be regarded as an organic being, psychically as well as physically. This means, in the first place, that he is not a mere physical organism which is somehow connected with a series of mental states. Mental phenomena do not constitute a simple linear series. As Fouillée maintains, "psychology resembles biology, which considers each function of the living being as conditioned by the totality of the others, or the whole as reacting in each function, thus forming a sort of vital circle."[1] In short, the mind is an organism as well as the body. The connection between mind and body, too, can best be expressed by saying that the individual is a psychophysical organism. This seems to be the only work-

[1] Psychologie des Idées-forces, p. xvi.

ing hypothesis which does not do violence to the facts. The term 'self,' if properly understood, may be used to indicate the fact that the human being is in some sense an organic whole. All the objections which have been raised against the self could be turned against the conception of organism as such.

In the second place, this point of view implies that the human being is not only affected by stimulus, but reacts in accordance with his nature, for every organism has an inner character which expresses itself in its reactions. Further, this character is complex, since there can be no organic unity if there is no multiplicity of elements. Both contentions can be substantiated. If we investigate the phenomena of human conduct, we are forced to admit that no single principle of action is adequate to explain the facts. As Galton points out, "man's character is exceedingly complex even in members of the simplest and purest savage races." "Different aspects of the multifarious character of man respond to different calls from without, so that the same individual, and much more the same race, may behave very differently at different epochs. There may have been no fundamental change of character, but a different phase or mood of it may have been evoked by special circumstances."[1] This character in its essential features is the endowment of each member of the race. It directly conditions certain tendencies to action. These tendencies may be called 'primary,' since they spring from the very nature of the individual, and are independent of

[1] Inquiries into Human Faculty, p. 177.

everything else. They tend to assert themselves as occasion offers, regardless of consequences, and therefore without reference to hedonic results. They manifest themselves whenever the proper stimulus is present, and stimulus in this case is simply the coincidence between external opportunity and internal bias. As compared with these impulses, the tendencies to seek pleasure and avoid pain are secondary, inasmuch as they presuppose, and are determined by, hedonic experiences. The impulses which are conditioned by the emotions may also be classed as secondary. Emotions arise when the agent becomes aware of the relation in which objects stand to any of his tendencies. They are peculiar reactions of feeling and have a special influence on conduct. The neglect of the reactive side of human nature is nowhere more conspicuous than in the case of emotion. This mental fact is almost universally assumed, without question or inquiry, to be a mere complex, and its characteristic function in the mechanism of human conduct is thus overlooked.

From this standpoint, therefore, man is regarded as an essentially active being, and the question arises as to whether there is a consciousness of this activity. Here introspection is the only possible guide, for introspection alone can give a verdict in regard to the ultimate qualitative distinctions between psychical phenomena. Now, in the phenomena of effort, impulse, and desire, there seems to be involved an ultimate fact of consciousness irreducible to anything else, the fact of striving or

conation. Here we find an aspect of consciousness which cannot be described in terms of cognition, pleasure-pain, or emotion, and when we compare it with those other aspects of consciousness the verdict of introspection seems unmistakable. The contention that conation is not an ultimate fact proceeds from the prejudice in favour of Presentationism already referred to. The doctrine of Presentationism, if carried out to its logical conclusion, leaves no room for pleasure-pain any more than for conation, since the former, like the latter, cannot be presented as an object. The mere existence of pleasure-pain as a conscious fact proves that the world as idea or as sensation does not coincide with the knowable world. We must experience much that cannot be presented as object if we are aware of what is most intimately ourselves, and are conscious of ourselves as distinct from objects. There is no valid reason, therefore, for rejecting the evidence of introspection in favour of regarding conation as an ultimate fact of consciousness.

In the course of this preliminary statement we have indicated that emotion also must be regarded as an ultimate aspect of consciousness. In view of the weight of authority against this position, the arguments which support it must be set forth at considerable length. We shall proceed at once to this task for two reasons. In the first place, if emotion is proved to be an ultimate aspect of mind with a distinctive influence on action, the prevailing theories in regard to the principles of human conduct will necessarily require modification. In the

second place, when we come to deal with the conditions under which the special emotions arise, we shall find ourselves brought into contact with the primary tendencies of the psychical organism. The theory of emotion, in short, opens one of the best avenues of approach to the general problem which is the subject of this inquiry.

A STUDY IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS.

CHAPTER I.

THE NATURE OF EMOTION.

WHILE most psychologists agree in maintaining that emotion is not an ultimate aspect of mind, there is no consensus of opinion as to its precise nature and constitution. Emotion has been described as organic sensation (Lange); pleasure-pain (Horwicz); a fusion of feeling and organic sensation (Külpe); pleasure-pain in association with the idea of its cause (Höffding); a mass of sensuous and representative material with a predominant affective tone (Sully); instinct-feeling (Marshall); a strong primary feeling of pleasure or pain, accompanied by a change in the course of ideas, and strengthened by the feelings associated with the ideas called up (Wundt); rank feeling of excitement (James[1]); a complete psychosis

[1] Psychological Review, I., v. p. 525.

involving cognition, pleasure-pain, and conation (Ward). This is sufficiently bewildering in itself, but the confusion is still further increased by the fact that many writers do not keep consistently to one point of view. Bain starts with the position that emotions are "secondary, derived, or complicated feelings."[1] It appears later, however, that love, anger, and possibly fear, are "original fountains of sentiment or feeling."[2] Then emotion is classed, along with intellect and action, as one of the chief divisions of the mental powers.[3] Finally, we find that particular emotions are defined in terms of pleasure-pain or impulse.[4] Wundt, after expounding the theory already mentioned, comes to the conclusion that "the universal animal impulses are the earliest forms of emotion."[5] Höffding and others show the same tendency to depart from their original position, and to identify emotion more or less closely with conation.[6]

The root of the trouble seems to be that emotion is explained away before a serious effort is made to ascertain with accuracy its real nature. In attempting to rectify this omission, we must begin with an examination of the fact as it appears in consciousness. It is evident that direct observation alone affords absolutely reliable information with regard to the qualitative distinctions of psychical states. The application of the introspective method to emotion is not so hopeless an undertaking as one

[1] The Emotions and the Will, 3rd ed., p. 3.
[2] Ibid., p. 73. [3] Ibid., p. 95. [4] Ibid., pp. 142, 173, 177.
[5] Menschen- und Thierseele (1892), pp. 421, 422; Eng. trans., pp. 386, 387.
[6] Psychology, English trans., p. 235.

is accustomed to suppose. All emotions do not involve commotion, and the less violent states can be accurately observed. We can in a measure supplement the results obtained by the use of this method. If, for example, the phenomenon under investigation not only seems fundamentally distinct from other aspects of mind, but is found in addition to have special conditions and effects, the testimony of introspection gains in objective validity.

The simplest and most natural way of opening the inquiry will be to take concrete instances. When ill-feeling, for example, is aroused, into what constituents can the total consciousness of the moment be resolved? Under ordinary circumstances we can distinguish at once the cognition of the object, the pain of the injury or series of injuries, the awareness of certain organic disturbances, and an impulse towards a definite course of action. But the statement that we have this emotion is not equivalent to the assertion that we are pained, know the cause, have various organic sensations, and feel impelled to act in a particular manner. The emotion cannot be identified with any one of these elements, or any combination of them. It implies that, in consequence of his actions with reference to us, we feel disposed towards some one in a certain way, and that, as a result of this feeling-attitude, actions of a special sort and these alone appeal to us. The 'plain man' in describing his state of mind will say that he has 'ill-feeling towards' the object of his hate, 'feels as if he could' inflict on him all manner of harm. Similarly, liking or affection for a person is not the

idea of the object, the pleasure received, the expectation of future pleasure, the awareness of various physical processes, or any combination of these. It is a feeling in reference to the object which is dependent on the intellectual attitude and conditions the practical.

The observation of every emotional state will yield the same result, and we seem to have here a fact fundamentally distinct from the ultimate aspects of mind commonly recognised. The existence and nature of this distinction will become more evident if we imagine an individual who is composed psychically of cognition, pleasure-pain, and conation, and possesses no characteristics which cannot be expressed in terms of these. Such a being, when injured, might judge it advisable to retaliate, on the ground that if he does not he may be attacked again. Or, on general principles of abstract justice, he might deem it right to act towards the offender as the latter has acted towards him. But he would have no intense ill-feeling towards the aggressor, prompting him, apart from all deliberation and calculation of consequences, to adopt a particular line of conduct. His attitude would be similar to that of the ideal judge in the act of sentencing a criminal according to the general principles of law. We might assume that he had inherited an instinct of retaliation, or was so constituted as to take pleasure in giving pain in return for injury. But in neither case would his action be accompanied by any malevolent feeling towards the object. He might, of course, be moved to activity by the pain

involved, but in that case his action would be directed to the immediate removal of the pain. It cannot be asserted that he would invariably attain this end by inflicting suffering on the aggressor, but if he resorted to retaliation with this purpose in view, he would proceed with the same lack of ill-will which the hunter displays in killing an animal to relieve the pain of hunger. It is scarcely necessary to add that the presence of organic sensation would make no essential difference in any of the cases mentioned, for the awareness of certain physical processes localised within the individual's own body has nothing in common with a feeling which relates the individual to an object.

As this imaginary individual would be destitute of all malevolent feeling, he would likewise be incapable of affection or gratitude. If he were agreeably affected by one of his fellows, he might cognise the pleasure-giving agent as a deserving sort of being, and return the favour from a sense of justice or with a view to future benefits. His action, however, would not be prompted by any kindly feeling towards the individual concerned. He would regard the latter in a purely intellectual manner as a series of sensations involving, according to all probability, a personality like himself—a personality which had been the means of causing him enjoyment. On the other hand, he would turn on himself the same cold cognitive gaze. His actions would give him pleasure if they harmonised with his interests or ideals, but there would be no responsive feeling of self-satisfaction.

It is evident that a being of this sort would lack one of the springs of action which plays so large a part in our life both directly and indirectly. Even if he were supposed to be so constituted as to perform the actions to which emotions prompt, he would never be driven along regardless of everything, simply because one course alone seemed to satisfy his feeling at the moment. Further, there would always be this fundamental difference between him and the actual human being, that his attitude to other persons and to things could only be intellectual and practical. Since pleasure-pain ends in the self and has no outward reference,[1] when he faced a person or situation he could only cognise the facts in a certain way and act accordingly. The nature of the cognitive attitude would doubtless be influenced by the pleasure-pain received, but it would still remain purely cognitive. In short, our hypothetical individual would be absolutely self-contained so far as his feelings were concerned. In this aspect of his nature he would be a mere atom, abstractly separated from his fellows and the world in which he lives.

When we thus eliminate everything which cannot be expressed in terms of cognition, pleasure-pain, and conation, the distinctive character of emotion comes prominently into view. I have used the term 'feeling-attitude' to indicate, not to define, this apparently unique aspect of mind. The word 'feeling' expresses subjectivity and diffusedness. Emotion is subjective in much the same sense as pleasure-pain.

[1] Bradley, 'Mind,' 1888, p. 3; Höffding, 'Psychology,' p. 234.

It is a centrally-initiated reaction, however, while the latter is pure subjectivity. Briefly, the one is subjectivity as reaction; the other is subjectivity as receptivity. The word 'attitude' is employed to mark this distinction and to emphasise the fact that emotion, in virtue of its character as reaction, has an outward direction or objective reference. It might be urged that the distinction between receptivity and reaction does not hold in this case, for pleasure-pain itself may in a sense be regarded as a reaction. This simply means, however, that a psychical state must express in some way the nature of the psychical organism, and cannot be thrust, as it were, into the mental life from an alien source. The fact is undeniable, but it does not do away with the distinction, which holds in the case of every organism, between being affected by something and reacting in reference to an object. Using a spatial metaphor, we may say that in the one case the line of direction is from the object to the self, whereas in the other it is from the self outwards to the object. This is the distinction which is here indicated when we oppose receptivity to reaction.

We may say, then, that emotion is the subjective response which appears when we react in view of a situation instead of being merely affected by it. This response, we must repeat, is not pure impulse or tendency to act. It is a mood or state of feeling in regard to the object, on account of which special modes of conduct appeal to us with a force they do not possess on other occasions. Impulses and volitions arise in consequence, for particular motor ideas

thus become dominant. These ideas gain this ascendancy, however, simply because they are in harmony with that phase of subjectivity which is prominent at the time. No better proof of this could be desired than the well-known fact that an action which cannot be done in 'cold blood' seems the only thing to do when passion is aroused.

In order to establish this view more definitely, it will be necessary to contrast emotion with the other aspects of mind in turn. In this connection, cognition can be treated briefly. A cognitive state is not merely a subjective event with a place in the series of psychical occurrences. It reports the existence and nature of something, and thus has a reference beyond itself. This reference is its most prominent feature, and its factual nature as a psychical event falls into the background. Emotion, it is evident, has not the objective reference which pertains to cognition. It possesses objective reference in the sense that it has the outward direction which is characteristic of all reaction. Moreover, it is not so much an isolated activity as the actual being of the individual in a certain phase or aspect. For this reason its factual character as a psychical state is obtruded on consciousness. Naturally this awareness of subjectivity is not so strong as in the case of pleasure-pain, for there is an outward direction and a fixing of the attention on some object. This consciousness is always present, however, except in a few exceptional cases, and even then the obliteration is but momentary.

This leads naturally to the discussion of the

contrast between emotion and pleasure-pain, for the latter is also subjective in a special sense. It is pure receptivity, however, and thus lacks that outward direction which emotion as reaction possesses. In itself it has no reference and no object; it is subjectively subjective. It is mere result, an effect coming from an object and ending in the self. Emotion, on the contrary, is an attitude we adopt. We are pleased or pained *by* something, and have emotion *towards* something. This distinction is embodied in the structure of language.

That emotion has an outward reference has frequently been admitted,[1] but the significance of the fact has not been fully recognised. This characteristic is usually explained as an appearance which results from a blending or association of cognition with pleasure-pain. "A feeling of pleasure or pain," Höffding tells us, "naturally enters into an association with the idea of that which played, or appeared to play, a part in giving rise to the pleasurable or painful feeling, with consequently its real or apparent cause. Previous to such association feeling has no direction or no object, is consequently not feeling *about* or *for* something. . . . Pain becomes, by association with the idea of its cause, aversion (anger). . . . By a similar metamorphosis the feeling of pleasure becomes delight and love. The idea of that which has an essential connection

[1] Cf. Hume, 'Treatise' (Selby-Bigge ed.), pp. 278, 329, 330; Höffding, 'Psychology,' p. 234; James, 'Principles of Psychology,' ii. p. 313; Lehmann, 'Hauptgesetze des Gefühlslebens,' pp. 19, 116, 117.

with the feeling of pleasure blends with it and gives it a certain direction."[1] It is not clear how an association of pleasure-pain with the idea of its cause in itself imparts to the former a characteristic which is foreign to its intrinsic nature. And if these two elements are supposed to unite more intimately and blend into a total result, it is scarcely conceivable that the complex whole thus produced should be a feeling in reference to an object which, by hypothesis, is an integral part of the complex itself. Moreover, the very phraseology of the passage cited indicates that antecedents or conditions have been mistaken for constituents, and that it would be truer to assert that, when the factors mentioned are present, they condition or precede the appearance of something entirely different. On this whole question the evidence of introspection is unambiguous. Pleasure-pain and cognition can be present together while emotion is absent, for this is the state of affairs when we are 'hurt' — *i.e.*, pained but not angry at the conduct of a friend. On the other hand, when emotion is present, it can be clearly distinguished from the hedonic effect and from the idea of the object. The outward direction of emotion, therefore, cannot be explained away merely as a derived or secondary characteristic of pleasure-pain. It is not an adventitious attribute casually attached to a purely subjective state; it is essential and intrinsic. Hence feeling *for* an object is absolutely distinct from the hedonic feeling conditioned *by* the object.

[1] *Loc. cit.*

That emotion is a central reaction, and in this respect different from pleasure-pain, is another position which has been admitted[1] without a full appreciation of its consequences. As this position is of basal importance, it will be well to indicate the arguments in its favour. The mere fact that emotion has an outward reference similar to that of desire, impulse, and attention, is of itself conclusive. There are, however, numerous subsidiary facts which add their weight to this general argument. In the first place, it is obvious that emotion is subject to that law of activity which we call the principle of habit. The more frequently an emotion is indulged in, the smaller is the stimulus necessary to call it forth. This general rule is liable to exceptions owing to the complexity of conditions which may affect the rise of any particular emotion, but the existence of the general tendency seems undeniable. When we say that a person is timorous, irascible, vindictive, or affectionate, we mean that he has a certain emotional habit, in virtue of which fear, anger, ill-feeling, or affection, is readily aroused. Such habits partly constitute and partly express the temperament or disposition of the individual, and may be acquired or inherited. Now pleasure-pain does not become habitual in the sense that it becomes by repetition more easily excited. It is true that it comes under the influence of the principle of habituation, but this is a very different thing, being a principle of accommodation which implies a weakening in the

[1] Sully, 'Human Mind,' ii. pp. 91, 93; Bain, 'Emotions and Will,' p. 70.

effect of stimuli that are frequently repeated. The law of habit, however, is but one phase of a more general principle affecting activity—namely, inertia. There is always a certain amount of inertia, varying with circumstances, which must be overcome before reaction takes place. That emotion is influenced in this way is evident from those cases where a situation, hedonically effective and in itself emotionally exciting, fails, for a time at least, to evoke any appropriate response. Anger, for instance, may thus be checked by inertia. The individual feels the unpleasantness of the situation, recognises fully that the circumstances are 'annoying,' but does not react emotionally, because it is 'too much trouble to get angry.'

It is significant also that emotions are affected by general rules and considerations, and are therefore not absolutely determined by the particular conditions actually realised at the moment. While the actual circumstances may present all the necessary conditions, an emotion may be inhibited, or at all events appreciably affected, by a consideration of the propriety of indulging it. Anger may be restrained or totally inhibited by a perception of the consequences it might entail, or by the reflection that it would in the circumstances be useless. Any passion tends to subside if the agent feels that he is making himself ridiculous, and the thought that a passionate outburst would be vulgar may have a distinctly restraining effect, not only on the manifestation of the emotion, but on the feeling itself. On the other hand, no abstract reflections on the

uselessness of the infliction will get rid of the pain of toothache if the nervous agitation continues. No general considerations of the evil results of pain will affect the disagreeable effect produced by an ill-proportioned building, so long as the ugly object remains within the field of vision. We can influence pleasure and pain only by dealing with their conditions, whereas we can restrain emotion when its normal conditions actually exist. Indeed, if certain points of view have become habitual, certain emotions may be habitually suppressed on all ordinary occasions, and even passions of great intensity may in time be sensibly affected by the habitual ways of regarding things which have grown up in cooler moments. It is scarcely necessary to point out that a merely passive effect cannot be controlled in this way, and that a reaction alone can be influenced by a perception of its consequences and general bearings. In view of these facts, it is important to observe that we feel more responsible for emotion than for pleasure-pain. We may be ashamed of being afraid or of harbouring ill-feeling, but we are never really ashamed of being pained. We justify, excuse, or condemn our emotions, while we accept our pleasures and pains as mere facts. This is inexplicable save on the assumption that emotion is reaction, for we can identify ourselves only with our own activity, not with an effect imposed on us from without. It is worthy of note in this connection that individual differences are much more prominent in the emotional life than in hedonic sensibility. The former is more susceptible to the

influences of environment, education, and experience, and thus tends to acquire a more and more individualistic stamp as life goes on. Finally, attention may be drawn to certain common phrases and modes of speech which add the testimony of language to the evidence already adduced. We talk of 'instinctive' fear or dislike,[1] 'involuntary' or 'grudging' admiration, 'unmotived' hate, 'unbridled' passion, 'outburst' of emotion. This language would be absurd if emotion were not a reaction, and it is absurd if applied to pleasure-pain. We cannot speak of an 'unmotived' pain, or an 'outburst' of pleasure. We are justified in concluding, therefore, that pleasure-pain is simply the way in which things affect us, while emotion is the manner in which we react. The former represents something 'given,' the latter is something 'done.' The one expresses the relation in which objects and conditions stand to us, the other is the attitude we adopt.

If we turn now to the conditions of the two phenomena we shall find that they are entirely distinct, as might indeed be inferred from the results already attained. Pleasure and pain depend upon harmony and discord respectively.[2] Lehmann maintains that anything causes pain which is in conflict

[1] It is the feeling itself, and not any action, which is here referred to as instinctive. This can be shown to be a legitimate use of terms. The feeling may arise instinctively in circumstances which render a new line of action necessary. In such cases, of course, there can be no instinctive action, and in other cases all action appropriate to the emotion may be inhibited.

[2] 'Harmony' is taken in its widest sense to include all that is not discordant. Cf. Bradley, 'Mind,' 1888, p. 7.

with the conditions of mental or psychical existence, and that the opposite holds in the case of pleasure.[1] This is true, but it does not cover all cases. Many things affect us agreeably or disagreeably because they harmonise or conflict with that aspect of our nature which is for the time being in evidence. If we are gloomy, gaiety displeases us; and the same action will cause pleasure or pain according as hate or kindly feeling is dominant. As Shaftesbury puts it, "the man in anger has a different happiness from the man in love."

While mere discord and harmony are the conditions of pleasure-pain, they do not determine emotion. Whatever is at variance, even temporarily, with the individual's nature causes pain; but anger does not appear until he feels that he is injured—*i.e.*, unless he regards the occurrence as antagonistic to his interests or wishes. If, as sometimes happens, the unpleasant result is not viewed in this light, anger is not evoked. Similarly, while any bodily disorder is painful, the sense of danger must be present before fear is aroused. In like manner, hate presupposes that the object of the feeling is cognised as a hostile personality, and admiration implies the recognition of worth. A situation becomes emotionally effective, therefore, only if it is viewed under a definite aspect which has a general significance. The detail as such, while possessing hedonic potentialities, is irrelevant. The concepts 'injury,' 'danger,' and so forth, need not be present in clear cut and explicit form, but the

[1] Die Hauptgesetze des Gefühlslebens, pp. 150, 151.

isolation of aspects on which they depend is indispensable. In other words, every emotion presupposes a judgment by means of which the situation is brought under a general category. This judgment may sometimes seem to have the character of an 'immediate feeling' or 'intuitive perception,' but it always involves an intellectual activity which interprets the general character and significance of the actual circumstances as presented to us. We do not respond to the facts as mere particulars, as brute existence devoid of meaning. If we do not interpret we do not react emotionally. When we thus react it is because we have interpreted the situation in a certain way, as having such and such a character, as a 'what' and not a mere 'this.' At times we may not clearly comprehend the reason why we react as we do, but even then the existence of some dim sense of the general character or significance of things can be detected. Since a given situation presents a number of aspects, a variety of emotions is possible, even if one element of the situation is so prominent in itself that a particular hedonic effect is unalterably determined. A distressing spectacle causes pain inevitably, but, while the disagreeable effect persists, anger, pity, or contempt may arise according to the point of view adopted. Similarly, while defeat is and remains unpleasant, we may admire our opponent if we attend to the skill displayed, or dislike him if he appears to us merely as the cause of a disagreeable result.

That judgment is the determining condition is further evident when it is observed that the emotion

can be directly influenced by a change or modification of the intellectual point of view. If a terrified individual can be fully convinced that there is no danger, the emotion will vanish. It is true that abnormal physical and mental conditions influence the emotional life, but they do so only indirectly by perverting the judgment. That intellectual interpretation of the real is always necessary, is somewhat obscured by the fact that emotion may apparently take the form of a reflex response to presentation. In a frequently recurring situation, where we are accustomed to respond in a particular manner, anything associated with the conditions of the emotion may come to arouse the latter directly. Fear may thus appear on a sign or signal, simultaneously with the sense of danger. It is obvious, however, that the stimulating presentation has power, not in itself, but as a sign of the general meaning of the given circumstances. Previous interpretations and responses are therefore required to form the connections which give the particular presentation a borrowed power. Such cases are instances of habit, and judgment is active in the formation of the habit. The close relation between feeling-attitude and intellectual regard is clearly indicated even on those extreme occasions when the emotion bursts forth without apparent provocation, and seems to be explicable only on the ground that a need was felt for reacting in that way. For instance, as Bain points out, "the irascible temper in a state of surcharge does not need an actual offender"; "the temperament overflowing with tender emotion finds many

things to love."[1] In such cases, however, the emotion creates its own object. More precisely, the functional irritability acts on the cognitive activity of judgment, and must so act before the functional tendency can be realised.

This view does not exclude the possibility of a conflict between 'reason' and 'passion.' Emotion is dependent on a cognitive interpretation of the facts, and will therefore be 'irrational' if the judgment is wrong. Moreover, if a false interpretation has been persistently repeated, the resulting emotional reaction will have acquired, through repetition, a momentum of its own. For this reason it may appear in opposition to the truer insight which the individual has more recently attained. Further, when it is once aroused, the individual has committed himself to one point of view, and the opposing judgment must contend with this obstruction. The conflict between reason and emotion, then, is ultimately a conflict between inadequate knowledge and the deeper insight which has been subsequently attained.

It can be maintained, therefore, that emotion demands as its necessary condition a judgment in reference to the situation, whereas pleasure-pain is conditioned solely by the actual relations of discord and harmony in which things stand to the self. This statement, however, does not fully express the difference between the respective conditions of the two phenomena. Even when the judgment is made and the normal conditions are thus fulfilled, the emotion

[1] Emotions and Will, pp. 189, 281.

may be restrained or inhibited by general considerations which reach beyond the present case and bring into play the general relations of the object to the self and the wider bearings of the emotional reaction. A situation may be recognised as 'irritating' without arousing anger, if a vivid perception of ultimate consequences intervenes. This possibility of direct control, when the normal conditions are present, has been indicated in another connection, but it is important to emphasise it here, since it illustrates in a striking way the difference between pleasure-pain and emotion in regard to their determining conditions. The whole distinction can be summed up in the statement, that the one is determined by *causes* while the other is conditioned by *reasons*.

Since hedonic effect is determined by harmony and discord, and since these can differ only in degree, it is natural to suppose that pleasure and pain have only quantitative differences. This is the position which is most generally accepted by psychologists at the present day.[1] On the other hand, evidence can be adduced to prove that emotion exhibits qualitative distinctions. In the first place, there is the testimony of introspection, and in a case like this, as Külpe maintains, it is to introspection that the final appeal must be made.[2] So far as direct observation is concerned, it may confidently be asserted that fear, hate, contempt, are as

[1] Cf. Ward, 'Encyclopædia Britannica,' xx. p. 71; Bradley, 'Mind,' 1888, p. 2; Sully, 'Human Mind,' ii. p. 7; Lehmann, 'Haupt. d. Gefühl.,' p. 124; Külpe, 'Grundriss d. Psy.,' p. 246.

[2] Grundriss, p. 333.

distinct from one another as blue, red, green. In both cases the assertion of qualitative distinction rests on the same basis, and has the same justification. Further, while every pain may be set down to discord, and every pleasure to harmony, the primary emotions must be referred to conditions that are in each case specifically distinct. The recognition of worth, for instance, is entirely different from the sense of injury, or the consciousness of danger. What holds for the conditions is true of the consequents. Again, while pleasures and pains always prompt to activity of the same sort, each primary emotion gives rise to a special mode of behaviour. There is nothing in common between the actions due to anger, fear, contempt, admiration, hate, and affection. It is also noteworthy that the different emotions are marked off by special names, while the various pleasures and pains are not thus distinguished from one another. Ordinary language is not an infallible guide in matters of detail, but when it presents us with a broad general fact of this sort, its testimony cannot be entirely ignored. It is scarcely necessary to add that emotions cannot be classed simply as pleasurable or painful. No emotion has the same hedonic character throughout. A certain degree of fear is stimulating, and therefore pleasurable, and an outburst of rage may be distinctly agreeable.[1] "Blind voluptuous rage," a phrase used by Keats, expresses a possible fact and not a mere poetic fancy. Affection may be painful in the sense that it may be

[1] Sully, 'Human Mind,' ii. pp. 94, 95.

accompanied by greater pain than pleasure.[1] While hate in its initial stages usually involves a large element of pain, it may in the end become exclusively pleasurable. The thought of revenge is pleasant, especially when backed by the consciousness of power, and the emotion heightens general activity, and is therefore in itself a source of pleasure.

We may now consider the influence which pleasure-pain and emotion exert on action. If a state of consciousness is pleasant, we seek to retain it; if unpleasant, we seek to get rid of it.[2] An effect on our own subjective condition is invariably the end in view. When we act *from* pleasure or pain, we act in reference *to* them. Can we apply this in the case of emotion? Is vengeance desired for the purpose of putting an end to hate? Can a parent be said to make sacrifices for his children in order to maintain his affection for them? This seems rather absurd, and the reason is not hard to find. We have already pointed out that an emotion has no constant hedonic character, and may be pleasurable at one time and painful at another. *Yet the action which it prompts is always the same.* This proves conclusively enough that emotion is a principle of action entirely different from pleasure-pain in its mode of operation. The distinction is specially prominent when the two principles come into direct conflict. Pity is thus at variance with the pain which is

[1] Cf. Horwicz, 'Psychologische Analysen,' ii. pp. 448, 460.

[2] Cf. Ward, 'Ency. Brit.,' xx. p. 71; Spencer, 'Principles of Psychology,' i. p. 280; Höffding, 'Psychology,' p. 274; Sidgwick, 'Methods of Ethics' (4th ed.), pp. 44, 45.

always associated with it. The former directs attention to the disagreeable object, as such, while the latter impels us to banish the unpleasing spectacle from consciousness as speedily as possible. Moreover the intensity and range of emotion-prompted actions are often out of all proportion to the pleasure-pain involved.[1] The actions of hate and affection alike usually bear no quantitative relation to the amount of pleasure or pain received or expected.[2]

It is not difficult to ascertain the exact nature of the distinction which thus obtrudes itself. Pleasure-pain is purely subjective, concentrates attention on itself, and naturally enough arouses activity dealing with the hedonic condition of the agent. Emotion, on the contrary, is an attitude or disposition towards something, directs attention outward, and therefore impels to action that has reference to an object. When the agent is entirely under the influence of emotion, he acts as he feels disposed towards the object, just because he is so disposed and for no other reason. He is concerned with the object alone; the subject is in the background, the object all in all. The malevolent passions are as 'disinterested' as the others. We 'lose ourselves' in hate as in love. When hate is dominant the conduct of the individual is unselfish in precisely the same sense as it is unselfish when he is impelled by

[1] Sidgwick, 'Methods of Ethics,' p. 50.

[2] This is partly due to the fact that these emotions are feelings in reference to a permanent object, and may thus outlast the occurrence which occasioned their arousal.

the opposite emotion. He may know that he is acting contrary to his own interests, but that does not affect him so long as the passion retains its power. In short, under the influence of emotion we strive to satisfy or express a feeling towards an object, whereas under the guidance of pleasure-pain we seek to maintain or remove a subjective state which falls absolutely within the limits of our own individual being.

This characteristic of emotional action has been indicated, more or less clearly, by different writers on ethics and psychology. Shaftesbury contends that interest does not govern the world, and that it is hard to believe that nothing is done in pure good-nature or kindness.[1] Hume, following Butler, points out that even the selfish passions carry the mind beyond the self directly to the object, and, though the satisfaction of these passions gives enjoyment, the prospect of pleasure is not the cause of the passion since the former would not exist without the latter.[2] Even egoistic hedonists like Gay and Tucker do not question the fact that emotion-prompted action is disinterested, though they seek to account for the origin of this characteristic in conformity with their hedonistic principles.[3] Bain is very explicit on this point. "When a burst of strong emotion possesses the mind, . . . the usual course of volition is manifestly here perverted and paralysed

[1] Characteristics, i. pp. 115, 116.

[2] Inquiry concerning Human Understanding, section i. note 2.

[3] Gay's 'Preliminary Dissertation,' pp. xlvi. ff.; Tucker's 'Light of Nature,' ch. xxi.

by some foreign influence."[1] This means that "the passions urge us on apparently without regard either to pleasure or pain."[2] In discussing the propriety of arousing passion in the service of some noble end, he says: "As regards the work to be done, nothing could be more effectual; as regards the happiness of the agent, the immolation is often remorseless."[3]

This distinguishing feature of emotion-prompted activity seems to be intimately connected with the intrinsic nature of emotion as such, and no valid attempt has been made to explain it away as a derivative or secondary result. The method adopted by Gay and Tucker need not be criticised in detail, since few psychologists would now maintain that association, usually the friend of memory, could cause a naturally selfish individual to forget himself. Bain's theory on the subject demands more attention, since it represents one phase of a very prevalent misconception. According to this writer the non-hedonic character of emotional activity is due to the fact that "an emotion persists in the mind and dominates the course of the thoughts, not because it is pleasurable or painful, but because it is strong." "This is the aspect of emotion that we express by the name 'excitement.' The nervous pressure is accumulated in some one region of the brain, in connection with one class of thoughts; any ideas belonging to that class will arise with facility, others of an incompatible kind are kept back. . . . In such a state the mind is no longer in its calm centre; the judgments and convictions are liable

[1] Emotions and Will, p. 380. [2] Ibid., p. 383. [3] Ibid., p. 394.

to perversion or bias."[1] There is "an undue or morbid persistency of certain ideas in the mind," and this intellectual obliquity expresses itself in action.[2] In short, the whole phenomenon is a consequence of the existence of fixed ideas whose persistence is pathologically conditioned. Now, emotions do tend to fix certain ideas in the mind, but there is nothing inevitably pathological in the process. In the first place, emotion is not always accompanied by excitement and loss of equilibrium. We may have a slight anxiety or irritation, 'cool' contempt, 'dry' admiration, 'cold' dislike, and these affect conduct in precisely the same way as the more violent states. Their influence, moreover, may be of vital importance, for the efficiency of an emotion does not depend on its strength alone, but is conditioned more frequently by the absence of opposing or obstructing forces. A slight fear with regard to the distant future may be a more potent factor in conduct than a pervasive dread suddenly aroused by an impending danger. Further, even intense emotions are not necessarily accompanied by excitement. An individual of strong character may have strong emotions and yet retain his self-control. In such cases, reflection is not excluded. The agent may know that his emotion prompts him to act contrary to his hedonic interests, and may, nevertheless, give way to the impulse of feeling. Accordingly, when he reflects in a calm hour, he may still justify his conduct and approve it, even if he is suffering from the consequences. In the second place, it must be

[1] Emotions and Will, p. 381. [2] Ibid., p. 390.

pointed out that the different emotions arise regularly in connection with definite normal conditions. We feel kindly disposed towards those who have benefited us, are irritated by injury, admire worth and scorn its opposite, and the feeling in each case tends to influence conduct by fixing certain ideas in the mind. Given the conditions, the result always follows unless special counteracting forces come into play. The conditions, too, are obviously normal. Moreover, the connection between the different emotions and the different conditions on which they depend, seems, on the whole, admirably adapted to the nature of the individual and of his environment. That he should fear those evils with which he cannot cope, pity those in distress, love his friends and hate his enemies—all this seems to imply a species of adjustment to physical and social environment rather than mere loss of mental equilibrium.

The results obtained by this discussion of the contrast between pleasure-pain and emotion may now be briefly summarised. Both are essentially subjective, but the former is an effect imposed on the self, the latter is reaction. While the one is mere result ending in the self, the other has outward reference. The primary emotions are qualitatively distinct, whereas pleasures and pains differ from one another in quantity alone. The two phenomena are further distinguished by difference in conditions and in effects on conduct. The fundamental distinction beween the two is expressed in the fact that the more we are immersed

in pleasure or pain the more we lapse into mere particularity; while emotion, in proportion to its strength, binds us to the world of objects. For this reason the two states are mutually antagonistic. The stronger the emotion is the less conscious do we become of pleasure and pain; the more we are absorbed in the hedonic effect the weaker is the emotional reaction.

Emotion must now be contrasted with conation, in order that the distinction between them may be determined with precision. It will be necessary at the outset to indicate briefly the nature and conditions of the phenomena denoted by the term 'conation.' When a tendency to action is realised immediately, we may either be conscious of a sense of ease and power, or simply become aware of the sensations attending the completed activity. If, however, the tendency is not at once actualised, an 'impulse' to action is felt—*i.e.*, a sense of striving. When an obstruction or hindrance is distinctly perceptible, the feeling of 'effort' appears. This is essentially the sense of striving plus the awareness of hindrance, and is accompanied by certain muscular sensations. In physical effort, these muscular sensations are organically related to the tendency, and difficult to distinguish from the sense of striving which its realisation involves. In the case of intellectual effort, however, the situation is different. The strain of attention produced in attempting to solve a problem has only an adventitious connection with the muscular sensations which usually attend it, and is therefore easily distinguishable from them.

When the obstacle to activity cannot be overcome at the moment, desire emerges. Desire implies that something, not yet in existence and not immediately attainable, appeals to us as a thing to be realised. It presupposes further a comparison between the actual state of affairs and that which exists in idea. The resulting consciousness of want or deficiency, the sense of conflict between the ideal and the real, is the characteristic feature of desire as opposed to effort and impulse. Desire, however, is not merely this awareness of deficiency or discrepancy which arises when immediately successful action is impossible; it is also a striving to find means to remedy this state of matters, for a conscious being necessarily strives to realise the end which appeals to it unless this is distinctly recognised to be altogether impossible. When the ideal is felt to be absolutely unattainable, the striving to find means ceases, and wish may take the place of desire. This state implies a species of contradiction, though one which is easily explicable. While it presupposes the recognition of the impossibility of realising the ideal, it also implies that this fact is kept in the background. Just because the real is so hostile to us, we neglect it as much as possible and live in the ideal. Hence wish does not involve that vivid sense of discrepancy so prominent in desire, though it depends ultimately on the consciousness that this discrepancy can never be removed. Accordingly, wish gives rise to rudimentary impulses totally at variance with the tacitly recognised demands of the real. When the ab-

solute contradiction between real and ideal is kept in the foreground, all striving or impulse vanishes. Wish in the proper sense then gives way to mere regret. In these circumstances, if we say "I wish it were," we simply mean "I regret it is impossible."

It is with desire and impulse that emotion has been frequently confounded, and we shall confine our attention to these, partly on this account, and partly because the argument which applies in their case may easily be adapted so as to apply to the other phenomena of conation. If we consider, first, the evidence of introspection as to the distinction between desire and impulse, on the one hand, and emotion on the other, the verdict seems clear and unmistakable. Feeling-attitude, or the way in which we feel towards some object, is fundamentally different from that peculiar consciousness of striving to do something which is called 'impulse.' It is equally distinct from that conscious want and striving which is the essence of desire. The sense of conflict between the real and the ideal, which is the most characteristic feature of desire, is conspicuously absent from emotion as such, since the latter is, for the time being, the real self with which things are felt to be in harmony or conflict. Thus, to take a concrete instance, pity is not merely an impulse or desire to do certain things; it is primarily a kindly feeling in reference to a person in distress. This is clear when we compare the emotional impulse or desire to alleviate suffering with the similar impulse or desire which sometimes springs from policy or pure selfishness.

Further, emotion is distinguished from impulse and desire, not merely by the presence of 'feeling-towards,' but also by the nature of the object to which it directly refers. While emotion and conation both have outward reference, the object in each case is generically distinct. Whereas conation is always a striving to realise what is not yet in existence, emotion is directed towards a person, thing, or event, regarded as such, not as end to be realised. The former refers to an ideal which we hope to make real, while the latter is the feeling in reference to some object which is regarded merely from the point of view of existence. This is most obvious when we compare desire and emotion, for in desire the reference of conation is naturally brought into distinct consciousness. In virtue of this difference, the emotional attitude as such can be clearly distinguished from the impulses and desires which it tends to foster.

This distinction in objective reference inevitably entails a difference in conditions. Impulse and desire, being strivings to realise what does not yet exist, necessarily presuppose the conception of End and certain motor ideas. On the other hand, since emotion directly refers to existence as such, the notions of means and end are not implied among its essential conditions. This is well stated by Hume in the following passage: "Though 'tis certain that we never love any person without desiring his happiness, nor hate any without wishing his misery, yet these desires arise only upon the ideas of the happiness or misery of our friend or enemy being pre-

sented to the imagination. . . . The passions may subsist a considerable time without our reflecting on the happiness or misery of their objects."[1] In other words, when an emotion is aroused, a special line of conduct appeals to the agent with peculiar force, if he thinks of it; certain motor ideas are encouraged, if they are suggested to the mind. The feeling-attitude itself, of course, gives rise to an intellectual bias, and in most cases the circumstances suggest definite courses of action. As a rule, therefore, emotion at once occasions impulses or desires, rudimentary or otherwise. But, if for any reason the individual does not think of ends or means, if these new conditions are not realised, no active tendencies appear. The agent may be temporarily immersed in the current of feeling, may be 'lost' in admiration, 'too terrified to think.' This does not happen merely when, as in the case of terror, the emotion is accompanied by a species of intellectual paralysis. Any strong emotion, when first aroused, tends to cause absorption in itself. This tendency is occasionally reinforced by the distinct pleasure which is sometimes felt in emotional excitation as such, a pleasure which inevitably encourages immersion in the mere feeling. The 'luxury of pity,' and the attraction which sensationalism in all its forms possesses, testify to the existence of this delight in the stir of emotion as such. The temporary dissociation between feeling-attitude and practical tendency may also be effected in other ways. There may be no immediate occasion for action. The happiness of a friend, for

[1] Treatise (Selby-Bigge ed.), pp. 367, 368.

instance, may not be an urgent affair requiring instant attention, and in this case surely one may have kindly feeling without any definite desires or impulses. The idea that something should be done is not suggested; consequently the striving to act is likewise absent. Again, some deeply-rooted principle of conduct, noble or base, may inhibit the particular motor ideas which would naturally be aroused. For instance, where expenditure of money is the sole means of relieving distress, a parsimonious individual may have a genuine emotion of pity without any impulse, for the thought of parting with money on such an occasion may never occur to him at all, or make a tardy appearance after the emotion has existed for some time. The application of all this is obvious. Though emotion and impulse are normally associated, yet even when they are present together they can be distinguished by the fact that they presuppose different conditions. Emotional impulses do not arise until all the conditions necessary to conscious striving are fulfilled—that is, until the conceptions of means and ends are presented to the mind. If those conditions are not realised the emotion may subsist without giving rise to any tendency to act. Accordingly, while the conceptions of means and end constitute a necessary condition of desire and impulse, they are not essential to emotion as such. They do not condition the appearance of the emotion, and are not invariably present after it is aroused.

The preceding discussion has also made clear the exact relation between emotion and active tendency.

The close connection which exists follows necessarily from the very nature of the former. The feeling in reference to the object not only tends to make dominant certain motor ideas when they are suggested, but it also tends to form an intellectual bias favourable to the appearance of special practical conceptions. Circumstances or the action of opposing forces, as we have seen, may prevent these tendencies from being realised, but the existence of the tendencies as such seems indisputable. From this point of view, new light can be thrown on the distinction between emotion and the impulses and desires which are connected with it; for this statement of the case makes clear that the emotion itself is an important factor in the sum of conditions on which the conative phenomena in question depend. Indeed the emotion is the prior condition which renders the others possible in the circumstances; for certain ends or motor ideas come to consciousness and become dominant because a special feeling in reference to some object exists at the time. The resulting desires or impulses, therefore, are ultimately conditioned by the emotion, and form its expression in conduct. An action, externally similar to the emotion-prompted activity, may imply impulses or desires otherwise conditioned, but the spirit in which the action is done is by no means the same. This inward difference subtly manifests itself in the total behaviour of the agent. An outsider is therefore able to infer the spirit or motive which lies behind the outward result, and this inference has a profound influence on his attitude in the matter, whether he is

directly concerned or is a mere spectator. We do not admire an individual who alleviates distress from interested motives, and the average man resents a favour which is not rendered in a spirit of fellow-feeling for him. The normal human being is too proud to accept a benefit which is not conferred out of pure kindness. That emotions express themselves in conduct, therefore, is a generally recognised fact; it is the assumption on which we proceed in ordinary life.

Other testimony can be adduced which proves the impossibility of identifying an emotion with the concomitant desires or impulses, and at the same time confirms the view that emotion is the condition of the active tendencies in question. In the first place, a multiplicity of desires and impulses appears in connection with any emotion which refers to a person or relatively permanent object. Affection, for instance, is associated with a long-continued series of actions which implies a great variety of practical tendencies. These tendencies include not only impulses but also desires, for any obstructed impulse may give place to a corresponding desire. In the second place, any emotion may, under different circumstances, coexist with widely different impulses, however transitory its object may be at any one time. Fear may be associated with the tendency to run away, the impulse to dissimulate, the desire to receive aid from others, the impulse to 'give up,' according to the nature of the occasion and of the individual. These facts can only be explained on the assumption that the different tendencies to action are the varying expressions

of one and the same feeling in reference to the object. In themselves, however, they have another significance which must also be emphasised. It is evidently impossible to identify an emotion with the particular desires and impulses associated with it at any given time, if these vary at other times while the emotion remains the same.

This argument may be met by the objection that the varying impulses or desires spring from a general desire which has a different expression in different situations. To make the discussion concrete we shall consider the view that desire for the happiness of the object is the source of the various activities and tendencies of affection. Obviously, if this desire is not always coexistent with the emotion, the contention falls to the ground. Now this desire implies a speculative attitude of mind not always compatible with emotion, likewise a power of abstraction and synthesis not found under any circumstances except at a high stage of intellectual development. This speculative product, therefore, could not possibly be present in every instance, and the assertion that it is necessarily involved in the emotion is a glaring illustration of the 'psychologist's fallacy.' The various manifestations of affection have, as a matter of fact, a general character, and can therefore be brought under a general formula, but we cannot infer that this abstraction as such necessarily exists in the actual emotional state. As the result of a reflection on activity, the formula presupposes the existence of the activities reflected upon. Particular actions come first, afterwards comes the

recognition of their general character. This is nowhere more conspicuously evident than in the case of emotion-prompted activity. A particular action suggested by the circumstances appeals to the agent because it harmonises with his feeling-attitude at the moment. He feels inclined or impelled to act in that way to satisfy the emotion in existence. Other actions make a similar appeal on different occasions when the same emotion is present. Reflecting on these, he discovers that they have a general character, make for one end. After reflection has taken place, the emotion is no longer the source of blind impulses. The agent knows the general end to which he is impelled, and may desire this end if no particular activities are suggested or practicable in the circumstances. The desire for a general end which thus arises cannot be regarded as the source of all the particular impulses and desires connected with the emotion, for it implies reflection on different tendencies and activities, and appears only when no definite action is possible. Accordingly, even if it were true that all the activities connected with affection have the happiness of the object as their end, these activities could not be derived from a desire for this general end. It must be pointed out, however, that the particular generalisation here in question is wrong in point of fact, or at all events inadequate. It would be much truer to say that when affection exists one individual acts on behalf of another—acts, so far as possible, as if the *alter* were the *ego*. This is the only formula which includes all the particular

facts, and few would be tempted to maintain that this wide and ultimate abstraction forms the basis of a desire which is always present and conditions all the activities associated with the emotion. This whole argument has evidently a general bearing, and can easily be adapted to similar cases. Consequently, the conception of a general desire necessarily present behind all the particular emotional tendencies may be dismissed without scruple. Such a desire may appear on occasion, but it presupposes reflection on the particular actions or tendencies to action, and these in turn presuppose the emotion.

In conclusion, attention may be directed to two considerations which support the position here adopted in reference to the relation between emotion and desire or impulse. In the first place, there is a certain analogy between the conative relationships of pleasure-pain and those of emotion. It is impossible to assert that pain is merely the impulse to apply a particular remedy or the desire to find relief in some way or other, and it is equally impossible to maintain that fear is just the impulse to run away or the desire to escape. The feeling-attitude, like the hedonic feeling, stands out against the tendencies to action essentially connected with it. In the second place, it may be pointed out that emotions differ in quality, while impulses or desires vary in intensity alone. The evidence of introspection and the testimony of language alike corroborate this assertion. It is true that desire and aversion are sometimes used as correlative terms; but aversion is not a qualitatively distinct species of desire. It is

mainly an emotional state which may include dislike or repugnance or both. So far as it is simply the desire to avoid or negate an object, it is not different from any other desire.

The main points of the general argument in regard to conation may now be briefly summarised. Emotion cannot be identified with desire or impulse because it is feeling-in-reference-to the object, and as such is introspectively distinct from the sense of striving or of want. This difference is accentuated by the fact that emotion refers to objects as existing, while the conscious conative tendencies are directed to an end to be realised. Consequently the latter always presuppose the conceptions of means or ends, whereas this is not the case with emotion. Indeed the feeling-attitude may exist for a time without corresponding impulses or desires, if the idea of something to be done is not suggested to the mind. When the desires and impulses in question do arise, they are conditioned by the emotion and constitute its expression in conduct. The same feeling in reference to the object necessarily expresses itself very differently in different circumstances, and is therefore easily distinguishable from the varying phases of its manifestation—*e.g.*, from the particular desires or impulses. Nor can emotion be identified with a general desire, for the latter presupposes reflection on particular activities which in turn presuppose the emotion. While our argument has explicit reference only to impulse and desire, its application to the other phenomena of conation is obvious. Wish, for instance, so far as it is a fact

of will, is distinguished from desire by secondary characteristics alone, while effort stands in the same relation to impulse. The conclusion to which all this points is that emotion is an aspect of consciousness fundamentally distinct from conation. This position does not imply that emotion and will are regarded as distinct 'things,' more or less externally related. On the contrary, we have emphasised the essential and necessary connection between emotion and tendency to act. Indeed, one of the main objects of this volume is to show that emotion is an important factor influencing human conduct. When emotion fails to issue in impulse, effort, or desire, special counteracting circumstances will be found at work. In short, the distinction here maintained is a distinction between *aspects* of consciousness. Emotion, like pleasure-pain, cannot be abstractly separated from conation nor abstractly identified with it.

The final result of this whole discussion regarding the nature of emotion is now evident. Emotion is not only introspectively distinct from cognition, pleasure-pain, and conation, but has, in addition to its unique character as a conscious fact, definite conditions of its own and other features absolutely peculiar to itself. It is, therefore, unanalysable and irreducible, and must be regarded as an ultimate and primary aspect of mind. This conclusion would appear more plausible if the term 'emotion' were less misleading. The word suggests too easily mere 'commotion,' and inevitably tends to give rise to the preconception that emotions have no place in the regular economy of the mind, and no appli-

cation to the ordinary affairs of life. This prejudice can be fully dispelled only by careful observation of the particular states which the term denotes. Accurate investigation will disclose the fact that emotions permeate the mental life in the same way as pleasures and pains. Slight anxieties, evanescent irritations, momentary dislikes and repugnances, for example, will be found unobtrusively present and effective on numberless occasions in ordinary life. Any statement in regard to the nature of emotion, therefore, should be tested by reference to the particular states which the term 'emotion' denotes.

CHAPTER II.

CURRENT THEORIES OF EMOTION.

THE argument of the previous chapter would be incomplete if it were not supplemented by a critical examination of the various methods by which modern psychologists have attempted to explain away the distinguishing characteristics of emotional states as such. This chapter accordingly will be devoted to a criticism of the typical theories at present in vogue. After discussing the identification of emotion with pleasure-pain, and the view that emotion is a mere result or accompaniment of tendencies to act, we shall take up the James-Lange theory in its various forms. We shall then deal with the contention that excitement is emotion, or, at all events, an essential element of it; and, finally, consider the hypothesis that emotion is explicable in terms of pleasure-pain and cognition. It is not possible to classify the various theories in a perfectly systematic way, on account of the complex interrelation which frequently exists, but under the heads we have given, the different hypotheses can be arranged conveniently enough for purposes of exposition, and with a rough approximation to accuracy.

Horwicz has worked out in great detail the theory that emotion is pleasure-pain as such, and may therefore be taken as the representative of this point of view. According to this writer, the pleasures and pains of sense, 'moral' feelings (hate, love, pride, gratitude, contempt, &c.), æsthetic, intellectual, and religious feelings, differ from one another only in degree of complexity. The higher feelings develop out of the sense pleasures and pains,[1] though the latter are themselves not altogether simple.[2] The primary feelings differ qualitatively from one another.[3] They combine to form new feelings, and each complex thus formed is a unity which possesses a character peculiar to itself.[4] The lower combinations in turn enter as constituents into higher complexes, and the latter again are synthetic unities with specific qualities of their own. If this account of the matter be correct, it is obvious that there must be an indefinite number of possible combinations. It might, however, be maintained (1) that pleasure-pain admits of quantitative distinctions alone, and consequently that there is no multiplicity of qualitatively different elements capable of forming a large number of new combinations, (2) that in point of fact there is no indefinite diversity of concrete 'feelings' such as our author postulates. Further, the testimony of language seems directly opposed to the view adopted by Horwicz. If ordinary pleasures and pains are complexes of distinct elements, and emotions are combinations of such complexes, it is not clear why

[1] Psychologische Analysen, ii. 2, p. 4.
[2] Ibid., pp. 7, 467.
[3] Ibid., pp. 4, 22.
[4] Ibid., pp. 368, 467.

the various emotional states should be referred to by different names, while the particular hedonic states are not thus favoured. On this theory, moreover, one would naturally expect a great number of complexes at the emotional level, while there is only a strictly limited number of distinctive terms to be distributed among the different combinations. The main difficulty of the position, however, has been brought to light in the author's treatment of love. He describes this state as a highly organised complex which is formed by the combination of all the feelings excited by the person who is the object of the emotion.[1] Despite the qualitative differences of its components, this complex constitutes a unitary feeling with a unique character, and has always the same hedonic colouring, although its elements may vary in this respect. The quality of the constituents makes no difference, nor their character as pleasures or pains.[2] Leaving out of consideration the first assertion, let us direct attention to the second. Horwicz maintains that so long as the feelings aroused by the object of the emotion are strong, it is indifferent whether they be pleasures or pains. Intense pains as well as strong pleasures lead to love,[3] and yet the emotion is a strong pleasure.[4] In short, love is a strong pleasure, and it may be produced by a combination of pleasures and pains, or may be mainly, if not wholly, a synthesis of pains. Horwicz says emphatically that the highest pleasure may be felt when the elements entering into the complex

[1] Psychologische Analysen, p. 459.
[2] Ibid., p. 460.
[3] Ibid., p. 448.
[4] Ibid., p. 454.

consist of pain pure and simple.[1] The contention becomes still more paradoxical when we learn that, though the intense pleasure which constitutes love may arise from pure pain, it is unthinkable that the strong pain which is called 'hate' should result from pure pleasure.[2] This statement shows that the author has felt the need of finding some distinction between love and hate; but even if the assertion could be accepted, it would in certain cases be absolutely impossible to say why the resultant should be love and not hate, for the former like the latter may be a synthesis of pains. This position, however, does not call for detailed criticism; it is the *reductio ad absurdum* of the pleasure-pain theory of emotion. Moreover, it cannot be regarded as a gratuitous eccentricity on the part of a particular writer, for, if emotion be taken to be the sum of the pleasure-pain elements which are present at the moment, this is the view which must be adopted since the elements in question vary with circumstances. It is also interesting to note that the identification of emotion with pleasure-pain becomes still more paradoxical if qualitative distinctions are attributed to pleasure-pain.

Mr H. R. Marshall may be taken as an exponent of the view that emotion is a mere concomitant of tendencies to action. This writer maintains that "each and every physical reaction must have its coincident in mentality," consequently that "all instinctive reactions must have their coincident in-

[1] Psychologische Analysen, p. 460.
[2] Ibid., p. 448.

stinct feelings."[1] These 'instinct feelings' apparently are independent of any general organic disturbance. They constitute the states we call emotions when they are the correlates of "relatively fixed combinations of instinctive activities."[2] The activities which are accompanied by emotion must obviously be differentiated from ordinary reflexes. Accordingly, Mr Marshall asserts that "they are only occasionally recurrent, and when recurring must in general be immediate in reaction, and hence forceful, if they are to be valuable to us."[3] Emotions are in their very nature dependent on "irregularity of recurrence and forcibleness of reaction."[4]

In criticism of this general position, attention may be directed first to Mr Marshall's statement of the circumstances under which it is possible for instinctive actions to be accompanied by strong instinct-feelings. It may well be that instinctive activities must be forcible and infrequent if they are to be prominent in consciousness, but this would simply go to prove that emotion is not a mere concomitant of instinctive activity. The results previously attained render this obvious, for it has been shown (1) that all emotions are not forcible; (2) that those which are intense are not necessarily accompanied by forcible activities; (3) that, when the less intense states are taken into account, emotions cannot be described as "only occasionally recurrent." More vital objections are suggested by the contention that the reactions which emotions accompany are relatively fixed and definite.

[1] Mind, 1895, p. 183.
[2] Instinct and Reason, p. 101.
[3] *Loc. cit.*
[4] Mind, 1895, pp. 184, 185.

Mr Marshall is forced to make this assertion since the fixity and definiteness of the particular emotions could not be explained on any other supposition. It is clear, however, that the reactions with which emotions are 'correlated' do not always possess the characteristics here attributed to them. Hate, for example, may be associated with entirely different actions at different times, and it would be impossible to point out any fixed reactions which this feeling always 'accompanies.' This implies that the actions need not be instinctive at all. Sometimes emotion-prompted actions are instinctive, particularly when anger and fear are present, but even in the case of these emotions it is absurd to say that this is always true. The reactions of fear vary, not only with the object, but also with the individual. The fear of criticism does not accompany the same activities as the fear of death; it may itself in different minds coexist with totally distinct tendencies to act. It may be true that we have more instincts than we wot of, but it can scarcely be affirmed that different human beings have a multiplicity of different instincts. Nor can it be maintained that emotion is, at all events, invariably the correlate of a general instinct—revenge, for example. Such an 'instinct,' manifesting itself in diverse forms, could not be composed of the fixed elements which Mr Marshall finds it necessary to postulate. A general disposition of this sort, moreover, is not an instinct in the strict meaning of the word. It is really a frame of mind in which certain courses of action appeal to us with unusual force, and is thus a

phenomenon which must be connected with emotion itself. This leads up to the fundamental objection that emotion is a very potent factor in conduct, and cannot be regarded as a mere concomitant of instinctive activity. Many so-called 'instincts' will be found to presuppose the influence of emotion. That the latter is really the condition and not the mere concomitant of the activities usually associated with it, is evident from the fact that the emotion may remain even when these activities are inhibited by counteracting forces. This is intelligible if emotion is a condition of these actions, but somewhat difficult to understand if it is their mere accompaniment.

If the theory of concomitance be true, it is necessary to assume that the feelings of fear, anger, hate, &c., in themselves as feelings, make no difference, and are mere results without issue. It is incredible, however, that our feelings in reference to an object should have no direct influence on our behaviour in regard to the object. Moreover, these feelings arise only on occasions which have significance for the individual, and it would be strange if they themselves should be without significance. Emotions are of course intimately connected with the agent's basal tendencies to action. This is simply an example, however, of the complex interrelation between mental phenomena which results from the organic nature of psychical life; it does not prove that emotions are mere concomitants which possess no influence over conduct in their own right. For instance, if a tendency is obstructed through the

instrumentality of another self-conscious agent, this may cause that agent to be regarded as a hostile personality, and in that case ill-feeling will arise. But the emotion is not a mere awareness of obstructed tendency or any bare concomitant of thwarted activity; it is a feeling in reference to the antagonistic person which turns our attention in a new direction, and, unless restrained, gives rise to a new mode of action.

We may now proceed to consider the general point of view with which the names of James and Lange are so intimately associated. Although this theory has been thoroughly discussed by different critics, it cannot be briefly dismissed in this general survey. It is vitally important to determine the exact relation between emotion and organic disturbance, and this can best be accomplished by a careful examination of the James-Lange hypothesis. At present it is impossible to criticise fully the different forms which the theory has assumed in different hands, and in any case it is not always easy to know precisely where its various adherents stand. We shall, therefore, confine ourselves to a more or less general discussion of the following contentions: (1) that emotion is organic sensation;[1] (2) that it is caused by the physical disturbance; (3)

[1] This phrase will be employed in place of the ambiguous expression 'feeling of bodily change.' There seems little doubt that some writers at least have identified emotion with organic sensation. Lehmann, Ribot, and others have interpreted James in this way, and Lange uses the word *Wahrnehmung*. In any case it is better to discuss this view by itself, and then determine whether the addition of pleasure-pain makes any difference.

that it is composed of organic sensation and pleasure-pain.

Our first task, therefore, is to determine whether emotion is merely organic sensation. No one cares to deny that, when a strong emotion is aroused, the awareness of various organic disturbances is often a prominent feature in the total consciousness of the moment. The only question can be whether this by itself is able to impart the peculiar emotional tone to the mental state. Those who answer this question in the affirmative reduce emotion to a form of cognition, and it is not obvious how organic sensation can be both cognition and emotion at the same time. The sensations involved in organic disturbance are of the same order as the ordinary sensations connected with physical existence, and seem as little emotional. The statement that A hates B is not equivalent to the assertion that A is aware of certain changes in his own body. A's cognition of his own physical condition has nothing in common with that feeling towards B which is the characteristic feature of his consciousness at the time, nor does it explain why A feels impelled to injure B regardless of all consequences to himself. Organic sensations are necessarily referred to the self, and are thus at variance with the objective reference of emotion and the objective nature of emotional activity. Indeed the whole question of the relation between emotion and conation is a peculiarly difficult one from the James-Lange point of view. The supporters of this theory frequently deny that there is any connection between emotion and action.

The former, they declare, is simply the reflex in consciousness of activities otherwise originated. This is doubtless the logical result of the whole position, and in itself, as we have seen, constitutes a vital objection to the hypothesis which renders it necessary. In addition to all this, it may be pointed out that emotion is a reaction, and therefore a single pulse of consciousness which cannot possibly be analysed into a multiplicity of organic sensations, occupying at different times the focus of consciousness and localised at different parts of the body.

These objections follow for the most part from the results already attained, but other criticisms might be made which do not imply any special theory. In the first place, emotion may arise when the amount of organic sensation is so small that it approaches the vanishing point. This is proved by the fact that a person may be almost entirely anæsthetic and yet manifest the usual emotions. Two cases of this description are on record: one cited by Professor James, the other by Dr Worcester.[1] When anæsthesia is accompanied by emotional apathy, it is evident from the instances brought forward that the general mental condition is so affected that objects either are not perceived at all, or, if perceived, have no significance. In these circumstances it is not wonderful that emotion disappears, for an individual who was not anæsthetic would be equally apathetic if he were

[1] Principles of Psychology, ii. pp. 455, 456; Monist, 1892-93, pp. 293, 294.

in a similar psychical condition.[1] It may be that, in the case of those who have not been anæsthetic from birth, 'reproduced organic sensations' play a part, but these cannot well be identified with the vivid living emotion. In normal life, too, emotion is often strong when the bodily sensations are comparatively weak and unimportant. The amount of physical disturbance which accompanies self-satisfaction, admiration, and contempt, is no index of the strength of the feelings themselves. Many emotions which move us most profoundly are attended by slight organic excitement, for the bodily changes usually vary in extent and intensity with the practical demands of the situation. The organic perturbation tends to become very strong when immediate action of great importance to the agent is necessary; it is not so prominent when there is no sudden demand for prompt activity. The difference between anger and hate in this respect is very instructive. It is interesting to observe that the advocates of the view under discussion lay most stress on emotions arising under circumstances which render immediate activity necessary.

On the other hand, a large number of organic sensations may be present without affecting the emotional life in any way. An athlete who engages in a contest without sufficient preparation, is usually in a position to cognise a complicated series of physical changes — trembling, respiratory disturbances, heart-throbbing, and visceral changes generally. Yet these seem emotionally non-significant,

[1] Cf. Mind, 1895, pp. 96, 97.

for they remain the same whether he is glad, sad, angry, envious, or simply too fatigued to care for anything. In such cases, we are told, the 'emotional diffusive wave' is not complete — that is, certain organic sensations are lacking. The emotional wave, however, does not seem to have a wide or well-defined range of diffusion in such states as admiration or contempt, and it is not clear that the awareness of so much organic change should be irrelevant while the addition of so much more should make all the difference.

Other objections come to light when we inquire into the causes of the bodily changes which are indiscriminately massed together under the ambiguous and misleading phrase 'emotional expression.' These physical processes may be divided into two classes: (1) those which originally served some purpose or had some connection with psychical conditions; (2) those which are due to the fact that energy has been aroused and must find an outlet. The second class comprises all those phenomena which can be explained by the principle which Darwin called "the direct action of the nervous system." Darwin, as Ward remarks,[1] does not seem to have fully appreciated the range of this principle; but even in his treatment of the subject one cannot fail to be impressed with its importance. It has been emphasised by Spencer, James, Wundt, Külpe, Sergi, Mosso, and others, and the tendency of late years has been to lay greater stress upon it. There can be little doubt that by extending the scope of

[1] Ency. Brit., xx. p. 72, note.

this principle, we can attain a more adequate conception of the nature and origin of 'emotional expression' in general. It seems much better, for instance, to regard the respiratory changes in anger and fear as the results of actually present stimuli, than to accept Spencer's view that they are organic reminiscences of ancestral combat or flight.

The principle has been formulated by Darwin as follows: "When the sensorium is strongly excited, nerve-force is generated in excess, and is transmitted in certain directions, depending on the connection of the nerve-cells and partly on habit."[1] Whenever emotion is accompanied by strong bodily agitation, therefore, it will be found that nerve-force is liberated in greater quantities than can be used up in action. The excess must find an outlet; hence it spreads through the body, causing a marked organic disturbance. In this way we can account for trembling, laughing, weeping and other glandular changes, respiratory disturbances, and visceral changes in general. The only elements in emotional 'expression,' in fact, which cannot be thus explained are some purposive movements, and a few others which have for various reasons become associated with particular emotions. These are all habitual actions, however, and add but little to the sum of organic sensation. It is evident, therefore, that the physical excitement which is mechanically determined is the all-important factor for those who maintain that emotion is organic sensation.[2] Indeed, it is the

[1] Expression of the Emotions, pp. 29, 66.

[2] Cf. James, 'Psychology,' ii. p. 465.

source of practically the whole mass of organic sensation into which emotion is analysed; and this has important consequences, as we shall proceed to show.

In the first place, this organic perturbation is due entirely to the circumstance that more energy has been liberated than can be usefully employed. One obvious result is that, if emotion is the feeling of this disturbance, it is a purely fortuitous and unmeaning phenomenon. Professor Dewey is aware of the danger here, and refuses to admit, with James, that a large number of organic changes may be simply "mechanical outpourings through the easiest drainage channels."[1] He finds it "more or less intolerable" that the bodily changes should be wholly accidental. Our emotions are "too relevant and important in our lives to be in the main the 'feel' of bodily attitudes that have themselves no meaning."[2] He accordingly asserts that the "easiest path" is determined by habits which, upon the whole, were evolved as useful. He means by this, apparently, that emotional 'expression' is constituted by actions which were once useful, and by discharges which are "disturbances, defects, and alienations of adjusted movements."[3] The greater part of the bodily changes will certainly come under the latter head, and emotion can scarcely be any more relevant or important if it is mainly the 'feel' of organic processes which represent dis-

[1] Psychology, ii. p. 482.
[2] Psychological Review, 1894, p. 563.
[3] Ibid., pp. 561, 569.

turbances, defects, and alienations of teleological adjustments. Those who identify emotion with organic sensation, therefore, must regard it as a fortuitous and purposeless ebullition which has no legitimate place in our psychical nature. They can look forward to the time when things will be so arranged that no more energy is liberated than is necessary for action. In that happy era, men will no longer love their friends or hate their enemies, and will attach but a dim historical significance to such words as 'fear,' 'admiration,' and 'contempt.' Or, at all events, if nervous energy is ever meted out on strictly economic principles, emotions must become so pale and cold that they scarcely deserve the name.

Another result may be deduced from the fact that nearly all the physical changes which accompany emotion are caused by the spread of excess energy through the body. Since the process is under mechanical law, a given amount of energy spreading through a given organism will produce certain effects, irrespective of the nature of the situation which is instrumental in liberating this force. There is simply so much energy which is under a mechanical necessity to find an outlet. That the special character of the occasion has no influence in determining the actual channels of discharge, becomes still more obvious when we remember that the whole process is necessary just because there is an excess of energy over and above what is required for action appropriate to the special circumstances. The bodily changes in question de-

pend entirely upon the amount of stimulus and the constitution or momentary condition of the particular organism. As the organism is continually changing its condition, and as the situation in which an emotion arises does not always have the same stimulating power, the same emotion may have different expressions at different times, and different emotions may have fundamentally the same expression. No one denies the first part of this contention,[1] and the second can be substantiated. Trembling, changes in the blood-supply, respiratory disturbances, palpitation of the heart, glandular affections, may accompany different emotions which are equally violent.[2] A few habitual actions alone are peculiar to particular emotions, and these would form but a slight ground of distinction between one emotion and another. We may conclude, therefore, that emotion cannot be the sum of the organic sensations aroused by the bodily disturbance, for this view does not seem to harmonise with introspective results, or with what we know about emotion and the origin of the organic excitement.

In discussing this hypothesis, we have incidentally obtained results which may be used against the second contention, that the physical disturbance is the cause of the emotion. While the general physical condition of the individual indirectly affects his emotional life, the physical changes accom-

[1] Cf. Lange, 'Ueber Gemüthsbewegungen,' pp. 74, 75.

[2] Lange finds the greatest difficulty in distinguishing between the 'expression' of anger and that of joy ('Gemüthsbewegungen' pp. 28 ff.) He finally asserts a distinction which Wundt rightly maintains does not exist ('Phil. Stud.,' vi. p. 351).

panying emotion cannot act as causes, since they may be practically identical in the case of different emotions, and widely different in different instances of the same emotion. Even if they remained relatively constant in each case, a further objection could be made. Everything depends on the way in which the situation is viewed. Each emotion implies that the circumstances are felt to have a particular significance, and is fully explained thereby. The sense of danger, for example, is a good and sufficient reason for being afraid; it is not possible to assume anything else or anything more, for this alone is able to render the origin of the emotion intelligible.

In the light of these results, the theory that emotion is organic sensation plus pleasure-pain[1] can be briefly dismissed. The arguments which prove that organic sensation is not emotion, show at the same time that it cannot be a constituent. That the addition of pleasure-pain would in any case make no difference is evident from previous results. It may be well, however, to make this point explicit. In the first place, the hedonic character of the total state may vary while the emotion remains the same. Hate may be accompanied by more pain than pleasure, or may be predominantly pleasurable, but the tendency to action is the same in each case, and this proves the identity of the emotion. In the second place, it is not necessary that there should be any pleasure-pain at all. The only thing that is indispensable is that the situation should be felt to have a definite significance, and when an emotion

[1] Cf. Baldwin, 'Psych. Rev.,' 1894, pp. 610 ff.

takes the form of a reflex response to presentation, it may arise before the hedonic effect has time to make its appearance in consciousness. It is true that at times pleasure-pain is the fact which leads us to attribute a specific significance to the circumstances, while at other times it is the aspect of the situation which is regarded as significant. On these occasions, however, it is involved in, or pertinent to, the conditions of the emotion, and is not a constituent. Under those circumstances alone is it ever in any sense relevant to the emotion. On the other hand, it is undeniable that the aspect of the situation which affects us most strongly in the way of pleasure-pain, may be totally irrelevant so far as the emotional reaction is concerned. A person may feel defeat most keenly, and yet admire the opponent who inflicted it, instead of harbouring any ill-feeling. Pleasure-pain, therefore, like organic sensation, cannot be a constituent of emotion. It is only occasionally relevant, and then it appears as a factor involved in the conditions by which the feeling-attitude is determined. Accordingly, emotion is not reducible to pleasure-pain and organic sensation.

It is desirable, however, to mention the special form which Külpe has given to the theory. This psychologist defines emotion as a "fusion of feelings and organic sensations."[1] "Fusion occurs when the constituent qualities are thrust more or less into the background by the total impression which results from the connection."[2] This implies that 'fusion'

[1] Psychologie, pp. 331-333; Titchener's trans., pp. 320-322.
[2] Ibid., pp. 21, 22; Trans., p. 21.

must not be taken as a kind of psycho-chemical process; and Külpe further insists that it must always be possible, by direct or indirect means, to analyse the total impression into its component elements.[1] There is undoubtedly a process of the kind here described, but emotion cannot be a 'fusion' of the elements indicated, since these, as we have seen, cannot figure as constituents in any sense. Nor does it seem possible to account for emotion as a fusion or blending of any elements whatever. We cannot directly analyse feeling-attitude into anything else, and all the indirect evidence corroborates the introspective result. Emotion has special conditions and a characteristic effect on conduct; it is a reaction, and consequently a unity. Hence it cannot be a blending of non-emotional elements.

The theory that emotion is mere disturbance or excitement now claims our attention. The Herbartians seem to adopt this view explicitly,[2] but writers of all shades of opinion tend to favour the same position. Thus Professor James tells us that he "took for granted, without discussion, that the word 'emotion' meant the rank feeling of excitement, and that the special emotions were names of special feelings of excitement and not of mild feelings which might remain when the excitement was removed."[3] It is important, therefore, to determine whether excitement is the essential attribute of emo-

[1] Psychologie, p. 285; Trans., p. 277.

[2] Waitz, 'Psychologie,' pp. 478, 479; Nahlowsky, 'Das Gefühlsleben,' pp. 244 ff.; Volkmann, 'Psychologie,' ii. p. 389.

[3] Psych. Rev., 1894, p. 525.

tion. This question is not a mere verbal one, for the term 'emotion' has already been applied to certain mental states, and it is a question of fact to decide whether these consist essentially of commotion or excitement.

Excitement appears whenever the mental equipoise is seriously disturbed. In such circumstances voluntary attention becomes difficult or impossible, the ideational train is affected, and ill-directed or random movements take the place of co-ordinated activities. The ordered whole no longer exists and the parts assert their independence. In a sense there is excitement when the stimulus is sufficient to heighten general activity but not strong enough to destroy co-ordination. No one, however, would identify emotion with excitement of this sort, and we shall, therefore, adopt the narrower definition of the term. Any excessive stimulus, especially if sudden, tends to destroy mental equilibrium, and thus, in greater or less degree, to reduce the psychical system to its component parts. Mental excitement is therefore conditioned in much the same way as the organic perturbation which constitutes so large a part of emotional 'expression.' It must be noted, however, that although the stimulating power of the situation affects mind and body at the same time, the amount of disturbance is not always the same in both cases. The physical excitement is practically uncontrollable, while the psychical disturbance can to a certain extent be repressed. Hence the former may be strong while the latter is weak.

It is intelligible, therefore, that excitement should accompany great fear, sudden anger, and intense joy. Obviously, however, it is not an essential feature or necessary concomitant of emotion as such. Fear may act simply as a healthy stimulus to the normal activities appropriate to the occasion. Hate may be very intense while the general mental condition is free from excitement. This species of hate is the most effective in conduct, for the absence of commotion renders possible coherence of thought and activity. A person who is apparently 'cold-blooded,' may thus be powerfully influenced by emotion. From the nature of the case, moreover, certain emotions are habitually dissociated from all excitement. Contempt, for instance, implies that the object of the feeling may be entirely disregarded; hence, when it is free from all admixture with anger, it may be strong and yet coexist with absolute mental serenity. Further, if excitement reaches a certain pitch, it tends to weaken emotion, and, when it gets beyond all bounds, emotion tends to disappear. Much *commotion* means little or no emotion. Rage may thus pass into sheer psychical turmoil, and in extreme terror there would be much more real fear if coherent intellectual activity were possible. Finally, it is to be observed that emotion is not the only state accompanied by excitement. Pure pleasure-pain also, when excessive, has this concomitant.

Excitement is therefore a merely fortuitous and occasional accompaniment of the states we call emotions. It depends mainly on the relation be-

tween strength of stimulus and the varying stimulus-capacity of the individual. If it be regarded as an essential characteristic, and used as a criterion, the most arbitrary distinctions must be made. We must separate the stronger and weaker forms of the same emotion, and oppose strong feelings accompanied by commotion to the same feelings equally strong but calm and concentrated. We must assert that anger, fear, and hate are only occasionally emotions, though they have at all times the same conditions and effects, and manifest the same character as conscious facts.

The belief that excitement is an essential attribute of emotion is the source of many misconceptions. The James-Lange theory loses much of its plausibility when it is recognised that many mild feelings have the essential characteristics of emotion, and that an emotion may be strong without involving violent agitation. The prejudice that all emotions are strong and that strength and violence are synonymous, also accounts for the prevalent tendency to overlook the function of emotion, for excitement of course is simply disturbance of co-ordinated activity. It is evident, too, that it is scarcely possible to detect the true emotional *quale* when attention is directed exclusively to states of excitement. The feeling-attitude is there concealed under a mass of concomitants, and, in any case, the commotion renders introspection almost impossible.

The origin of the common opinion that emotion is explicable in terms of pleasure-pain and cognition can be easily understood. Since emotion is a sub-

jective state it is naturally confused with pleasure-pain, especially if the ambiguous term 'feeling' is used without any qualification; and, when it is observed that the former has an objective reference which the latter lacks, the cognitive element is added to account for this fact. This position must imply either that the mere co-presence of the elements is all that is necessary, or that some process of blending or fusion comes into play. But the mere coexistence of pleasure-pain and cognition cannot constitute emotion, for hedonic effect has no outward reference at all, and cognition has objective reference in a totally different sense from emotion. And if some process of blending or fusion be invoked, the case is not altered. Since chemical fusion cannot be implied, it must be possible to distinguish the constituents in the total impression. This cannot be done, and all that we know about the conditions and effects of the alleged result proves that it cannot be a complex of any description. It has also been shown that pleasure-pain cannot be a constituent, and that the cognitive element cannot explain objective reference if it is a factor within the total result. If the object thus disappears in the total impression, the latter cannot be a feeling for the object. Reference to an object is essential, and for that reason the cognition of the object must not blend. Hence, even if pleasure-pain could act as a constituent, the presentative element, so far as it is idea or perception of object, could not be the other factor.

On this theory, the differences between the various

emotions are no less inexplicable than the characteristic features of emotion as such. Professor Sully maintains that "each of the well-marked species of emotion has its characteristic group of [physical] reactions. . . . Thus fear is differentiated from other emotive states in general, as well as from other varieties of disagreeable feeling, by its peculiar organic resonance, including such familiar effects as that disturbance of the heart's action known as palpitation, tremor of muscles, pallor, certain alterations in the secretions."[1] This implies that emotions derive their specific character from the organic sensations which accompany them. We have seen, however, that the bodily changes mentioned by Sully are not peculiar to fear, and that no emotion is accompanied by a characteristic organic resonance. The physical changes which are definitely associated with particular emotions are habitual actions which give rise to little organic sensation. Moreover, no appreciable organic perturbation is observable in the case of the weaker emotional states. It is evident, therefore, that the facts cannot be explained in this way.

Lehmann seeks another solution of the difficulty. He asserts that bodily pain, fear, anger, hate, &c., are all painful feelings, and that the differences between them arise solely from the fact that the pain is in each case bound up with different ideas. Similarly, the distinctions which exist between the pleasurable feelings—hope, æsthetic enjoyment, joy, love, &c.—are due to the differences in the ideas with which

[1] Human Mind, ii. p. 67.

the hedonic effect is connected.[1] The obvious objection here is that the same emotion may arise under very different circumstances, and may thus be associated with very different ideas. Lehmann notices this difficulty, but bids us observe (1) that the circumstances always have an essentially similar character, (2) that the feeling in each case has a peculiar stamp in consequence of the differences which coexist with that similarity.[2] The second statement will not bear examination. If an individual be regarded as a hostile personality, his individual characteristics and peculiarities do not affect the quality of the ill-feeling which is aroused, though they may affect its intensity. And, as a variety of emotions is usually possible in a given situation, on account of the variety of aspects which it presents, a mass of detail must be totally irrelevant to any particular emotion which actually appears. On the other hand, the first statement is as undeniably true as the second is demonstrably false. The situations in which we are afraid have all an 'essentially similar character'; they may all be described as 'dangerous.' It is to be observed, however, that as soon as this aspect is recognised, the emotion appears without any more ado unless counteracted by forces external to it. This recognition, therefore, is all that is necessary, and since by itself it is not the emotion, it must be the determining condition.

[1] Die Haupt. d. Gef., pp. 17, 18. Later on, the author makes statements inconsistent with this, but, as he reverts to the view of Sully already discussed, the complication may be disregarded.

[2] Ibid., p. 19.

Thus a cognitive element does give character to the special emotions, but it evidently acts as a condition, not as a constituent. Accordingly, whether we consider the specific qualities of the different emotions or the emotional *quale* as such, we must come to the conclusion that emotion is not a combination of pleasure-pain and cognition.

In addition to the foregoing criticism it seems necessary to discuss in some detail the special form of this theory which is adopted by Sully and others. Sully defines emotion as "a mass or aggregate of sensuous and representative material having a strongly marked and predominant concomitant of feeling or affective tone."[1] This seems to be in the main the position of Bain and Spencer, and probably represents a common opinion. We have already pointed out the difficulties involved in the conception of emotion as a combination of pleasure-pain and cognition, and we shall confine ourselves here to a criticism of the contention that emotion is a 'mass.'

In the first place, no cognitive mass is necessary. The simple conception 'danger' is all that is indispensable for the appearance of fear, and the other emotions are dependent on other conceptions equally non-massive. Moreover, emotion in proportion to its strength fixes attention on one object and on one class of motor ideas. The individual who is thoroughly afraid can think only of the danger and the means of escape, while in intense fear the idea of the terrible object may dominate

[1] Human Mind, ii. p. 57.

consciousness to the exclusion of everything else. Hate and affection, when they are living realities and not mere potentialities, contract the circle of consciousness in a similar way. When a person is brooding over an injury, his mind may be filled with a multitude of ideas, but in these circumstances anger is weak or merely potential, and when it becomes real and strong the crowd of ideas is summarily dispersed. Emotion, in short, is not in its origin dependent on a mass of ideas and sensations, and while it exists it is hostile to this mass in proportion to its intensity.

In the second place, a hedonic mass is not always present. No feelings of pleasure or pain are necessarily involved in the conditions of the emotion, and sometimes as a matter of fact emotion succeeds cognition before the hedonic potentialities of the situation can be realised. Sometimes, too, from the nature of the case the pleasure-pain is so weak that its presence is rather inferred than felt. One may have strong contempt for an inefficient person merely because he is inefficient. Probably there is a species of æsthetic pain in these circumstances, but it is not a conscious factor of any importance, especially if the emotion is strong. Indeed, under any conditions, a strong emotion tends to weaken pleasure-pain by directing attention to an object and thus forcing the mere subjectivity of the self into the background. Even if all the pleasures and pains which might possibly be aroused did make themselves felt, they would conflict, and thus to some extent neutralise one another. The causes of

hate are *per se* painful, but the sthenic effect of the emotion and the thought of vengeance are pleasurable. Emotion cannot be compared in this respect to a dominant mood which determines a dominant feeling-tone. In such cases, only those ideas that involve a particular hedonic character tend to arise, and sensations and perceptions which are accompanied by the opposite hedonic effect are thrust out of consciousness by force of attention, or are viewed in such a way that the feeling-tone is minimised or altered. When we are melancholy our minds are filled with dismal thoughts, and the joys and pleasures of the world seem 'hollow' and 'unreal.' On the other hand, in a joyous mood, we see the best side of everything and slur over the rest. It cannot be said that this happens in the case of emotion. That an individual is smarting under a series of injuries does not diminish the pleasure he experiences in planning schemes of revenge, or render him less ready to entertain such thoughts. For this reason the hedonic character of emotion varies with circumstances; the dominant feeling-tone, which is a feature of every 'mood,' is conspicuous by its absence.

Difficulties would still present themselves, however, even if a mass of hedonic and cognitive material did in all instances exist. Each emotion has a definite quality, and this is inexplicable on the assumption that it is a heterogeneous mass of pleasures, pains, ideas, sensations, percepts. Moreover, the mass is not a fixed quantity with definite constituents in each case. The ideas and percep-

tions differ with circumstances, and the organic sensations and feelings of pleasure-pain are equally variable. The advocates of the 'mass' theory ought to explain how it comes about that we apply the term 'hate' to a large quantity of pain, a small amount of pleasure, and one set of ideas and sensations, while we also use the word to designate a large amount of pleasure, a small amount of pain, and another set of ideas and sensations. If they assert that amid the diversity there is a unity, they are unquestionably right, but they will find that on their hypothesis the unity in no sense forms a mass. If it be maintained that the emotion differs with the diversity of the alleged constituents, it must be urged that if this were true the diversity would swamp the unity, and there would be very little justification for the application of a common name in the different cases.

The view under discussion derives some plausibility from the fact that emotions, when strong, are felt to possess a characteristic which might be termed 'massiveness.' They are never local, isolated, or partial activities; they are the reactions of the individual as such, ways in which he is disposed towards something. Accordingly, when they are prominent in consciousness, they are felt as diffused. This massiveness, however, is not the result of addition; it follows from the fact that emotions are 'total' states, reactions of the individual as a whole.

Professor Rehmke's theory is an interesting variation of the general standpoint represented by Leh-

mann and Sully. According to this author, while 'feeling' in the narrow sense indicates mere abstract pleasantness or unpleasantness, in a wider sense the term applies to such states as fear, anger, love, and hate, which are momentary unities of three elements, namely, pleasure-pain, a determining cognitive factor, and certain organic sensations dependent on the intellectual element. Every complex feeling thus constituted has certain bodily consequences. These are called its 'expression,' and must be sharply distinguished from the physical element, which is necessarily connected with the cognitive condition, and is a constituent of the feeling itself. The 'expression' is not the cause of the emotion, therefore, and it is equally erroneous to maintain that all the physical changes are the effects of the emotion. The true position is one which mediates between these two extremes.[1] It is not necessary to discuss this view in detail, however, for the general objections to which it is liable have already been indicated.

Wundt's theory is hard to classify, but it may for convenience be treated here. This psychologist maintains that emotion is a complex state consisting of a primary feeling of pleasure or pain, which causes an inhibition or stimulation of ideational activity, and is in turn modified by the feelings thereby originated. Emotion is thus partly the effect of the primary feeling on ideational activity, and partly the effect of this change on the original feeling.[2] It is not merely a strong pleasure or pain, nor is it

[1] Zur Lehre vom Gemüth, pp. 56 ff.

[2] Phil. Stud., vi. p. 360; Grundzüge der phys. Psy., 1887, ii. p. 405.

a feeling or succession of feelings caused by the ideational change; it is a complex state composed of the hedonic and ideational elements.[1] Towards the close of his exposition, however, Wundt makes an elaborate attempt to prove that certain impulses are the earliest forms of emotion.[2] This is rather significant, for if his original description were correct there would be little temptation to identify emotion with impulse.

This hypothesis is really a statement of the circumstances which occasionally precede the appearance of emotion. Sometimes there is a sudden shock which inhibits all ideational activity; sometimes anger, hate, &c., do not arise until we have brooded over what has occurred. It cannot be maintained, however, that emotion is always ushered in by a shock, particularly if it be remembered that all emotions are not violent. It has also been shown that no crowd of ideas is necessary. These alleged constituents are therefore not even invariable antecedents. The 'primary feeling' can equally be dispensed with; it may succeed the emotion, or may be so weak that its presence is barely discernible. The secondary feelings cannot always be relied upon to strengthen the initial feeling of pleasure-pain, for they may conflict with it and thus have a minimising or neutralising effect. Finally, it is to be noted that a complex of elements loosely conjoined cannot possess the unitary character which is a feature of every emotion.

[1] Menschen- und Thierseele (1892), p. 405; Eng. trans., p. 372.
[2] Ibid., pp. 421, 422; Trans., pp. 386, 387.

A review of the theories which have just been discussed, discloses the fact that emotion is not usually identified with pure cognition, pleasure-pain, or conation. Psychologists, almost without exception, admit that the phenomenon in question differs in some respects from any of the other aspects of mind in isolation from the rest. The numerous hypotheses which have been employed to explain away this difference can be reduced to a few simple elements. That the addition of cognition to pleasure-pain accounts for the objective reference of emotion; that multiplicity of elements constitutes felt diffusedness; that emotion is a mere reflex in consciousness of activities otherwise originated, or a mere result of over-stimulation—these are the contentions or tacit assumptions which are continually appearing, either separately or in varying combinations. Since there seems to be good reason for rejecting all these positions as equally untenable, it can be maintained that the difference between emotion and the other aspects of mind has not been successfully explained away. The general result of this critical investigation, therefore, harmonises with the conclusion which was reached in the previous chapter.

CHAPTER III.

THE PRIMARY EMOTIONS, AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON CONDUCT.

FROM the point of view now attained emotion must be regarded as an ultimate aspect of mind with a distinctive influence on conduct. At this stage, therefore, it is important to determine definitely the manner in which emotion functions as a principle of activity. In order to do this, it is necessary to ascertain the qualitatively distinct forms which feeling-attitude assumes, for, though all emotional impulses and tendencies have the same general character, each primary emotion has a specifically distinct manifestation in conduct. Our precise object will therefore be an attempt to discover these primary forms and to determine their influence on action. The two inquiries, however, throw light on each other and cannot well be separated.

From this statement of the problem it is evident that the term 'primary' has here a qualitative, and not a temporal significance. By 'primary emotions' we mean those which are qualitatively dis-

tinct, not those which are first in point of time. We are dealing with the psychological individual as now constituted, and in any case temporal priority seems irrelevant to the present subject of inquiry. The fact that anger is prior to admiration does not decide whether the two emotions are qualitatively the same or different. The latter question must be settled mainly by introspection. Temporal priority would have significance only if it could be asserted that the emotions which are first in the field necessarily constitute the material out of which the others are compounded. There is, however, not a particle of evidence in favour of this view. On the other hand, good ground for rejecting it can be found if we investigate the determining conditions of those emotions which are slow to appear in the individual or in the race. Admiration, for instance, is conditioned by the sense of worth, and therefore presupposes self-consciousness and a high degree of intellectual development. It is not present at the dawn of mental life simply because the conditions on which it depends do not exist. It is present later on whenever worth is recognised, whether or not more primitive emotions are simultaneously aroused. Consequently it cannot be a mere fusion of other emotions. What holds in this case is valid in others, and it is thus clear that temporal priority has no bearing on qualitative difference. In seeking to ascertain the primary emotions, therefore, we must rely mainly on direct observation, though subsidiary aid is not altogether lacking.

For the purposes of exposition, the phenomena

under investigation will be arranged under the following heads: (1) joy and grief; (2) anger and fear; (3) kindly feeling and its opposite; (4) the self-feelings; (5) admiration and scorn, respect and contempt; (6) feelings of repugnance; (7) intellectual, æsthetic, ethical, and religious feelings. The results of the inquiry must at present be somewhat tentative. Emotions blend with one another and are associated more or less intimately with intellectual and hedonic accompaniments. Consequently analysis, though always possible, is not always easy. The ambiguity of language is a further source of difficulty. This is natural in the circumstances, for, while language is usually accurate in respect to broad general facts, it is necessarily misleading in matters of detail which involve subtle distinctions.

The first states to be examined, therefore, are joy and grief. The prominent element in joy is the agreeable sense of advantageous transition. In addition to this, however, there is another factor to which the term 'satisfaction' may be applied. As we shall show later on, satisfaction is a reaction, a feeling in reference to an object. Usually it occupies a subordinate place, but it gains in relative importance when joy is calm and profound. Grief is more distinctively emotional than joy, for its chief feature is the feeling-attitude which may be called 'dissatisfaction.'[1] More specifically, it is unavailing dissatisfaction with a state of affairs which cannot

[1] Although 'dissatisfaction' has associations which tend to narrow its meaning, it is the best term available.

be remedied. Grief is thus distinguished from pure dissatisfaction, not merely by the intensity of its hedonic accompaniment, but also by the feeling of powerlessness which it necessarily involves. Since it is primarily a reaction, it is distinct from sheer misery. The latter is the hedonic state which appears when the unpleasantness attending disadvantageous transition inhibits emotional reaction. Grief must also be differentiated from sorrow and sadness. In sorrow there is little or no dissatisfaction, and the salient feature is regret — *i.e.*, retrospective wish referring to some painful event in the past. Sadness is the diffused but subdued unpleasantness which results when the individual is predisposed to see the dark side of everything. Melancholy is simply sadness in a more permanent form. It may be accompanied by emotion, but is not itself a peculiar feeling-attitude.

Since satisfaction and its opposite are present in joy and grief respectively, it is necessary to discuss them at this stage. Dissatisfaction seems to be unquestionably emotional. It cannot be identified with pain as such for several reasons. It has always an outward reference, since it cannot exist without an object to which it is directed. It is never caused by the mere presence of the discordant, but invariably depends on an intellectual condition—namely, the recognition of the fact that some object is not what we should like it to be. This explains why it does not always appear when we are pained, and may arise when we are agreeably

affected; for the immediate influence of an object and its ultimate effects may widely diverge, and that which is conditioned by cognition is not necessarily determined by the immediately present. Even when we are dissatisfied with an object because it is unpleasant, we can detect the presence of a feeling-attitude towards the object in addition to the mere hedonic effect. This is substantiated by the fact that dissatisfaction does not arouse action for the removal of itself, but gives rise to activities affecting an object. In short, dissatisfaction can be proved to be a reaction, and is therefore distinct from pain. On the other hand, it cannot be analysed into mere intellectual or practical attitude, and we are forced to conclude that it is a feeling-attitude. In regard to satisfaction the case may seem to be less clear. Nevertheless, all that has been said in reference to dissatisfaction applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to its opposite; and though the latter can have only a negative effect on conduct, still a negative influence implies a positive function, and one that may be very important. Hence satisfaction also must be placed among the emotions.

It is not difficult to ascertain the modes of behaviour which are characteristic of dissatisfaction and its counterpart. The one prompts to action that will produce some desirable change in the discordant; the other inhibits all activity in reference to its object. It is not so easy to define the conditions of the two emotions with accuracy and brevity. We may say, however, that the feelings in question are evoked by anything which is re-

garded as discordant or the reverse if it is viewed simply as bare fact and not as cause. The actual effects or causal possibilities of the object doubtless affect our judgment in reference to the existential character of the fact, but, if the causal aspect be dominant, other emotions will appear in place of satisfaction or dissatisfaction. For instance, an object which is cognised simply as discordant causes dissatisfaction, but it will arouse anger or fear if attention be directed to the events which may issue from it. Accordingly, satisfaction and dissatisfaction refer most frequently to inanimate things or to a state of affairs, for in these cases the connection between actuality and causal activity is felt to be external or remote.

Anger is evidently a feeling in reference to an object. It is not a necessary result of pain, for it is possible to be pained without being angry. Indeed pain by itself can never be the condition of the emotion. When it is asserted that the individual is angry because he is pained, the true statement of the case is that he is angry because he objects to being pained. If for any reason he acquiesces in the unpleasant result, no anger follows. Similarly, any thwarting of activity or desire is apt to occasion irascibility, since every agent is prone to regard interference with his activities as objectionable. If, however, the obstruction is viewed as a mere fact which has a definite place in the order of things, anger is not excited. In short, the primary condition of this emotion is the actual or threatened occurrence of something which is felt as objectionable.

Rebellion against what has happened or may happen is the characteristic of anger, and this presupposes that the event appears as objectionable. The statement that anger is dependent on the sense of injury is a convenient form of expression, which is strictly accurate, however, only if the term 'injury' be taken in an unusually wide sense. It is true that the condition which anger involves is not always explicitly present, for the emotion may become a habitual response to certain stimuli. It must be remembered, however, that the condition is presupposed in the formation of the habit. What the individual finds 'objectionable' depends upon the range of his interests. It is absolutely incorrect to say that painful events alone come under this category. Anything which is contrary to the agent's basal tendencies or regulative ideals is opposed to what he is interested in, and, if viewed in that light, furnishes occasion for anger. A person may be irritated by an occurrence, solely because it is at variance with his ideals. Of course, the conflict thus involved has hedonic potentialities, but it would be ridiculous to assert that the conflict is objectionable only on account of its actual or possible unpleasantness. As a matter of fact, the emotion may be out of all proportion to the hedonic effect, for an event which is by no means excessively painful may yet be excessively irritating.

Anger must be sharply distinguished from ill-feeling in all its forms. As conscious states the emotions are absolutely distinct, and there is a corresponding divergence in their conditions and

in the character of the objects to which they refer. Anger depends solely on the cognition of the fact that something objectionable has occurred or may occur, while ill-feeling presupposes that some individual is regarded as the cause of objectionable effects. In the one case, attention need not pass beyond the event; in the other, it must be directed to the cause. Hence ill-feeling refers to an agent, while the object of anger is something that happens. The person is the object of hate; what he has done is the object of anger. When anger is apparently directed to the stupidity, shallowness, or any other quality of the individual, it will be found that its object is really the occurrence of results which are directly or indirectly involved in the individual's actual or possible behaviour. One who is easily roused to anger is not necessarily prone to ill-feeling or hate. Indeed a 'good heart' and a choleric disposition are frequently associated. Naturally enough the feeling in reference to the event is often accompanied by the feeling towards the agent, and this frequent blending of anger and ill-feeling tends to obscure their qualitative difference. There are certain occasions, however, when anger is separated from this concomitant, and in these cases its true nature comes to light. When, for instance, we are angry with our own mistakes we are simply angry at what has happened. Again, when the cause of injury is an individual for whom we have a strong friendship, ill-feeling will probably be inhibited. We may be angry at the behaviour of a friend without any trace of malevolent feeling towards him. In such

circumstances we have merely a feeling in reference to what has occurred.

The distinction between the conditions and objects of the two emotions enables us to understand other differences which exist between them. Anger is usually less enduring than ill-feeling, for an event is transitory in its very nature, while an agent is relatively permanent. Anger, too, is frequently, though not necessarily, accompanied by excitement, since an event comes into direct relation with us and must if possible be dealt with at once. It is more rarely suppressed than ill-feeling, for an occurrence as such is a single thing which stands out alone, while an agent is the sum of a past and the promise of a future. The event thus frequently causes immediate anger on occasions when ill-feeling is checked by the remembrance of our past relations with the agent. Moreover, the occurrence may be one that ought not to be ignored, while, at the same time, the agent's general nature may nevertheless be such that his other actions outweigh or neutralise the particular instance in question. Accordingly, even where it is not possible to overlook the single event, it may be both possible and right to ignore its connection with the agent, so far as our feeling-attitude towards him is concerned.

It is now possible to ascertain the influence of anger on conduct. The emotion being a feeling in reference to an event which is felt as objectionable, it is natural to suppose that it prompts to action which prevents the occurrence of the event or guards against

its recurrence. This is what we find if we do not confound anger with ill-feeling. It is obviously inaccurate to maintain that retaliation is the mode of behaviour by which anger always manifests itself, for we may be angry with what we ourselves have done, and, when others are the offenders, less drastic measures may be found more suitable. Anger is satisfied when the individual has taken steps to ward off, prevent the recurrence of, or nullify any event which he views as objectionable. Since it is not ill-feeling towards the agent, it does not imply delight in suffering as such.

So far we have been dealing with anger *per se*, and we may now examine several more or less complex states in which this emotion is closely associated with various concomitants. Rage is anger accompanied by excitement. Wrath is anger transfused with the sense of power. Irritation arises when the expression of the emotion is restrained, either by something purely external or by some internal check. It is differentiated from anger voluntarily repressed in that it always involves a sense of restraint. Irritation passes into exasperation when the emotion becomes so strong that the inhibition is overcome. Indignation is not simply 'altruistic' anger, since anger is the same whether it be felt on our own account or on behalf of others. As the name itself indicates, indignation is called forth by occurrences which presuppose unworthiness on the part of some agent. Accordingly, it contains anger in reference to the event and scorn of the unworthiness therein evinced, the former being the predomi-

nant element. It is a blending of anger and scorn.[1] This explains why it is almost invariably 'altruistic,' for scorn rarely applies to the self. Resentment is a more or less passive state in which anger is checked by self-respect or by the sense of powerlessness. Its salient feature is a feeling of injury, and though anger is present in an incipient stage at least, the total state is more cognitive and hedonic than emotional.

Fear is the feeling in reference to what is regarded as 'dangerous.' In other words, it is the emotion which arises when the individual knows or suspects that he cannot cope with some evil which threatens himself or those with whom he is in sympathy. When self-distrust is not present, an impending evil occasions anger instead of fear. Anything which increases self-distrust increases the tendency to fear. A surprisingly insignificant evil will cause the emotion if self-confidence is seriously shaken by recent failures, general mental depression, or physical weakness. This emotion is probably more easily excited than any other. The mere possibility of evil may be sufficient even when the powerlessness to cope with it is itself a mere possibility. An unknown or unaccountable object tends to inspire fear because it *may* work harm, and we obviously cannot be sure that we are able to defend ourselves. The dread which attaches to the supernatural can be

[1] When scorn is inhibited, a sense of the unworthiness displayed may be the sole concomitant of anger. This state is also called 'indignation,' but it is evidently an abbreviation of the normal form.

accounted for in this way. The fear of darkness has a more positive basis, for, while the possibility of evil is a mere suggestion of the fancy, the feeling of self-distrust has some justification. It is evident, therefore, that fear may frequently seem unaccountable. We may not know why we distrust ourselves or what in particular we are afraid of. There is always present, however, the consciousness that an evil is possible which possibly we cannot cope with. This constitutes the conception of 'danger' and the determining condition of fear. What requires explanation is that possibilities affect us so much, and that we are so keenly alive to their existence. These facts are intelligible, however, if we suppose that the experience of the individual and of the race has taught that in matters of importance it is better to err on the safe side.

From what has been said, it follows that fear, like anger, is a feeling in reference to an occurrence or event. When it seems to have an individual for its object, closer observation will discover that it really refers to the effect which the agent may cause. The range of particular objects which may excite the emotion is coextensive with the scope of our interests. It would be wrong, therefore, to maintain that fear is aroused merely by occurrences which affect self-preservation, for it is not true that the individual is interested solely in keeping himself alive. Both anger and fear give rise to activity which may be described as 'self-protective,' if 'self' be taken to cover everything in which the agent is interested; but while the former disposes

the individual to confront an evil directly, the latter impels him to protect himself by avoiding what he is not able to resist. Open defiance is the expression of anger in conduct, whereas 'the discretion which is the better part of valour' springs from fear. When fear is described as a pathological phenomenon, it is evident that the emotion as such is confounded with terror. The latter only appears, however, when the stimulus is too great for the stimulus capacity of the individual. It is unquestionably pathological, therefore, but it is largely the mere result of excessive stimulation, and only partially an emotion. Indeed extreme 'terror' arises on occasions which can usually be described as "too fearful for the feel of fear." Normal fear is not accompanied by general lack of ordination or by inhibition, and its influence on action can scarcely be disputed. Even slight fears which are barely perceptible may have most important results. The practical efficiency of an emotion depends not merely on its strength, but mainly on the fact that it appears at the 'psychological moment' when everything is in its favour.

The complex states into which fear enters as one element may now be briefly examined. Dread is calm and concentrated fear permeated with awe. Consternation is a blending of fear with astonishment or amazement. Anxiety is strain and oscillation of attention accompanied by uneasiness and intermittent fear. It presupposes that the chances for and against some event of importance cannot be determined with certainty. Attention passes con-

tinually from one possible issue to the other, though the adverse alternative always occupies a prominent place. Apprehension is a species of tentative fear. It implies that, while an undesirable event seems probable, the remaining element of uncertainty prevents the emotion from obtaining a firm footing. Alarm is surprise followed by fear or anxiety. Misgiving is sudden self-distrust, usually attended by some degree of fear.

Since hope is frequently, though erroneously, regarded as the direct counterpart of fear, it is necessary to deal with it at this stage. It is defined by Descartes as "a disposition of the soul to persuade itself that the thing which it desires will come to pass."[1] Sometimes this is all that the word signifies, but there is also a definite mental state to which the name is frequently attached. This may be described as a condition of expectancy, but not of direct expectation, in which we await some issue with the pleasurable but uneasy consciousness that the wished-for result is a possibility. The desired event is not regarded as certain, but the possibility that it may happen is uppermost in the mind. The favourable alternative usually gains this predominance, apart from all calculation of chances or effort of attention, on account of the unwillingness to face the possibility of evil. Still, the fact that the desirable result is not assured, is necessarily recognised, and hope thus involves an element of uncertainty and a tendency to alternate with sadness or fear. Hope is, therefore, not a peculiar feeling in

[1] Œuvres, Cousin's ed., iv. p. 177.

reference to an object; in itself it is simply expectancy together with uncertain pleasure.

The so-called 'fear' which is the direct counterpart of hope is totally different from real fear; it is a state of expectancy in which the individual looks forward to the future with the unpleasing consciousness that some undesirable event is possible. Hope alternates with genuine fear, however, more frequently than with its correlate, and this is inevitable in the nature of things. Since hope refers to some doubtful issue beyond our power, when the evil possibility is prominent, the conditions of fear are complete, namely, threatened evil and sense of powerlessness. But hope and genuine fear do not correspond, although the former frequently gives place to the latter. They do not belong to the same order of mental facts, as the preceding analysis has made manifest.

Disappointment appears when an event happens which is contrary to our hopes. It is simply a disagreeable sense of the conflict between the wished-for and the actual. Despair is conditioned by the conviction that some evil is unavoidable; it is analysable into the hedonic effect and practical attitude which are hereby occasioned. Fear is not an element, for it disappears with the extinction of hope. The behaviour which is characteristic of despair as such is passive expectancy without acquiescence or submission. On further reflection, this may give place either to resignation or to a reckless activity which implies as little hope of result as fear of consequences.

In hate, ill-feeling, and dislike there is a feeling towards the agent which, for want of a more convenient general term, may be called 'ill-feeling.' The necessary conditions of this emotion are present whenever the object is regarded as the source of effects which are felt as objectionable. The effects in question may be actual or possible, directly or indirectly due to the agent, and may affect ourselves or those in whom we are interested. What a given individual finds objectionable is dependent on his nature and on circumstances. A person may be disliked on account of his virtues or for the benefits he has conferred. Ill-feeling, therefore, is not always aroused by malignant actions or possibilities; the object may be the source of results which for other reasons are classed as objectionable. It must be noticed, however, that ill-feeling, like any other reaction, does not always appear when its conditions are present. It may be inhibited on specific occasions by other emotions, or by the influence which considerations of prudence or justice gradually acquire. As mental evolution progresses, the range of the emotion becomes more and more restricted. Thus ill-feeling comes to be regarded as uncalled for, if the objectionable occurrence does not presuppose intention on the part of the agent. It is felt in these circumstances that the connection between the cause and the effect may be ignored, since the relation is in a sense accidental and does not imply active hostility. It is partly for this reason that ill-feeling towards inanimate things tends to disappear.

Ill-feeling, therefore, presupposes that an agent is

antagonistic to us in virtue of his character, or hostile by his actions. Accordingly the emotion always incites to activities which imply that the object is absolutely excluded from the social self and placed beyond the pale of sympathy. The tendency to action may frequently be nullified by counteracting forces. In that case, however, the emotion may still exercise an important negative influence on conduct by excluding kindly feeling with the impulses which belong to it. While anger leads the individual to confront an event, ill-feeling puts him in opposition to the centre of activity from which the event has issued. The value of this duality in emotional attitude is obvious. An actual or threatened occurrence must usually be dealt with at once and by itself, but as a rule it is advantageous to turn to the agent also. Hence it is important that there should be, in addition to the feeling in reference to the event, a direct feeling towards the agent. Ill-feeling, therefore, is not in itself an anomalous or pathological phenomenon. Its effect on conduct, particularly in its negative aspect, may well prove useful in the life of the individual and of the race.

The various states in which ill-feeling appears, can now be distinguished from one another. 'Dislike' is difficult to analyse, for the term is very ambiguous. At times the word seems to denote a slight degree of repugnance; at other times it indicates merely a dim sense of antagonism, due to the fact that the object suggests objectionable potentialities in a vague and indefinite way. Usually, however, dislike signifies the mild emotion which is called forth when the

objectionable events associated with the object are not of vital importance. We speak, it is true, of 'intense dislike,' but the phrase refers to a state in which the sense of antagonism is strong while the amount of ill-feeling is small. Hate is ill-feeling in its most concentrated and permanent form. Though it may be aroused on insufficient provocation, it really presupposes that the object is regarded as essentially and continuously hostile or noxious. This explains why the intensity and duration of hate are independent of the amount of injury actually received.

In this connection, the more complex states known as 'envy' and 'jealousy' may be analysed. The word 'envy' sometimes signifies the mere desire or wish to raise ourselves to the level of another who has made us aware of our relative inferiority. Occasionally the term implies irritation on account of the superiority of some one, together with an unpleasant though unavowed sense of inferiority. Usually, however, 'envy' designates a more sinister state which contains the pain of inferiority, irritation, and a large amount of ill-feeling towards the individual who affects us disagreeably by the mere fact of his superiority. In such circumstances there is no desire directed primarily to the attainment of the envied good. The prominent factors in the total state are ill-feeling and pain; consequently, the objects most strongly desired are the injury of the objectionable individual and the removal of the pain. Both ends may be attained at once, for the individual is injured and the pain relieved if the good

in question is destroyed, its existence denied, or its value lessened in the eyes of others. Accordingly the pain and the emotion generally combine their forces, as it were, and produce one strong desire to bring the envied person down from the level he has attained. Envy and jealousy are frequently classed together, but the latter is differentiated from the former by the absence of the consciousness of inferiority. 'Jealousy' usually denotes a complex state which includes (1) fear that the desire to attain or retain some highly valued good will be thwarted through the instrumentality of another person, (2) ill-feeling towards the rival, (3) intermittent irritation. Sometimes the word is used to indicate a permanent condition of excessive and irritable watchfulness in regard to the individual's own interests. Jealousy always springs from some estimate of what is due to the self, and consequently stands on a higher plane than envy.

The opposite of ill-feeling is the emotion which appears as the common element in pity, gratitude, liking, affection. This emotion can best be described as kindly-feeling or fellow-feeling. It is aroused by any person whose actions or nature stand in a harmonious relation to the needs or tendencies of the self. We may say, therefore, that kindly feeling depends upon the sense of community with others. It is conditioned, however, not merely by community of interest in the narrow sense, but also by community of nature. Any being who is recognised as akin to us tends to arouse kindly feeling on that account alone. This is primarily a result of the fact

that no individual can fully realise his powers in isolation from his fellows. To be himself he must live with others. In himself he is incomplete, and consequently has a natural tendency to self-completion. Moreover, there is no arbitrary limit to the scope of this tendency, for the self as a whole is enriched in proportion as the social self is extended. Any fellow-being, therefore, by his very nature is fitted to harmonise with one of the most basal tendencies of the self. It is evident, then, that kindly feeling is capable of being more spontaneous than its opposite. A fellow-being does not arouse ill-feeling until his actions or specific character definitely breaks the tie of community at certain points. The connection, however, can never be completely severed, and kindly feeling may therefore make its presence felt, even when the actual or possible behaviour of the object would naturally tend to arouse the contrary emotion. In these circumstances the feeling-attitude is clearly determined by the mere sense of community of nature, since it manifests itself in direct opposition to the actions or individual character of the object.

It may be urged that ill-feeling also can be in a measure spontaneous. This is not its natural character, however, and if an individual seems to adopt a general attitude of hostility to his fellows, special reasons can always be assigned to explain the fact. Moreover, ill-feeling can never be spontaneous to the same extent as its opposite. Though useful and legitimate on certain occasions, it is manifestly detrimental to the individual if it is habitual and

indiscriminate. It is a species of surgical remedy which is misplaced unless there is a special call for it. Further, though it may at times be distinctly pleasurable, it presupposes discord and is as a rule attended with unpleasantness. Still more important is the fact that it involves contraction of the self, and therefore cannot be carried to any extreme without violating the conditions of healthy existence. On the other hand, kindly feeling towards our fellows as such is fostered and encouraged by its essential nature and incidental results. Kindness begets kindness, or at all events tends to disarm hostility. It implies harmony, and is in consequence primarily pleasurable. It also involves normal and healthy expansion of the self.

As a general rule, therefore, we have a fellow-feeling for our fellows, and are kindly disposed towards them, until they declare themselves to be hostile or noxious. It is evident that one who is absorbed in self or is reared in a hostile environment will rarely manifest this spontaneous good-feeling, but the limitations and exceptions which must be made do not invalidate the general rule. Indeed the truth of the latter must be assumed to account for the existence of many facts that would otherwise be wholly unintelligible. No human being is an atom so impenetrable that he is incapable of compassion for a fellow-being in distress. Even the most selfish mortal may be pained by a great calamity which affects some remote section of the human community, and may be roused to indignation by injustice which does not in any degree

concern himself or his immediate associates. But the good or ill which befalls others gives rise to sympathetic pleasure, pain, or emotion, only if we feel kindly disposed towards them, for kindly feeling expands the self, and in proportion to its intensity makes us identify our interests with those of others. The facts in question prove, therefore, that we are capable of kindly feeling towards our fellows irrespective of everything except that they are our fellow-beings. This latent fellow-feeling naturally becomes prominent when our fellows are in need of help and sympathy.

The activities and tendencies which are conditioned by this emotion must now be considered. Kindly feeling, as we have seen, is determined by the relation in which objects stand to the desires and tendencies of the self. It is necessary, therefore, to distinguish carefully between the emotional tendencies as such and the concomitant tendencies which are involved in the conditions of the emotion. The feeling-attitude is a separate fact which has its own influence on conduct, and this must be discovered by observation. If the emotion be considered by itself, apart from its concomitants, it will be found to incite to activity on behalf of the individual who inspires it. Schopenhauer maintains that pity abolishes the distinction between ego and non-ego,[1] and this is true of kindly feeling in general. So far as tendency to act is concerned, the distinction between self and not-self is abolished. Of course, the emotional tendency may not be realised in action,

[1] Werke, iv. p. 209.

but even when the feeling-attitude does not produce any positive result, it yet has a negative influence which is by no means unimportant.

The different states into which kindly feeling enters may be discussed at this stage. It is evident that spontaneous kindly feeling for our fellows forms the basis of pity. The constituent elements of pity are kindly feeling and sympathetic pain or sadness. The former conditions the latter, for, if we were not kindly disposed towards our fellows, their suffering would cause no sympathetic suffering in us. The kindly feeling is not aroused because we ourselves suffer; we suffer because we have the kindly feeling. In the case of gratitude, liking, and affection, the individuality of the object is the main factor which determines the rise of the emotion. Gratitude is kindly feeling towards one who has of his own accord done something for the individual's advantage which could not be demanded as a right. The consciousness of the fact that disinterested kindness has been freely offered, unites with the emotional element to give character to the total state. Liking involves kindly feeling towards some person who stands in a definitely advantageous, but not intimate, relation to the self. As a concrete state it is distinguished from ordinary kindly feeling by the relative strength of the hedonic accompaniment. Affection in all its forms is the counterpart of hate. It is aroused by any individual who is intimately associated with the special nature and interests of the self. The particular circumstances under which affection may originate do not alter the essential

character of the emotional element as such, though they may affect the nature of the concomitants with which the emotion is combined.

It is evident from what has been said that kindly feeling in general is the sole source of all sympathetic pleasure-pain or sympathetic concern for others. This emotion, therefore, accounts for all the facts which are vaguely classed under the general term 'sympathy.' A reference to the statements already made in regard to the conditions of the emotion will show in what sense 'sympathy' can be regarded as an ultimate fact.

Pride, Humility, and Shame are the chief forms of the so-called 'feelings of self.' Like so many other terms in this connection, 'pride' means many things. At times it denotes that sense of personal dignity which presupposes that the individual feels there is something owing to himself, a mode of behaviour which alone is worthy of him. This fact is not in itself emotional. It is primarily an ideal of worth which implies that certain things must be demanded or done for their own sake. Shame is the correlate of this species of pride. It is merely the sense of unworthiness which manifests itself when the agent fails to realise his ideal of worth, and is degraded in his own eyes. 'Pride' also designates the natural inclination towards a high or exaggerated estimate of self in comparison with others. This bias is a result of the tendency of every individual to assert himself and make his being effective in some way. The tendency to self-assertion makes power important and superiority desirable. Power and superi-

ority are therefore objects of strong desire; the wish is father to the thought, and illusion is almost inevitable. The craving for self-assertion, the concomitant pleasure in power, and the desire for superiority are also included under the protean term 'pride.' It is clear, however, that no feeling towards self is connected with this basal tendency or its manifestations unless self-satisfaction is aroused. Vanity is an indirect derivation of the self-assertive tendency. It is primarily desire for the approbation of others—that is, desire for external recognition of personal merit. Humility is a consciousness of relative inferiority along with acquiescence in that state of affairs, and must therefore be distinguished from self-dissatisfaction. It is evident, therefore, that the 'self-feelings,' though they may be accompanied by emotion, do not constitute any specific feeling-attitude. This seems inevitable when we remember that the self must take its place as one object among others before we can have any feeling in regard to it.

Admiration and scorn are the peculiar emotional reactions which are conditioned by the recognition of worth or unworthiness respectively. They necessarily refer to some object which is considered as in some sense a real source of events; for that which simply contains or transmits what it receives from without may have positive or negative value, but cannot be described as worthy or unworthy. Scorn and admiration are true 'æsthetic' emotions. We admire an individual solely because his actions manifest intrinsic worth according to our standards

of worth. The involuntary admiration which an opponent sometimes evokes, proves that the practical relations of the object to the self are altogether irrelevant. The modes of behaviour directly due to these emotions regulate our action in reference to the object, but are not so important as the indirect results. Admiration and scorn concentrate attention on concrete ideals and deterrent examples, and accordingly have a marked reflexive effect on conduct.

Scorn is frequently accompanied by anger, and also by that feeling of superiority which is called 'pride.' The connection between scorn and this element of 'pride' is so natural that it tends to obscure the true nature of the emotion. Admiration may be associated with humility, though the relation between the two is not so close as that which exists between scorn and pride. The most frequent concomitant of this emotion is wonder, since admiration is most readily excited by an object which exhibits worth in an extraordinary degree, and accordingly often refers to something which we do not fully comprehend. Indeed, the term sometimes signifies merely wonder and pleasure, or wonder, pleasure, and satisfaction. This is true of the so-called 'admiration' of the beautiful or the inanimate, unless there is an implied reference to the worth of some agent. The real emotion of worth, however, can be sharply differentiated from wonder and satisfaction. Admiration is not necessarily accompanied by wonder, nor is the latter always associated with the former. Wonder may be aroused by extraordinary unworthiness as well as by unusual worth. It is

caused by anything which is not fully intelligible, and has no necessary relation to worth or its opposite. In regard to satisfaction, the distinction is not less clear, for here again the idea of worth is not directly involved. It is evident, too, that 'to admire' and 'to be satisfied with' are entirely different mental states with different expressions in conduct.

Respect and contempt, though apparently related to admiration and scorn, are yet qualitatively different, and must be classed as primary emotions. They are distinctive feelings in reference to an object, and present many characteristics peculiar to themselves. They are conditioned by the recognition of effectiveness and inefficiency respectively, and have no direct connection with ideals of worth. They presuppose the tendency to self-assertion. Effectiveness and its opposite must be objects of interest in order to arouse emotion, and they would have no interest or significance for a being devoid of the craving for effective manifestation of himself. On the other hand, admiration and scorn presuppose another element of our nature, namely, the sense of personal dignity. If we did not have the feeling that a special mode of behaviour was alone worthy of us, we should not possess any ideal of worth by which worthiness or unworthiness could be recognised in others.

Other considerations can be brought forward to emphasise the distinction here indicated. Admiration is usually associated with respect, since the realisation of an ideal necessarily demands effectiveness; but it is possible to respect an individual when

admiration in the true sense is out of the question. Scorn and contempt are more frequently at variance for obvious reasons. Unworthiness need not imply inefficiency; its most notable manifestations indeed presuppose the opposite. The most intense scorn is aroused by effective villainy, and therefore appears in circumstances where contempt would be ridiculous. If scorn and respect are but rarely associated in such cases, this is due to the greater interest which the aspect of worth normally possesses. Respect is possible, however, for it is conceivable that the sheer force or power displayed may rivet the attention. The distinction between scorn and contempt can be further accentuated. Contempt may be good-natured or tolerant, if inefficiency is united with good intentions or is more or less excusable. Scorn, on the contrary, is in its very nature intolerant. Again, what is beneath contempt is beneath notice; what is beyond scorn is repulsive. Finally, attention may be directed to the modes of behaviour which are characteristic of respect and contempt on the one hand, and admiration and scorn on the other. Respect leads one to treat the object as a factor that must be reckoned with in practical relations; contempt manifests itself by total disregard for the object as a force. On the contrary, the actions and tendencies in which admiration expresses itself imply that the individual who exhibits worth is to be honoured on account of his intrinsic nature. The manifestations of scorn imply that unworthiness is to be despised in and for itself. In view of all the facts, therefore, it seems

legitimate to infer that respect and contempt are primary emotions specifically distinct from admiration and scorn.

Disgust, aversion, abhorrence, detestation, horror, are all emotions of repugnance. They are feelings in reference to some object which is regarded as repulsive, and give rise to actions of withdrawal or avoidance. The object is not an event, but a person or thing considered in itself, and not as a cause. If we think of the events which may issue from the repulsive object, anger, fear, or ill-feeling may appear according to circumstances and the point of view adopted. The repulsive is not the hostile, as such, or the merely harmful. It is the unnatural, that which is *against* nature. In other words, it is that which is directly opposed to the essential fitness of things. This is evident in the case of the morally repulsive. The undue prominence of the animal nature, desires which lead to misuse of functions, desires of any kind raised to an unnatural degree, all arouse the emotion of repugnance. The same principle is at work where merely physical objects are concerned. Objects of this kind are natural in their proper place; but they may be misplaced, and this is the *rationale* of all physical repugnance. While actions of rejection or avoidance in regard to certain objects may be developed as instincts at a low stage of mental development, the emotion of repugnance depends upon a sense of what is 'natural' and the reverse. An object cannot possibly appear as repulsive unless it is viewed in its relation to some system or order, however dimly that may be conceived.

The emotions of repugnance are sometimes determined by judgments which are biassed by mere custom or convention; but, in the last resort, all judgments in regard to the repulsive imply a reference to the basal tendencies and ideals of the individual.

From this standpoint the repulsive can be differentiated from the unworthy, as well as from the harmful or hostile. The line actually drawn between the unworthy and the unnatural must be a shifting one on certain occasions. It may be a question whether one point of view will be adopted or the other, and scorn at times may alternate with disgust. But this does not destroy the essential difference between the two points of view. The unworthy object stands on the same plane of being as the judging individual, for unworthiness does not imply perversion of nature, and all judgments of worth apply only to responsible agents. On the other hand, the repulsive object is relegated to an entirely distinct level of existence. For this reason an inanimate thing may be repugnant as well as a real agent. Accordingly, 'repulsiveness' and 'unworthiness' are concepts which differ in content and extent, though their application to fact may vary in certain cases.

The emotion of repugnance, as we have seen, leads to actions of avoidance. Its characteristic manifestations in conduct imply that the object falls outside the sphere of legitimate activity. Its influence on action therefore is distinct from that of dissatisfaction or of fear. Against this statement the objection may be urged that the repulsive as

such can 'attract.' This is true in one sense and in particular instances. If the object is strikingly repulsive, it is unusual and difficult to understand; hence it has the fascination which always attaches to the novel and incomprehensible. Where the susceptibility to repugnance is relatively weak, this species of attraction is apt to be very prominent. That the repugnant can attract in this manner is simply one instance of the numerous conflicts which necessarily spring from the complexity of human nature.

The different forms which the emotion assumes must now be briefly noted. Disgust is primarily repugnance to the physically repulsive, and is therefore accompanied by actual or reproduced organic sensations. In 'moral' disgust these sensations are suggested by analogy. Aversion, as ordinarily understood, is not merely the practical attitude of repugnance, but also the corresponding feeling-attitude at a certain degree of intensity. Detestation is repugnance accompanied by intermittent ill-feeling. Abhorrence is intense repugnance. Horror is aroused when the object is repulsive in an extraordinary degree. It involves general organic and mental disturbance, and in this respect resembles terror. The apparent similarity between the two emotions is increased by the fact that in both cases the emotional element as such is overshadowed by the concomitant excitement. Moreover, horror is often accompanied by the feeling of powerlessness, and it is natural that it should at times be attended by an element of fear.

The intellectual feelings which require most careful treatment are surprise, astonishment, and wonder. Surprise is conditioned by the appearance of the unexpected, and is thereby differentiated from the mere feeling of novelty. An unexpected occurrence causes an abrupt stoppage in the intellectual activity of the moment; it also produces a more or less violent disturbance of previous adjustments, since it is not merely new but contrary to expectation. The sense of disturbance is therefore the characteristic element in surprise. Another constituent is the awareness of the fact that the unexpected has happened, and at times an element of bewilderment may also be present. Astonishment is excited, not by the unexpected as such, but by the utterly unaccountable. Astonishment may follow surprise, for the unexpected may turn out to be, for the time at least, absolutely unaccountable. The former, however, does not necessarily imply any previous expectation; hence it is not always preceded by the shock of surprise and may develop gradually. It is the state of mind in which we feel that something is totally beyond our comprehension, and in which the recalcitrant element so dominates consciousness that no effort is made to render it intelligible. Wonder arises on the presentation of something that we do not fully understand, but which does not seem in itself unaccountable or unintelligible. The object is partly or vaguely understood, or, at all events, is felt to have intelligible relations to what we already know. Hence the characteristic feature of wonder is a vague groping

more imaginative than ratiocinative; and behind this dim questioning stands as a background the consciousness of the present obscurity of the object. Wonder is closely allied to curiosity and yet distinguishable from it. The sense of present ignorance is implicit in curiosity rather than explicit, while in wonder it influences the mind to such an extent that indolent imaginative conjectures take the place of active and definite inquiries. In short, curiosity is the desire to know definitely, while wonder is an abiding sense of ignorance united with vague imaginative questioning. Wonder thus remains in the region of the dim and mysterious, and, while it may give place to active curiosity, the transition is often prevented by indolence or by the charm which vagueness and shadow sometimes possess. The relation between wonder and admiration has already been indicated. It is clear that surprise, astonishment, wonder, and curiosity are not feelings in reference to an object. Curiosity is merely intellectual desire, and wonder is primarily intellectual. The chief elements in surprise and astonishment are disturbance and inhibition, and the other factors are intellectual. These states may be succeeded or accompanied by emotion, but in themselves are not emotional. The other so-called 'intellectual emotions,' such as the pain of logical contradiction and the pleasure of discovering identity in difference, are purely hedonic and need not be discussed.

The æsthetic, moral, and religious feelings do not call for extended notice. It can easily be proved

that there is no special æsthetic emotion. A beautiful object excites pleasure and satisfaction directly, and by its associations gives rise to other hedonic and emotional states. The direct factor evidently does not involve any peculiar feeling-attitude towards the beautiful object; and, as might be expected, the same holds true of the indirect element. The feeling of the sublime may be analysed into pleasure-pain and awe. The latter is simply the impression produced by an agent of overwhelming power. It is not a feeling in reference to an object, but a way in which the self is affected. The feeling connected with the ludicrous is purely hedonic. In the case of the moral feelings the absence of any special moral emotion is still more marked. The moral emotions are nothing more than the ordinary emotions arising under specified conditions. The religious sentiment is obviously a complex, the constituent elements of which differ with the individual and with circumstances. It may include joy, fear, affection, humility, and awe. At the present stage of development the most distinctively religious feeling is probably reverence, and this may be analysed into affection and humility.

The primary emotions, therefore, seem to be the following: satisfaction, dissatisfaction; anger; fear; ill-feeling and its opposite; repugnance; scorn, admiration; respect, contempt. Each of these states is qualitatively distinct from the others, arises under special conditions, and has a characteristic function.

As factors in conduct these emotions regulate the behaviour of the individual in regard to the varying

phases of the world of things, persons, and events, which constitutes his environment. Dissatisfaction incites to activities which are designed to bring about a change in some aspect of reality which is not in harmony with the agent's desires or wishes. Satisfaction, on the contrary, inhibits all activity in reference to its object. Anger arouses active rebellion against an objectionable event. Fear causes the individual to avoid a threatened evil against which the success of direct opposition seems doubtful. Repugnance leads one to avoid some person or thing, not because the object in question is a source of danger, but because it is unnatural. It is the warning voice, not of prudence, but of our nature as such. The actions due to kindly feeling presuppose that the distinction between *ego* and *alter* is transcended. This emotion accounts for all sympathetic feeling or activity, and renders possible the existence of a real community of persons. It is, therefore, one of the most important factors in conduct. Ill-feeling prompts to actions which imply that the self is contracted by the exclusion of certain fellow-beings from the scope of sympathy. Its function seems to be a defensive one, and its range is essentially much narrower than that of its correlative. Contempt leads the individual to treat the object of the emotion as a negligible quantity in the universe of conduct. Respect has the opposite effect. Admiration and scorn affect our personal attitude towards the persons who inspire the feelings. Indirectly, they exercise an obvious and important influence.

All these emotional tendencies to action are distinct from the hedonic impulses. Whatever be the conditions under which an emotion arises, it prompts to activity apart from all consideration of hedonic consequences. Moreover, in dealing with the conditions of the different primary emotions, we have come in contact with principles of activity which are demonstrably not hedonic and are evidently more basal than the emotions to which they give occasion. The emotional life, indeed, cannot be fully understood unless we recognise the existence of tendencies to action distinct from those which spring from emotion or pleasure-pain. The truth of this assertion has already become obvious on more than one occasion, but the further proof and development of the general point of view must form the subject of a new chapter.

CHAPTER IV.

THE EXISTENCE OF PRIMARY TENDENCIES TO ACTION.

An inquiry into the conditions of the primary emotions brings to light, as we have seen, the existence of principles of activity which are not hedonic and are more fundamental than the impulses which spring from emotion. This can be shown to be a natural and necessary outcome of a thorough investigation of the nature of emotion. Feeling-attitude is determined explicitly and exclusively by the recognition of the importance or significance of certain aspects of reality. Since objects derive importance and significance from our interests, it may be said that no emotional reaction takes place unless the situation possesses interest of some sort. The particular concepts (injury, danger, repulsiveness, &c.) which condition the different emotions indicate the different ways in which objects are significant. In dealing concretely with the various emotions it is necessary to examine these concepts and the cases to which they are applied. This examination of the particular occasions which elicit emotional response

inevitably throws light on the range of human interests. Further observation of the same concrete cases enables us to gain an insight into the source of the interests in question. It then becomes evident that the primary interests are dependent on primary principles of activity. Moreover, we must carry our inquiries to this stage if we wish to understand the true place which the emotional life occupies in the economy of the mind.

The nature of the problem which here forces itself on our attention now becomes evident. That problem is essentially identical with the question in regard to the nature and source of human interests. In view of what has been said, however, the best method of approaching the subject is equally evident. The theory of emotion not only necessitates an inquiry into the nature of human interests, but also furnishes a direct method of reaching the root of the matter. Feeling-attitude being always conditioned by some aspect of reality which stands in a significant relation to our interests, if we ascertain the circumstances which are, as a matter of fact, emotionally stimulating, we shall find actual cases by means of which the range of interest and its sources can be determined in a concrete way. This is the method of approach which we shall proceed to employ.

When the problem is thus placed on a concrete footing, it is clear, in the first place, that the hedonic relations of things do not always account for the significance which objects possess. It cannot be asserted that emotions are always determined by the relations in which objects stand to pleasure-pain.

In other words, interest and hedonic value are not synonymous. The very existence of such emotions as admiration and respect proves this conclusively. Admiration is excited by the mere fact that a fellow-being realises in some way our ideal of worth. It is absolutely independent of hedonic considerations. The person is admired because he is what he is, apart from and even despite his hedonic relations to the self or to other individuals. Similarly, respect is evoked by efficiency as such. Whether this efficiency has pleasant or unpleasant results for ourselves or others, is absolutely irrelevant. Yet efficiency and the realisation of worth have significance since they arouse emotion. They must therefore appeal to some other interest than pleasure-pain. What holds true without exception in the case of admiration and respect can be shown to be true in most instances where other emotional reactions are concerned. Anger and fear, for example, are excited by events which involve injury or evil, that is, by events which are antagonistic to our interests. If pleasure-pain were the sole object of interest, evil or injury would be identical with pain. That this is not true can be proved by reference to the facts. An object which awakens superstitious dread is feared because it is altogether unusual and totally unaccountable. Since its relations to the self are absolutely uncertain, it obviously may inflict some injury against which no defence is possible. It is therefore judged to be a source of danger, and its possible actions become the object of fear. The peculiar intensity of the dread thus occasioned is due to the fact that the very

nature of the possible evil, like everything else connected with the object, is absolutely undefined. The emotion would never attain abnormal proportions if there were no dire uncertainty in regard to the kind of evil to be expected. This uncertainty clearly would not exist if pain and evil were identical. Again, death is not feared merely because it is regarded as painful or because life is pleasant. A painless death may be dreaded by one who finds the present life a hedonic failure, and who at the same time is not troubled by any thoughts about a future existence. Even when death appears as a painful event, the fear is apt to be out of all proportion to the pain anticipated. In regard to anger the case is not less clear. When an ambitious person is enraged by the failure of some undertaking, it is absurd to say that he is thinking solely of the hedonic consequences which his want of success has involved. He has set his heart on success; hence failure in itself is a pronounced evil, since it is opposed to the dominant interest of the moment. Other instances readily suggest themselves to prove that events which are not intensely painful may nevertheless be profoundly exasperating. If we turn to other emotional reactions, further evidence can be obtained in regard to the main point here at issue. To avoid unnecessary amplification, however, we shall content ourselves by referring, in conclusion, to the evidence furnished by the emotion of pity. In this case the emotional reaction is directly at variance with the hedonic aspect of the situation which is most prominent. Any fellow-being in dis-

tress may arouse pity, despite the fact that in the circumstances the object is necessarily a source of pain. This seems to prove that interest in objects is not determined exclusively by hedonic relations.

It can be maintained, therefore, that persons, things, and events may be significant in relation to interests which have no reference to pleasure-pain. If we now continue our examination of concrete cases we shall gain an insight into the nature and source of those interests which are not hedonic. This will enable us, later on, to define the range of human interests with more accuracy of detail.

The realisation of worth on the part of our fellows is significant enough to arouse a special emotion. If, however, the individual himself had no natural tendency to realise an ideal of worth, he would have no interest in reference to which the worth of his fellows would have significance. If, on the other hand, the individual has a natural impulse to act in this way, a certain mode of behaviour possesses intrinsic interest and is therefore significant when it is exhibited by others. In the same way, the efficiency of others would not arouse respect unless the agent had a direct and personal interest in efficiency as such. This particular interest can be explained only if we suppose that each individual has a natural tendency to make his existence effective in some way. The influence of this self-assertive tendency can be detected in connection with other emotional reactions. Since every agent has a natural impulse to express himself in effective action, he is keenly interested in the success of anything

which he undertakes. Success in itself is desirable; failure in itself is an evil. This accounts for the fact that anger may be aroused by failure as such apart from all consideration of hedonic consequences. It also explains the fear and anxiety which are apt to attend ambition. Another principle of activity is presupposed by the interest which attaches to everything connected with the maintenance of life. The existence of such an interest is fully established by the fact that fear is aroused by any event which threatens the continuance of life. The facts cannot be fully explained unless by reference to 'the will to live.' If the individual had no natural impulse to maintain his own being, the interest which belongs to everything connected with self-preservation could not be explained.

It is evident, then, that the phenomena of the emotional life prove the existence of tendencies to action which are not hedonic. These tendencies account for interests which the hedonic relations of things do not explain. In themselves, therefore, they must obviously be distinct from hedonic impulses. On the other hand, they are more fundamental than the emotions connected with them, for they lend that interest to objects without which the emotional reactions would not take place. They must be regarded as primary or basal principles of activity, since they cannot be explained by reference to other psychical facts, and seem to proceed directly from the nature of the psycho-physical organism.

It may still be urged, however, that these primary tendencies are simply impulses directed towards

particular pleasures. The reply to this objection will carry us to another stage of the argument by opening up the whole question of the relation between pleasure-pain and primary impulse. That the objection is not valid can be proved, apart from all reference to the argument already used, by direct observation of the mental states concerned. The self-assertive tendency, for example, is an impulse to act in a particular manner, not a desire for a purely subjective feeling. The tendency to realise ideals of worth is a still more striking instance. It is explicitly an impulse to act in a manner worthy of the self without regard to anything else. When accurately observed, the primary tendencies exhibit themselves definitely and exclusively as impulses to act in special ways. As such, they are sharply differentiated from desires for subjective gratification. Further, the pleasures which are supposed to condition those tendencies are themselves conditioned by the latter. If there were no tendency, and therefore no desire, for effective manifestation of the self, success in this respect would not be pleasant. [The attainment of success is pleasant because it is desired; it is not desired because it is pleasant.] The obstruction of the tendency involves pain; its realisation causes pleasure. The tendency must first exist, and struggle independently towards the realisation of its own end, before the hedonic effect can come into existence. It cannot, therefore, be merely a desire conditioned by the pleasure-pain which it incidentally occasions. This argument in its essential features has been used by Butler and others, and need not be

further emphasised in this connection. Enough has been said to show that the tendencies which have been described as 'primary,' are not merely hedonic impulses.

The point of view attained in the previous paragraph has implications which must now be developed. The principle has been established that impulses which are not hedonic cause hedonic results. Pleasure arises if any impulse or desire attains its end, whatever that end may be; pain ensues if any tendency to action is restrained, unduly repressed, or obstructed. It has been proved that there are impulses towards ends which have no hedonic interest. These impulses, therefore, must occasion hedonic consequences. When we proceed to ascertain how far this principle applies, we find that it explains the appearance of all hedonic phenomena. The physical pleasures and pains are conditioned by the success or failure of physical functions, and the latter are directly determined by the structure of the physical organism. Similarly, the purely intellectual pleasures and pains presuppose a tendency whose primary end is the exercise of cognitive activity. They would vanish if the attainment of knowledge as such were not an object of endeavour. Æsthetic pleasure is likewise conditioned by the fact that natural tendencies to action find perfectly free and unimpeded expression. It is indeed a contradiction to assert that objects or ends are intrinsically pleasant or unpleasant. The hedonic aspect of things is always explicable by reference to something else. It is an effect, and the nature of its cause depends upon the nature of the

being concerned. Since man is essentially an active being, his pleasures and pains are determined by reference to those tendencies to activity which spring directly from his nature and are primarily impulses towards definite kinds of action. The dependence is direct and unmediated, hence pleasure-pain must be regarded as conditioned exclusively by the success or failure of those primary impulses.

In harmony with this general conclusion is the fact that the impulses to seek pleasure and avoid pain can be satisfied only by means of the satisfaction of other impulses. Particular pleasures or pains are bound up with the fortunes of particular tendencies, and cannot be attained or avoided except through the intervention of these tendencies.[1] The hedonic impulses supply additional motives for the realisation of objective purposes, and are wholly subservient to this end. That they naturally play a subordinate part is tacitly admitted by the hedonists themselves. 'The paradox of hedonism' is that pleasure will not be attained if it is made the direct end of action. This simply means that the hedonic desires have a purely subsidiary place and function, and cannot be raised to the rank of primary impulses. The individual who attempts to make pleasure the ultimate end of action, attempts to alter the relative

[1] This supplies an answer to the objection which might be urged against the assertion that hedonic phenomena are all conditioned by impulses which are not hedonic. The objection is that the desires to attain pleasure and avoid pain themselves occasion hedonic consequences. It is clear, however, that the success or failure of hedonic tendencies cannot be separated from the success or failure of the underlying impulses.

importance of the different impulses of his nature. But natural arrangements have the power of nature behind them, as the 'paradox of hedonism' proves.

The position which must be assigned to pleasure-pain has now been indicated. Hedonic phenomena are the results of tendencies which are not directed to hedonic ends. They occupy a secondary place, and play a subordinate part. Obviously, therefore, the non-hedonic interests are primary in importance as well as in position. These interests, as we have seen in particular cases, indicate the existence of primary tendencies to activity. A general conclusion in regard to the nature and source of human interests is before us, and it may now be stated in general terms.

The individual with which psychology deals is primarily an active being, and therefore tends to act without regard to any extrinsic consequences. His activity necessarily takes definite directions since he has a definite nature or character. In other words, he has primary tendencies of a special sort; he desires to do certain things or attain certain ends. These ends constitute his primary interests. External objects acquire interest through their relation to the ends which are in themselves desired. Pleasure and pain are incidental results which appear in connection with the realisation of the primary tendencies. They possess an interest of their own, and thus a special influence on action; but the latter, like the former, is secondary and subsidiary. If the individual had no primary tendencies he would desire nothing, be interested in nothing. Under such con-

ditions no external object would be more important or significant than another. In such circumstances nothing would arouse pleasure or cause pain. Even purely intellectual interests would vanish, for they imply intellectual desires and tendencies. Indeed an individual thus constituted would have no synthesised knowledge of any description, since he would possess no cognitive interest, direct or indirect. So far as he was concerned, attention would be purely involuntary—*i.e.*, determined solely by the variations in objective conditions. Systematised knowledge, however, presupposes voluntary attention, and this in turn implies selection and synthesis in accordance with subjective interest. Voluntary selection and synthesis, again, have no *raison d'être* if one thing is not more interesting or significant than another, and no object can have interest or significance if there are no purposes to be served, no practical or purely intellectual ends to be attained.

In various ways, therefore, the existence of primary tendencies can be established. From the concrete phenomena of emotion and pleasure-pain, as well as from more general considerations in regard to the nature of human interests, the same conclusion follows. In order to complete the argument, however, it is necessary to criticise briefly the common doctrine that pleasure-pain is the source and end of all activity.

It is manifest that beings constructed on the simple hedonistic plan would exhibit but slight differences of character. Diversity of character depends upon diversity of dominant interests, and

therefore of reactions. By hypothesis, however, these individuals would have only one tendency to action, and in consequence would all conduct themselves in the same way in the same circumstances if their stores of energy and of knowledge were the same. Concrete human beings are obviously more complex than this. So complex are the springs of action, that the individual must gradually learn by experience the existence of the basal impulses which mould human conduct. This process would of course not be necessary if all activity obeyed one principle. Individual variations render the whole matter still more complicated. While the same basal tendencies are common to all members of the race, their relative strength varies in different cases. The result is that different individuals have different dominant interests, and therefore react differently in the same circumstances. These individual variations also must be learned by experience. Each person has to observe the constitution of his special nature and may be surprised by the character or intensity of his reaction to certain stimuli. This surprise would be inexplicable if all his activities were determined by one tendency which was directly conditioned by quantity of pleasure-pain.

Again, if we adopt the hedonistic theory of conation, the actual phenomena of conduct become wholly mysterious. From the point of view of this theory it seems necessary to admit that all men are more or less guilty of seeking particular pleasures, to the exclusion of others which are more easily obtained and are not inferior when judged by purely

hedonic standards. No amount of insight or circumspection seems to alter the fact. The enlightened hedonist is as much to blame as the most ignorant and misguided of his opponents. The impulses towards certain pleasures seem stronger than the impulses towards others, and no hedonic reason can be assigned which explains the difference. The doctrine that pleasures admit of qualitative distinctions was used by Mill to remove this undeniable difficulty. The doctrine is now generally admitted to be false, and the difficulty remains insoluble. On the other hand, if we assume that the hedonic impulses are not the only springs of action, everything becomes clear. The pleasures which are connected with certain activities can then be regarded as the effects of these activities and not as their cause. The facts which are inexplicable on the hedonistic theory prove in the most direct way the truth of this assumption.

The doctrine that pleasure-pain is the alpha and omega of all activity is thus at variance with the phenomena of conduct. The full consequences of this theory are usually obscured by the fact that other principles of activity are introduced under the head of 'instincts.' By means of this ambiguous term, many of the manifestations of primary needs and functions are surreptitiously introduced. The real implications of the pleasure-pain theory, however, are brought to light most clearly when the historical affiliations of the position are realised. This doctrine is an integral part of the general view of mind originated by Locke and rigorously developed

by Condillac. It is the *tabula rasa* theory applied to conation. The individual is supposed to be somehow affected pleasurably or painfully. He tends to avoid pain and seek pleasure. As a cognitive being, he infers the future from the past, and comes to act in accordance with ideas of pleasure and pain. All activity is directed by hedonic experience, and this is the whole secret of human conduct. Now the *tabula rasa* doctrine has been generally abandoned as untenable in the realm of cognition. It is recognised that knowledge would be impossible if definite intellectual tendencies did not exist. These tendencies spring directly from the nature of the mind, are independent of hedonic considerations, and condition intellectual pleasure and pain. It would be strange if no other primary tendencies existed, and it can be shown that the purely intellectual interests are not coextensive with the primary human interests in general. In short, the pleasure-pain theory of action is an inconsistent survival of the old sensationalism which treated mind as a passive thing, and naturally reduced all activity to a necessary consequence of a passively received effect.

Apart from everything else, it seems more consistent with the place of psychology in the scale of the sciences to regard the mental life of the individual as in some sense an organic whole, with a complex nature of its own which is expressed, not in one mode of activity, but in a multiplicity of reactions. On this view the psychical life has a character of its own as complex as the physical, and man is a psycho-physical organism, not a mere physical

organism associated with a dependent and characterless mental concomitant. This standpoint necessarily leads to the recognition of basal tendencies, for it implies the existence of an organised structure expressing itself in a complexity of reactions. Adopting this point of view for the reasons already assigned, we shall now attempt to indicate some of the more important principles of activity.

CHAPTER V.

THE PRIMARY PRINCIPLES OF ACTIVITY.

THE first principle to be noted is the tendency of function to realise itself. This simply means that man is essentially an active being, has a natural tendency to activity, and necessarily acts in the direction prescribed by his powers and capacities. He must act in some way, and necessarily acts in accordance with the constitution of his nature. Activity is pleasant because there is a basal tendency to act. In its primary manifestations, therefore, it is not determined or influenced by pleasure, and is desired for its own sake. Consequently functions tend to be realised without forethought of any description, since the exercise of function is action in the concrete. In harmony with this is the fact that a special opportunity for the employment of a particular function is in itself a special temptation to act in that direction. If action is suppressed, 'uneasiness' manifests itself. This is not mere pain or consciousness of want; it is function in a nascent stage of excitation. 'Uneasiness' may appear, without external provocation, if a function has been

unduly restrained. Repression of function, however, cannot be maintained for a length of time without affecting the general economy of the organism.

The functions which are physically determined include the exercise of all the physical powers, whatever they may be. In addition to these are various capacities which are essentially psychical. Mere curiosity, or the desire to know irrespective of the ulterior significance of what is known, points to the existence of cognitive powers and the innate tendency to use them. A higher phase of intellectual capacity manifests itself in the desire to systematise our explicit judgments about reality. Distinct from either of these is the faculty which mediates between the theoretical and the practical. It deals with the application of general rules to particular cases, the adaptation of means to ends. All the special capacities which individuals exhibit, involve the exercise of functions in specialised directions or in particular combinations, and therefore come under the general rule. The various emotions are also functional reactions, but they are not primary. They are mediated in a double sense, inasmuch as they presuppose the recognition of the relation in which objects stand to our interests in general.

In connection with the tendency of function to manifest itself without consideration of consequences, the influence of a limitative principle must be emphasised. The individual tends to realise his functions because he is an active being, but there is a limit to his activity since there is a limit to the amount of energy at his disposal. After expenditure

of energy comes the necessity for accumulation. Consequently, along with the tendency to expend energy there is a natural tendency to retain or economise it. For convenience this may be termed the principle of 'inertia.' The existence of this modifying factor is shown by the inclination to follow the path of least resistance—an inclination which accounts for the formation of habits, and is largely responsible for the phenomena of unconscious imitation. It is easier to tread a beaten path than to strike out a new one, easier to do what others are doing than to judge and initiate for oneself. Hence the agent tends unconsciously to repeat his own actions, and to follow the lead of others. It is the same general tendency which raises ready doubt as to the advantages or morality of any departure from tradition or custom. Innovation always involves increased expenditure of energy, and, though change might mean economy in the long-run, it is easier at any moment to let things be. The strength of the limitative principle varies with age, circumstances, and disposition, but a being with limited energy is never totally free from the tendency to economy. Hence our whole existence is a ceaseless conflict and compromise between activity and inertia. They wax and wane alternately, for expenditure or accumulation must always be succeeded by its opposite. In our most strenuous moments we take the easiest path to our end; after arduous labour comes the desire for rest. But rest is not absolute repose. The need of activity pursues the active being, and he must play in some form or another in his moments

of ease. That is, he must compromise between activity and inertia, for play in its natural and spontaneous form is simply activity expressing itself in the easiest way.

From this point of view many facts can be rendered intelligible. Ease of movement is æsthetically pleasing, because it is a combination of efficiency and economy. Activity is not always more pleasant in proportion as it increases in intensity, since expenditure may outrun accumulation. The varying strength of the limitative principle accounts for the further fact that the point beyond which activity becomes excessive is not fixed. This in turn explains why relative passivity and strenuous activity are alike pleasant at different times. The general oscillation observable in conscious processes also finds its explanation in the existence of a varying limit to the natural tendency towards activity. One instance of this rhythmical movement is specially noteworthy on account of the consequences it involves. The individual is continually oscillating between a state of self-concentration and a state of decentralisation or relaxedness, for concentration implies an expenditure of energy which cannot always be kept up. In the condition of decentralisation, the individual's actions conform to the ideo-motor type. An idea is immediately realised, without any consideration of consequences, simply because it is suggested to the mind. It seems to arouse activity by its mere presence. Here, as elsewhere, however, the idea has no impulsive power of its own. It evokes activity because it falls in line

with some tendency; it aids and abets but does not originate. The immediacy of the response is due to the absence of central control. Usually any tendency is restrained or inhibited by an awareness of its relation to the agent's dominant interests, that is, by a consciousness of its place in some system of tendencies. Self-concentration being absent, no check or hindrance exists, and the action takes place at once. The individual is reduced to his component elements, and the parts function separately. The agent is a mere bundle of tendencies which are realised as occasion offers, without reflection or calculation. While actions may approximate to the ideo-motor type for other reasons, pure ideo-motor activity implies decentralisation. The significance of the whole phenomenon is that it points to the existence of a number of tendencies which have an impulsive power of their own apart from everything else. Manifestly these tendencies, if left to themselves, conflict with one another. This does not prove that the individual's nature is a chaos into which order cannot be introduced. System is not impossible, for in any organic synthesis the parts possess an independent character of their own, though they are subordinated to the whole. Moreover, system is not only possible but natural, since there is, as we shall find, a natural principle of synthesis. If self-concentration does not exist, however, this principle cannot be effective, and concentration is not always possible on account of the limitation of energy. The recognition of the presence of a limitative principle, therefore, helps us to understand why temporary

chaos can emerge despite the natural tendency to order and system.

The principle of inertia gives activity a bias in the direction of the customary, for it is hostile to all innovation. It is directly opposed, however, by a tendency which springs from a basal need of the organism, and is expressed in the desire for change. When a function has been continuously exercised for a length of time, the desire for variation of activity makes itself felt, a desire which has no reference to the relation between expenditure and accumulation of energy. After intellectual labour, or the employment of any of the higher functions, the need of giving scope to other functions is apt to be distinctly perceptible. In consequence of this, all natural tendencies come to be realised and the balance of the organism is preserved. Here change appears as mere variety, but the need of change also shows itself in the tendency to seek or welcome the absolutely new. The existence of this tendency can be proved by a great diversity of facts. The vagaries of fashion, the desire for travel, the unpleasantness of monotony, the charm of imaginative literature, the disinterested interest excited by inventions and discoveries, are all inexplicable unless there is a distinct desire for novelty as such. In all creative activity, again, this desire plays an important part. While it is impossible by fiat of will to originate anything in art, science, or practical life, yet the mind can be set to work in one direction, and the result, if novel, can be seized upon and preserved in objective form. The desire for novelty, if excessive,

leads to mere instability, and in the case of individuals with a narrow range of interests it may produce very undesirable results. When subordinated to higher interests, however, it is a principle of development, an element of consciousness which is an important factor in the evolution of the race.

Hitherto the relation of the individual to his fellows has not come into distinct prominence, but attention must now be directed to a basal tendency which springs from the essential incompleteness of isolated individual existence. This tendency is expressed in sociability, or the desire of associating with others. That sociability is the direct outcome of a primary need is evident from the fact that artificial isolation takes rank as one of the greatest possible evils. To quote from Professor James: "Solitary confinement is by many regarded as a mode of torture too cruel and unnatural for civilised countries to adopt. To one long pent-up on a desert island, the sight of a human footprint or a human form in the distance would be the most tumultuously exciting of experiences."[1] Sociability cannot be explained solely on the ground that association with others makes life easier and safer. The tendency has a more ultimate origin. An individual cannot fully realise his capacities in isolation. He misses his true vocation in life if the aid and stimulus of his fellows is lacking. He is not self-sufficient, and accordingly has a tendency to complete himself by association with his kind.

[1] Principles of Psychology, ii. p. 430.

In the lower stages of mental development this primary social inclination leads to mere gregariousness. At higher levels, however, discrimination enters, and the selection of definite associates takes place. Friendship and affection are the specialised forms of fellow-feeling which mark the more intimate relationship; they are feelings in reference to those members of the community who are fitted to satisfy more fully than others the need of self-completion. As such they are sharply differentiated from the basal need which occasions them. They form a new tie between individuals, and abolish the distinction between *alter* and *ego*. The difference between sociability and general fellow-feeling is equally obvious. There is of course the intrinsic difference between a feeling-attitude and a mere tendency to act. Further, though the two are in this case intimately associated, the emotion may be inhibited by counteracting forces. Sociability may thus exist by itself, in isolation from the natural emotional response. A selfish person, for instance, may show little kindly feeling towards his associates and yet manifest sociability in a marked degree.

On the principle that "nature implants contrary impulses to act on many classes of things," James seems to regard sociability and shyness as contrary 'instincts.' The two phenomena, however, do not stand on the same level. Even a very shy person would not flourish under solitary confinement on a desert island or elsewhere. Unlike sociability, shyness is not a primary impulse corresponding to a basal need. It springs from a self-distrust which

proceeds in large measure from an undue consciousness of the self in its particularity. There are no exceptions to the rule that association with others is a primal necessity. An individual who came into the world with a constitutional aversion to all human society would be a monstrosity. Sociability is conditioned by the requirements of individual existence as such, and from the nature of the case it can have no direct opposite.

A different class of primary impulses now demands consideration. Every individual strives to preserve his existence, and also to express it or make it effective in some way. In other words, every one has an impulse towards self-preservation, and a tendency to self-assertion. In both cases, capacities and functions are employed in the service of a definite end, and for this reason these springs of action are not so unmediated as the others which have been mentioned. They are primary in the sense that they are 'blind' impulses, which are independent of cognition and hedonic experience, and cannot be destroyed by reflection. It is true that a conscious being, when under the influence of either of those impulses, knows what he is doing, but it is not so easy for him to explain why he is doing it. The direction taken by his activity is clear, but why he is carried along in that direction is the thing to be explained. The only reason which can be assigned for the impulse in either case is the agent's intrinsic nature. The individual is so constituted that he is impelled to act as he does. The evolutionist can perhaps account for the existence of the natural bias

in one direction or the other. He can assert that the immediacy and universality of the self-preservation tendency is an obvious outcome of natural selection, since any being devoid of this primary impulse would speedily perish in the struggle for life. The statement is not so plausible in regard to self-assertion, for this tendency may endanger the existence of individuals and communities alike. Such questions, however, do not concern us at present. All that is necessary is to indicate in what sense these tendencies are basal principles of activity.

The impulse to self-preservation has already been mentioned in another connection and can be briefly dismissed. It is evidently prior to, and independent of, reflection or hedonic calculation. Death is regarded as an evil solely because there is a strong desire to live. For the same reason the 'right' to existence is claimed as something natural and inalienable. While every being clings to life instinctively, the influence of this tendency may be counteracted by contrary impulses. This does not happen without conflict, however, and courage or resolution is required to conquer the impulse to self-preservation even when life is in other respects undesirable.

Self-assertion in any strict sense of the term is a distinctively human impulse, since it presupposes a consciousness of self as opposed to not-self. Everything in the universe, as a matter of fact, affects other things, but a self-conscious being has a distinct desire to be an influence of some sort. He is not content merely to be and continue to exist, but desires to do or achieve something, make some

effective manifestation of his presence in the world. The 'primitive credulity' in regard to personal importance, which is often called pride, is the best proof of the existence and strength of this tendency. The individual has a strong desire to be a force or influence, and is therefore liable to believe more than the facts warrant despite the shocks of much disturbing experience. Other evidence is not lacking. The constructive tendency, so well described by James, is a direct outcome of the primary impulse to self-assertion. "Constructiveness is as genuine and irresistible an instinct in man as in the bee or the beaver. Whatever things are plastic to his hands, those things he must remodel into shapes of his own, and the result of the remodelling, however useless it may be, gives him more pleasure than the original thing. . . . Clothes, weapons, tools, habitations, and works of art are the result of the discoveries to which the plastic instinct leads, each individual starting where his forerunners left off and tradition preserving all that once is gained. Clothing, where not necessitated by cold, is nothing but an attempt to remodel the human body itself—an attempt still better shown in the various tattooings, tooth-filings, scarrings, and other mutilations that are practised by savage tribes."[1] The destructive tendency so prominent in the early stages of life has the same source as its opposite, though it necessarily is not allowed the same scope. Destructiveness is merely a simple and easy form of self-manifestation. A self-assertive being naturally has a distinct

[1] Principles of Psychology, ii. p. 426.

pleasure in the sense of power as such, since power is capacity for self-expression. He is loath to accept defeat, and therefore perseveres under adverse circumstances, striving to carry out what he has undertaken simply because he is committed to it. The spirit which makes difficulties an incentive instead of a check has the same origin. Efficiency and inefficiency, as exhibited by others, are necessarily objects of special interest and arouse special emotions. On the other hand, the agent cannot fail to be affected by the opinions of his fellows in regard to his own effectiveness. It is on this account that fame attracts, since fame is the community's recognition of successful achievement, and is more permanent than the individual himself. For the same reason nothing is more galling than social disregard. To avoid this, notoriety may be sought, if no other form of social recognition is attainable. Indeed, if self-assertion is a dominant passion, a person may court hatred to escape indifference, and choose infamy rather than oblivion. Unregulated and excessive self-assertion shows itself in many other ways. Impatience of all restraint, the pride which will not acknowledge error or accept suggestion from others, the tendency to boastfulness, the delight in inspiring fear, jealous ill-feeling towards a rival, envious ill-will towards a superior, are cases in point. A more sinister instance is the pleasure of 'disinterested' cruelty. This is primarily pleasure in self-assertion over other sentient beings, and presupposes that the self-assertive tendency is absolutely uncorrected and unrestrained.

It is clear that the impulse toward self-manifestation is a tendency which can take many different directions. It appears as the ambition to accomplish something which will extort permanent social recognition. It is present also in the desire for domination over others, the desire for power in the narrow sense. In these cases it substitutes a struggle for pre-eminence in place of the struggle for mere existence. In another aspect it is the 'property instinct,' the tendency to establish control over things and bring them under the dominion of the self. It manifests itself more directly in the constructive and destructive tendencies. These impulses spring from the mere desire to express in objective form the inward capacities of the self. In all its aspects this primary tendency is a desire for objects not for pleasure. Power over others, for instance, is sought for its own sake; it is pleasant because it is desirable; it is desired because there is a tendency in that direction. The pleasures associated with it are by no means equal in amount to the other pleasures which are sacrificed on its account.

In the preceding discussion many principles of action often called 'instincts' have been explained by reference to the basal tendencies which spring from the nature of man as an active self-conscious being. The term 'instinct' is very ambiguous and has led to much confusion. If Bain's statement be accepted and instinct is defined as "the untaught ability to perform actions of all kinds,"[1] it is not essentially different from any realisation of function.

[1] Senses and Intellect, p. 246.

If we follow James and take instinct as "the faculty of acting in such a way as to produce certain ends without foresight of the ends,"[1] it is clear that this faculty will disappear with the development of reflection. If we interpret James's definition less literally, however, and assert that instinct is an impulse which is not determined by the bare cognition of the end to which it is directed, then all our primary tendencies at least are and remain instinctive. In other words, though we may acquire a knowledge of the ends really attained by means of our natural impulses, yet these impulses existed prior to this knowledge and remain after it is acquired. The self-conscious being may come to know explicitly and fully what he is doing when he is under the influence of any primary impulse, but the tendency itself is directly conditioned by his nature and has no other explanation. This must be the case if man has a definite constitution, psychical as well as physical, for this must express itself in his reactions to stimuli. Evolution can explain why our natural impulses acquire a certain bias, why one function is used more than others or employed in reference to a limited class of objects, why functions are grouped to produce certain results, since all this is explicable by reference to the environment. This brings us to another meaning of the term instinct, for those specialisations of function are frequently, though not always explicitly, indicated when the phrase 'instinctive action' is employed. Instincts in this narrow sense are to be explained in terms of function and environ-

[1] Psychology, ii. p. 383.

ment. There seems no reason why definite impulses of this description should not be inherited. If, however, they are mere survivals of past relations with past conditions of life, they must tend to disappear as reflection makes its influence felt. Reflective cognition will bring to light the conflict between the past and the present, and thus arouse contrary impulses which are more fitted to the conditions which actually exist. Reflection makes the whole self, with all its interests, effective at any moment,[1] and accordingly ensures the dominance of what is really most interesting and important to the agent. Several modes of activity which seem mere survivals will be found to derive assistance and support from impulses which are essential to man as such. The 'hunting instinct,' for example, may be partly a survival, but it is at all events aided and encouraged by the self-assertive tendency, which is by no means a historical relic.

In connection with the general standpoint here outlined, it is necessary to discuss the whole question of the influence of knowledge on the basal principles of action and their specialised forms. As already indicated, the presence of cognition does not make any essential alteration in the character of primary impulses. It cannot directly restrain or inhibit any tendency to activity, for it does not create any impulse. It throws light on the existence and connection of objects, and is therefore an invaluable ally though it can put no forces of its own into the field. Ideas in themselves have no impul-

[1] Cf. Schopenhauer, 'World as Will and Idea,' i. p. 112.

sive power, and would be wholly without influence if they were not the guides and friends of tendencies to activity. The way in which ideas become 'fixed' shows this very clearly. A fixed idea is the conception of something which the individual desires more than anything else, and what he desires depends on his essential nature and the impulses thereby conditioned. If it be urged that knowledge renders possible action for ends in place of *a tergo* propulsion, it must be admitted that a conscious being acts in view of ends which at first exist only as ideas in his mind. But this merely implies that he knows what he wants, and consciously strives to realise his dominant tendencies. It is true that self-consciousness is the presupposition of certain primary impulses, but these activities are not determined by the mere awareness of self as opposed to not-self. We are apt to be misled here because we take it for granted that anything which is recognised as pertaining to the self must have a special interest. If, however, there were no tendencies to maintain and assert individual existence or to realise ideals of worth, there would be little special interest in what concerns the ego as distinguished from the non-ego. The greater vividness of pleasure-pain in the one case would remain the only basis for superiority of interest, and even this tends to disappear in a sympathetic being. This is not the only instance where the influence of primary tendencies is confounded with that of mere cognition. There is much truth in Hume's statement on this subject. "Reason exerts itself without producing any sensible emotion.

Hence it proceeds, that every action of the mind, which operates with the same calmness and tranquillity, is confounded with reason by all those who judge of things from the first view and appearance. Now 'tis certain there are certain calm desires and tendencies, which, though they be real passions, produce little emotion in the mind, and are more known by their effects than by the immediate feeling or sensation. . . . When any of these passions are calm, and cause no disorder in the soul, they are very readily taken for the determinations of reason, and are supposed to proceed from the same faculty with that which judges of truth and falsehood."[1] In other words, an action may seem to the agent to be in harmony with the universal, objective, and necessary principles of reason, when it is merely in harmony with some primary tendency too strong to admit of opposition and too ultimate to be easily detected.

It can be asserted, indeed, that an action is never judged to be 'reasonable' on purely cognitive axioms or principles. 'Reasonable' and 'rational' are by no means synonymous. This is true even of actions which would be regarded as reasonable by an impartial and competent outsider. A judgment of this sort necessarily involves a criterion, but this criterion is not intellectual. As we shall see later, conduct is judged in reference to a standard of worth, not in accordance with a standard of truth. The criterion is consistency with self, not self-consistency. A mere criterion, however, is not

[1] Treatise, Selby-Bigge ed., p. 417.

sufficient; it is never reasonable to act in any given way if there is not a capacity or tendency to act in that way. The agent, therefore, must have a natural tendency to realise the end which appeals to him as worthy of himself. On any other supposition our judgments on conduct would be very unreasonable. An action, then, is regarded as objectively reasonable if it is in harmony with the impulse to do what is worthy of the self. All that cognition does, is to make the regulative tendency effective, by showing what particular impulses are in harmony with it on particular occasions.

We mistake our position in the universe if we imagine that we can stand outside the course of events as impartial spectators, and decide on purely cognitive grounds in regard to our mode of conduct. The human being is in the universe, and is a definite part of the whole. This means that he has a definite nature which directly impels him to act in certain ways. Cognition guides, but does not create, tendencies to action. It seems tolerably clear that, if the individual had no specific tendencies to begin with, he could not create them by means of cognition or in any other way.

The true relation between cognition and the ultimate principles of conduct does not become manifest, however, until we remember that knowledge in the strict sense of the word implies voluntary attention, and therefore selective synthesis in accordance with subjective interest. Subjective interests, again, presuppose tendencies to action. Voluntary attention is always conditioned by our

interests, whatever they may be, and our basal tendencies determine our basal interests. This does not imply that knowledge is always systematised for employment in the service of practical ends. There are purely intellectual tendencies and interests which may determine the direction of attention, and thus determine the content of knowledge. These statements seem paradoxical only if we fail to distinguish cognition from the cognitive activity, and identify knowledge with knowing. The cognitive activity itself is a primary function in operation, and as such may be self-determined. Knowledge may be sought for the sake of knowing; truth may be desired on its own account. But knowledge may also be systematised in view of ethical, æsthetic, or practical purposes, for cognitive activity is determined by the dominant interest of the moment. The content of our knowledge, therefore, is stamped with the character of our interests, and thus bears the imprint of all our basal tendencies to activity. Knowledge and activity thus stand in a relation of interaction. What we know influences what we do, but our tendencies to act determine the content of our knowledge. The unique position of knowledge is a result of the essential nature of the cognitive function, and must simply be recognised as an ultimate fact.

Knowledge as content, therefore, is not an independent factor capable of changing the character of basal tendencies. It presupposes a primary function which may be self-determined or subordinated to interests which are not purely intellectual. On the other hand, the indirect effect of knowledge, however

acquired, is necessarily of vital importance. Knowledge affects the further exercise of the cognitive function itself. The latter is self-illuminating as well as a guiding light to others. The influence of cognition on the other basal tendencies is too obvious to require special emphasis. If the agent is aware of the ultimate consequences of a particular impulse on any given occasion, he knows when these are at variance with something which on the whole he is more desirous of obtaining. In this manner a contrary impulse is aroused, and the more important interest is made effective despite the waywardness of momentary impulse. The following quotation from Professor James's 'Psychology' gives in the main the final result of this whole argument in regard to the influence of cognition. The terminology is somewhat different, but the point of view is essentially the same. "Reason *per se* can inhibit no impulses; the only thing which can neutralise an impulse is an impulse the other way. Reason may, however, make an inference which will excite the imagination so as to let loose the impulse the other way; and thus, though the animal richest in reason might be also the animal richest in instinctive impulses too, he would never seem the fatal automaton which a *merely* instinctive animal would be."[1]

In reviewing all the principles of activity which have now been explicitly discussed, we find that the human being has various primary tendencies and is also determined to activity by emotion and by pleasure-pain. There is here a multiplicity of

[1] Vol. ii. p. 393.

diverse impulses and no principle of unity. The different tendencies assert themselves, regardless of the others, as opportunity arises. If left to themselves, they are in perpetual opposition to one another. Self-assertion, if unrestrained, will conflict with the impulses of fellow-feeling, and will frequently be at variance with the desire to avoid pain and seek pleasure. It may also conflict with the tendency to realise those functions which do not produce immediate and striking results. The hedonic impulse can obviously be in opposition to the tendency to function in certain ways, to avenge injury, or to aid the distressed. These conflicts may occur at the moment or make themselves felt after the action is over. The mere presence of cognition does not produce harmony. On the contrary, it precipitates strife before action takes place, for it enables the cognitive being to foresee conflicts and thus bring all the contending forces into the field. Consequently, if man were endowed only with the tendencies already mentioned, no system of conduct would be possible. Each individual would be resolved into a multiplicity of warring elements. Every tendency would assert itself as far as possible, and the limit to its range would be decided by the arbitrament of battle. System is impossible unless there is an all-inclusive end with which all the particular forces of the organism can be harmonised, and by reference to which their proper scope can be determined. This ultimate end or object, which includes all proximate ends, must have intrinsic worth; otherwise the tendencies to particular objects could not be regu-

lated in accordance with it. Regulation implies limitation or subordination, and is possible only if there is a distinction between better and worse. If one tendency is as good as another, there is no reason for subordinating one to another. There must also be an impulse to realise this supreme end, else all subordination would remain purely theoretical. Now all our judgments in regard to human conduct imply that the regulation of natural impulses is possible. We shall proceed therefore to test the validity of this presupposition. A separate chapter, however, must be devoted to this investigation.

CHAPTER VI.

THE IDEAL OF WORTH AS REGULATIVE PRINCIPLE.

SINCE all regulation of natural tendencies would be impossible without an ideal of worth, we must first ascertain whether there is any such ideal. The examination of the primary emotions has already thrown light on this subject. Admiration and scorn are emotions excited by worth as realised by others. A person is admired because he is intrinsically *better* in some respect than his fellows. A rival, or even an enemy, may receive the tribute of involuntary admiration. This implies not only that an ideal of worth exists, but also that it influences action. If we had no tendency to act according to our standards of worth, no desire to strive for the better and avoid the worse, we should have no vivid interest in the realisation of worth on the part of others. It is true that our admiration of our fellows has an influence on our own actions and arouses a desire to imitate what others have done, but this is due to the fact that it quickens our sense of what is worthy of ourselves, by suggesting higher possibilities or by reminding us of ideals which had

been neglected. It is also true that we are much more careful to avoid a course of action if its adoption by others has called forth scorn in us, but this likewise presupposes the existence of a tendency to do what seems worthy and to avoid the opposite.

Evidence of a more direct nature is indicated by Mill in that striking passage where he emphasises the influence of the sense of personal dignity. "Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast's pleasures; no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs. They would not resign what they possess more than he, for the most complete satisfaction of all the desires which they have in common with him. . . . A being of higher faculties requires more to make him happy, is capable probably of more acute suffering, and is certainly accessible to it at more points, than one of an inferior type; but in spite of these liabilities, he can never really wish to sink into what he feels to be a lower grade of existence. We may give what explanation we please of this unwillingness, . . . but its most appropriate appellation is a sense of dignity which all human beings possess in one form or other, and in some, though by no means in exact, proportion to their higher faculties, and

which is so essential a part of the happiness of those in whom it is strong, that nothing which conflicts with it could be, otherwise than momentarily, an object of desire to them." [1]

This implies that the individual feels there is a mode of life which alone is worthy of him, an ideal whose realisation is something he owes to himself. The sense of personal dignity is therefore the basal fact on which the emotions of worth depend. It is evidently distinct from any estimate of actual personal merit; it is the presence in consciousness of an ideal of worth which is felt as binding on the individual. It is expressed in the feeling that there is something *owing* to ourselves since we are what we are. It thus bears within itself the sense of worth and the feeling of obligation. The two aspects are indeed inseparable. That which has intrinsic worth for an individual and that which he feels internally obliged to realise, are one and the same thing.

No elaborate proof of the existence of this basal principle is necessary, for without it the facts of life would not be explicable. The agent who feels that there is a mode of conduct which he owes it to himself to adopt, necessarily recognises that he has a definite part to play in the universe. He cannot contentedly remain at the mercy of natural impulses, or direct his energies to any object indifferently. There is an end for him to strive for, whether momentary inclination points in that direction or not. He has duties as opposed to inclina-

[1] Utilitarianism, ch. ii.

tions, and the good for him is not synonymous with the merely pleasant. From this proceeds the shame which is degradation in his own eyes, and the self-deception by which he sometimes attempts to avoid self-condemnation. The distinction between duty and inclination, the existence of shame and self-deception, are facts which admit of only one interpretation. The facts themselves cannot be questioned. It is undeniable that man has a conception of duty, strives to act in accordance with it, and may notably succeed. It is equally certain that failure does not absolve him from effort, since the shame which attends failure precludes contented acquiescence in defeat. All this would be unintelligible if the human being did not possess an ideal of worth involving supreme obligation. The feeling of shame itself affords conclusive evidence, for it implies that the agent must justify his conduct to himself, and may be self-condemned. He may be unpleasantly affected by the condemnation of his fellows, but shame does not appear if the inward tribunal fails to sanction the social verdict.

The sense of worth makes its presence felt over the whole range of human conduct. Nothing is too unimportant to escape its influence. It can be traced in the instinct of propriety, the sense of 'good form,' and the minor social conventions, as well as in the higher realms of moral duty. No self-conscious being can throw off its yoke. If it does not take the form of conscience, it asserts itself as the obligation of 'honour,' and where honour seems unknown it manifests itself as a

lingering remnant of self-respect. There are some things which the most depraved will not do, come what may; even the most abandoned can be insulted by the imputation that they are capable of certain actions. The scope of the principle is not to be judged merely by its direct manifestations in action. Where it is ineffective in conduct it makes itself felt in the feelings of shame and self-condemnation. The existence and influence of the sense of personal dignity have been frequently emphasised, but no one has stated the case more vividly than Stevenson, and we cannot do better than close this argument in his words. "If I could show you these men and women, all the world over, in every stage of history, under every abuse of error, under every circumstance of failure, without hope, without help, without thanks, still obscurely fighting the lost fight of virtue, still clinging, in the brothel or on the scaffold, to some rag of honour, the poor jewel of their souls! They may seek to escape and yet they cannot; it is not alone their privilege and their glory, but their doom; they are condemned to some nobility; all their lives long, the desire of good is at their heels, the implacable hunter." [1]

It can be shown that this ideal of worth has the characteristics of a supreme regulative principle, for it furnishes an all-inclusive end, a universal criterion, and a supreme motive. The conception of a mode of life which is worthy of the self, determines both rights and duties. It defines an end to which all activities can be directed, and by reference to which

[1] Pulvis et Umbra.

every action can be judged. The impulse towards the end thus constituted occupies a unique position. The human being is not merely inclined to live up to his standards of worth, but feels obliged to do so. This sense of obligation is effective in conduct whenever he is master of himself. The facts of life substantiate this assertion, for, despite the existence of evil and baseness, the fact stands firm that every one shrinks from deliberate self-degradation.

Why, then, it may be asked, is the ideal of worth not always effective? The answer is simple. Self-consciousness is one condition without which the sense of worth could not exist. If the agent is not capable of distinguishing himself from other things, he cannot have the conception of something which is worthy of *him*. But the individual and the race alike gradually attain to distinct self-consciousness, and, when they come into conscious possession of themselves, they find an actually existent nature already developed. A conflict inevitably arises, at more points than one, between the self as it is and that ideal of what is worthy of the self which arises when the stage of self-consciousness is reached. Some tendencies to act are developed so strongly that it is difficult to restrain them. Such impulses have an indirect, as well as a direct, influence. The desires they condition tend to obscure the judgment, for it is a well-known principle that the human being is prone to believe what he wishes to believe. Frequently, too, when not strong enough to have this effect, they are strong enough to render momentary self-deception possible. The original bias of the

individual's nature finds another ally in the limitation of his energy which is inseparable from the limitations of his being. Self-consciousness, when once attained, is not maintained uninterruptedly. It is often potential rather than actual since it involves a distinct effort of self-concentration, and therefore requires an amount of energy which is not always available. The self-conscious being is continually relapsing more or less into a condition of decentralisation, in which his particular tendencies are more or less uncontrolled and assert themselves in their natural strength if opportunity offers. The same principle accounts for the formation of many undesirable habits during the individual's own lifetime, when he is, potentially at least, master of his own destiny. For lack of effective self-concentration at the critical moment, he acts 'without thinking'; the action, once performed, tends to repeat itself under similar external and internal conditions, until the agent suddenly becomes aware of the existence of a firmly established habit. It must also be pointed out that many conflicts between the real and ideal arise from the fact that man is a progressive being. The content of his ideal of worth is perpetually developing; the scope of his duties is always in process of enlargement. Consequently there is a continual struggle between habits which have grown up under one conception of worth and the new activities rendered necessary by a new and more adequate appreciation of what is worthy of the self.

In spite of all this, it would be wrong to describe 'the fight of virtue' as a hopeless struggle. All the

individual's tendencies have not been developed in such a way as to form obstacles to the realisation of his ideal. Even against those impulses which oppose his aspirations he is not without resource. However blinded he may be when an excessively strong tendency is aroused, there comes a time when he is master of himself. In such moments he sees things as they are, and can establish the true conception in his mind. This will bring the unruly tendency into direct conflict with the impulse to realise the ideal of worth. And if the success of direct opposition is doubtful, other means can be employed. Temptation can often be deliberately avoided. Opposing particular tendencies can be strengthened by giving them frequent opportunities for exercise, since habit can be made a friend as well as a foe. In this way the ideal of worth finds allies in the actual nature of the individual. It must also be noted that the struggle is not perpetual because it involves perpetual defeat. A conquered tendency will continue to assert itself until restraint becomes firmly fixed through habit. Further, every stage which is successfully attained becomes a point of departure, since new aspirations are continually arising with every advance.

It is in virtue of this conflict that the ideal of worth appears, not only as attractive, but also as authoritative. It is attractive because it represents what the individual fain would be. Its realisation would follow as a matter of course if no recalcitrant elements existed in the individual's own nature. Duty and inclination would then be indistinguishable, while the

opposition between 'ought' and 'is' would be converted into a temporary difference between the future and the present. As things are, however, the elements of authority and attractiveness are both present, for what the conscious being as such most desires to be is thwarted by what he actually is. This duality of aspect is expressed in the peculiar signification of the terms 'ought' and 'obligation.' 'I ought' does not signify 'I must'; nor, on the other hand, does it simply mean 'I am inclined.' Similarly, 'obligation' is not synonymous with compulsion or with mere inclination. The feeling of obligation indicates that the agent is impelled by his actual nature in one direction while his ideal of worth attracts him in another. It also represents the fact that the conflict is not between forces which stand on the same level; it implies that the ideal of worth has a natural superiority over the actual self as it happens to exist.

It is necessary to use the terms 'ought' and 'obligation' in this connection, for they alone are adequate to define the peculiar influence which the ideal of worth exerts. This shows that we are dealing with the moral impulse as such. No further proof is necessary, since the obligation to realise what has worth is evidently moral obligation. It is equally clear that the struggle of the individual against himself is the moral struggle. To this he is called by his very nature, and for this reason he cannot abandon the conflict even if ill-success may seem to attend his efforts. That the struggle, though perpetual, is not hopeless or without effect, will be clearer

when we realise more fully the implications of the ideal of worth. To this inquiry we must now turn.

As we have already observed, the sense of worth could not exist without self-consciousness. It does not follow from this, however, that the former is a direct and necessary result of the awareness of self as distinguished from everything else. Air is essential to life, but this does not prove that life is air or directly involved in air. Mere cognition deals with matters of fact; by itself it can only distinguish between the true and the false. It determines whether a thing is what it seems to be, whether the connections of a fact with other facts are correctly or erroneously interpreted. Its function is to interpret the actual; beyond this it cannot go. A purely cognitive being, therefore, even if it were aware of itself as opposed to other existences, would view all actions with impartial eye. Whether good or bad, they are so many facts with a definite place in the system of things, and to determine this place correctly is the sole aim of cognitive endeavour. Such a being would have no more interest in its own conduct than in the behaviour of others. Its only concern would be that its own actions should be attributed to itself. It would be displeased in the same manner and degree if its good actions or its bad actions were falsely attributed to others. In short, a merely cognitive being would be concerned only with the distinction between truth and falsehood, and from the standpoint of truth one fact is not better or worse than another. For the purposes of knowledge all facts are equally good if they are properly ar-

ranged in the system of things. Accordingly, though an ideal of worth is impossible without self-consciousness, the complete fact has other implications which remain to be determined.

In this further inquiry a clue is furnished by the reflection that, while an individual's ideal is *his* ideal and appeals to him on that account, it is not arbitrarily adopted by him. The notion of worth is an integral element in his constitution, and he cannot escape from its influence. Its content, moreover, has a necessary and direct reference to his capacities, for what is worthy of any given agent must be dependent on what he is. It is determined, however, not by his actual nature but by his essential nature. In other words, it derives its character not from what he actually is, but from what he is capable of becoming. This is implied in all our judgments on conduct, as Butler has pointed out in a passage which is well worth quoting. "Every one has a different sense of harm done by an idiot, madman, or child, and by one of mature and common understanding; though the action of both, including the intention, which is part of the action, be the same; as it may be since idiots and madmen, as well as children, are capable not only of doing mischief but also of intending it. Now this difference must arise from somewhat discerned in the nature or capacities of one, which renders the action vicious; and the want of which, in the other, renders the same action innocent or less vicious; and this plainly supposes a comparison, whether reflected upon or not, between the action and capacities of the agent, previous to

our determining an action to be vicious. And hence arises a proper application of the epithets, *incongruous, unsuitable, disproportionate, unfit,* to actions which our moral faculty determines to be vicious."[1] It is interesting to notice that the same point of view appears in the evolutionist doctrine that the individual should act in accordance with the idea of his kind or his type.[2]

It is manifest, therefore, that the self-conscious being has an ideal of worth, and that the content of this ideal is necessarily determined by his nature. This points to the conclusion that he is not at the mercy of a variety of particular impulses, and, on the other hand, that he is not permitted to excogitate an arbitrary end or capriciously choose a rule of conduct. In other words, the notion of worth implies that there is a definite law and order in the realm of self-conscious beings; the obligation of worth corresponds to law in the physical world. This regulative principle is different from a merely physical law, for self-conscious beings are different from mere things. The form which the law assumes is modified by the medium in which it appears. It acts through the feeling of internal obligation, not by external compulsion. It is expressed in the consciousness that something is owing to ourselves because it is worthy of us. Hence the form of the law is: Do this or be unworthy in your own eyes. From this alternative

[1] Dissertation on Virtue, section iii.

[2] Cf. Alexander, 'Moral Order and Progress,' p. 236; Leslie Stephen, 'Science of Ethics,' p. 397; Strauss, 'The Old Faith and the New,' ii. p. 51.

at all events there is no escape, and this internal principle has thus an inflexibility of its own though not the same inflexibility as that which characterises a natural law. Moral or internal obligation therefore is simply the form which law assumes in the world of persons as opposed to mere things. It can justly be called a law of the universe acting from within as a conscious force, for it impels the conscious being to systematise his conduct in accordance with his place in the system of things. This becomes more evident when we ascertain definitely what the law commands.

The definite modes of behaviour which are worthy of the individual and binding on him, must, as we have seen, be determined by his capacities. Now that which is distinctively the endowment of a particular being, that which he alone possesses or possesses in a special degree, must evidently be that which he feels specially called upon to develop, for what he owes to himself above everything is dependent on what he distinctively is. Since man as man has capacities which are distinctive in kind or degree, we may say that the supreme duty of each human being must be to realise his human capacities in the degree and manner prescribed by his distinctive nature. That this is implicitly or explicitly recognised to be the content of the moral law, can be proved by a reference to the facts of life. Our notions of decency and refinement, for instance, are determined by the feeling that the purely animal functions are strictly subordinate, and should therefore be kept in the background.

All lack of decency or refinement is constituted by a failure to perceive this principle or to act upon it. For the same general reason that the animal side is subordinate, the debauchee is condemned even if he keeps within the limits of decency and is refined in his vices. He is condemned because the animal elements in him have usurped the place of the distinctive human capacities. Moral disapproval also falls upon the man who allows unusual talents to remain latent. He may be conscientious in many relations of life, but it is felt that he has failed to accomplish what he was specially called upon to do in virtue of his distinctive nature.

The supreme end, therefore, so far as yet defined, is the realisation by the individual of his distinctive capacities. Each human being, however, is not an isolated particular. Consequently, though the end must always be personal in the sense that it appeals to the individual as such, it is not and cannot be selfish. It has been shown that the social emotions are integral elements of the nature of every individual, and form a tie which binds him to his fellows. As a result of this, he does not have duties to himself and separate duties to others in addition. His duties to his fellows constitute a part of his duties to himself. In both cases, too, he must have the same end in view, since what is of supreme worth for him and for his fellows must be essentially the same. As sympathy develops, therefore, the supreme end *for each individual* must be the realisation of human capacities in general. To this object he must direct all his energies; by this must all

his impulses be judged. The moral end of course need not be explicitly present in consciousness in its ultimate form. It is active in conduct long before its full implications are definitely realised. That the end is social, that the individual is necessarily interested in the realisation of the capacities of others, can be established by a reference to the more immediate ends which men deem worthy. It is now recognised, for instance, that no class of the community should be in actual or virtual slavery to another, since this is inconsistent with the realisation of the higher capacities of the individuals who are kept in subjection. Hence freedom for all members of the community is regarded as a worthy object of endeavour. Similarly it is felt that the aid and stimulus of education should be given to all. This may be defended on utilitarian grounds, but the real source of the feeling is deeper. In a word, it is recognised that each individual should treat others as ends, not as mere means. This principle has a positive as well as a negative significance; it applies to all social relations; it determines concrete social ends which every one can further in some degree.

Man cannot be abstractly separated from his environment as a whole, however, any more than he can be isolated from his fellows. The particular actions which are necessary for the realisation of the supreme end cannot be independent of the definite circumstances which exist at any given time. External circumstances define what is concretely possible or urgent. This does not imply

that general rules of conduct are impossible, for similar situations are constantly recurring. Particular cases, however, are not always identical in all important respects, and the diversity which coexists with the similarity may at times make a great difference in conduct. To cling to general rules regardless of the nature of the particular occasion is not morality but pedantry. It springs from inertia or from incapacity to make the necessary modifications. Moreover, it is inevitable from the complexity of the environment that general rules must frequently conflict with one another. In such cases the only resource is to consider how the supreme end can best be realised in the circumstances. General moral rules are not absolutely valid. They derive all their authority from the supreme end, and are simply convenient formulæ which are derived by abstraction from the concrete. Having no authority of their own, they may be set aside if the particularity of concrete cases cannot be neglected as unessential from the point of view of the end. There is and can be but one absolute in morality—namely, the obligation to realise the supreme end as can best be done in the circumstances. This does not shake the inflexibility of the moral law, but makes it a force in the concrete world. The content of the moral end, therefore, is determined by the distinctive nature of the individual and of his environment. In other words, what the moral law commands is that each individual should play his part as it is defined by his place in the whole.

The full significance of moral obligation now

becomes apparent. That the universe is in some sense a cosmos, is a necessary presupposition of science and philosophy alike. Everything in the universe, therefore, must be impelled or compelled to perform its proper function in the whole, and cannot with impunity fail in this respect. Otherwise the universe would be a mere aggregate and not a cosmos, for the very conception of an ordered system implies that the different members do not act for themselves arbitrarily or in isolation, but play their part as determined by their place in the system. The moral law, therefore, is the manifestation in consciousness of the principle of order which necessarily exists in the cosmos. The form which this supreme principle here assumes, is appropriate to the level of existence at which it appears.

From this point of view it is clear that the moral struggle, though perpetual, is not hopeless or barren of results. The moral law is the law of man's being, and impels the individual to do what falls to his share in virtue of his place in the system of things. Morality, in the true sense, is action in accordance with the nature of the individual, for by his nature he is a definite part of the whole. In short, moral action is healthy action. The individual must therefore be moral to some extent, must in some measure conform to the conditions of his being, if he is to lead a relatively healthy existence. In literal truth, life is not worth living, if morality as thus interpreted is not realised in a greater or less degree. This is generally recognised, since no one would if he could sink to the level of a mere animal. Every

human being strives to lead a distinctively human life, and must to some extent succeed.

That the ethical struggle is necessarily perpetual is manifest when we remember that man is in the universe and that the universe is not static. There must be ethical as well as organic evolution. The moral law does not change its essential character, but individuals become more moral, progress towards a more perfect realisation of the moral law. It is necessary to investigate the principles on which moral evolution proceeds, since there is a certain analogy between the process of ethical development and the process of natural selection in the region of life, and the analogy has been mistaken for essential identity. This inquiry, moreover, will furnish fresh evidence in favour of the general position here maintained.

In the moral realm we find something similar to the fact of variation in the organic world. Great ethical examples and teachers may be regarded as striking instances of moral variation. By some new combination of qualities, they introduce something new into the moral world, and when we attempt to explain this we are forced back, directly or through the intervening conditions, to the fact of variation, which simply means that the universe is not dead or static, but is the manifestation of an essentially active or productive principle. If variations were not possible here as in life, ethical customs and institutions would petrify, habit would rule the world, and morality would become static. Along with variation there is selection. The form of selection

which here prevails is not natural selection, and has nothing to do with biological survival. When a variation appears which throws new light upon the range and content of the moral law, the more adequate ideal of worth necessarily appeals to moral individuals. It is selected and survives inasmuch as it passes into the lives of individuals. It is selected, not for any ulterior reason, but solely because it seems to be a higher ideal. This adoption of the more adequate expression of the moral ideal necessarily leads to a struggle. The new cannot be adopted without effort by a being whose actual nature has developed under the influence of old ideals and of forces which are absolutely non-ideal. This is expressed, by those who will be biological at all hazards, in the statement that the struggle for survival is no longer a struggle between individuals but between ideals. The essential nature of the whole process is thereby obscured. Ideals apart from individuals are mere abstractions; in themselves they do not struggle, in themselves they do not survive. The struggle is a struggle within the individual, by the individual, and its sole object is the realisation of the more adequate ideal in the individual's own conduct.

This contention can be further substantiated by an argument drawn from the very nature of evolution itself. Evolution is not a law in the strict sense of the word; it is a result of laws and presupposes laws. The form it assumes in the case of any given class of phenomena must be determined by the special laws which there prevail. Natural selection, for

instance, presupposes life and the laws of life. It is incapable of acting where life does not exist; it ceases to apply when we pass, from mere life and the struggle for existence, to personality and the struggle for ideals of worth. From the essential nature of evolution, therefore, moral evolution must be different from any form of organic evolution.

The whole history of civilisation shows, on the plane of objective fact, the workings of the principle of distinctively moral selection. Amid all the struggle and conflict of nations, and the rise and fall of empires, we find that the higher ethical ideals tend to maintain themselves against the lower, just because they harmonise better with human conceptions of worth. A vanquished nation may conquer its conquerors if its civilisation is higher. In this way the ethically better constantly tends to be preserved. Here the natural selection doctrine is reversed: might is not right, but right is might. In a real and literal sense, that which has the right to survive possesses *de facto* the might.

In the light of this discussion of the notion of worth and the internal obligation implied therein, we can determine in what sense man is free. The individual is not free if he acts under external compulsion, or is carried away by any of his particular impulses regardless of everything else. He is free if he can do what he most desires to do, if he can be what he fain would be. This is the only intelligible meaning which can be attached to the term 'freedom.' Now the ideal of worth appeals to the individual as desirable in the highest degree. It represents what

he, in virtue of his essential nature, must desire above all else. Accordingly, if the human being can realise his ideals of worth to any extent, he is free to that extent. It has been shown, however, that the obligation which worth involves is effective in conduct. Consequently, in establishing the internal nature, paramount place, and practical influence of the obligation to realise the ideal of worth, we have established the possibility of human freedom. In other words, morality is freedom, for moral obligation is internal obligation and springs from the sense of worth. That we are morally obliged to act in a certain manner does not mean that Providence, or the powers that be, will punish us if we fail, or that some superior being has implanted in us a sense of duty which is an external restraint on our nature, a foreign tyrant that is within us but not of us. Morality is the free expression of our true nature. The moral being, *qua* moral, is alone free from external restraint as well as from the domination of his actual character as it happens to have developed. Only a moral being can have the consciousness that he is actually or potentially free. The presence of the ethical impulse implies that the agent is called upon, by his nature, to regulate his particular impulses. In consequence of this he feels that he is not determined by the actual bias of his character or by any of the particular tendencies which are thereby conditioned.

Freedom in this sense is not at variance with the order of things, seeing that the moral being feels obliged to play his part as determined by his place in the system. While an individual can do what he

most desires to do, he does not create any of his desires by an arbitrary fiat of will. This, again, is no real limitation of human freedom, for, if the human being had no natural desires or interests, he could not well create them, and in any case a reasonable person is satisfied if he can do what he desires to do.

From the same general standpoint it is possible to define the relation between virtue and happiness. Since the individual feels obliged to act in a manner which is worthy of himself, he cannot be permanently satisfied unless this end is attained or in process of attainment. Here as elsewhere success is accompanied by pleasure, but it is also attended by a peculiarly deep and permanent feeling of satisfaction. This pleasure and satisfaction together constitute happiness. Mere pleasure appears when any tendency is realised, whether the supreme end is thereby furthered or ignored; happiness comes only when the individual is leading the life which is distinctively his, or is striving to do so. The effort itself is a source of happiness, for it is never wholly without influence in favour of the ultimate attainment of the end. The human being can therefore be happy under very unfavourable hedonic conditions and unhappy when pleasures abound. We might say that pleasures of a certain kind alone satisfy the moral being, but this would be inaccurate. The facts imply that pleasure as such does not satisfy, for pleasures differ in quantity alone, and there is no intrinsic difference between one pleasure and another. It is the nature of the action which brings content-

ment, and the pleasure is the mere sign of successful achievement.

On the other hand, it would be wrong to assert that the hedonic aspect of things must be totally disregarded. The impulses to seek pleasure and avoid pain are particular tendencies which have their place and function when regulated in accordance with the ideal of worth. On many occasions it may be necessary to disregard them since more important matters may be at stake, but on many other occasions the supreme end demands that they should not be ignored. This is specially clear in the case of pain. Frequently pain is the sign and result of conditions which are a barrier to the attainment of the end. Lack of physical health, for instance, is a serious obstacle to self-realisation, and the presence of much physical pain is the sign of this physical defect. In order to remove physical pain effectively, the conditions of health must be restored. So far as this is accomplished, the agent becomes to that extent a more efficient factor in the moral community. Accordingly it is often a moral duty to avoid pain or remove it, since pain is frequently antagonistic to the supreme end. What is true of pain is true *mutatis mutandis* of pleasure. The exact place which is to be assigned to these hedonic tendencies becomes apparent when we remember that, as integral parts of our nature, they must be regulated but not suppressed. They must be regulated because they are particular tendencies among others, and are not paramount over others. The attainment of pleasure and the avoidance of

pain do not constitute the end which appeals to human beings as worthy of their distinctive nature. We do not justify our conduct to ourselves on hedonic principles, for it can hardly be asserted that we are overwhelmed with shame whenever we choose the less pleasant course in preference to the more pleasant. Pleasure and pain are judged worthy or unworthy by reference to something else. On the other hand, these impulses are not to be suppressed, since the moral being is not required to attempt the impossible. His duty is to regulate his particular tendencies in accordance with his ideal of worth; he is not called upon to alter the essential constitution of his being.

The supreme end, therefore, does not require the absolute suppression of the hedonic tendencies. Further, every action which is in harmony with the end is accompanied by that pleasure and satisfaction which constitute what is called 'happiness.' The pleasure which the fulfilment of duty brings with it is not necessarily greater in amount than the pleasure which would otherwise be attained. Happiness is not dependent on mere amount of pleasure. It has been urged that duty should not, ultimately at least, involve any sacrifice of pleasure, that the complete coincidence of duty and pleasure[1] is an ethical postulate. In other words, morality has no justification unless duty and pleasure are somehow essentially connected. This contention, however, implies that the vital distinction between

[1] 'Happiness' is the term usually employed in this connection, but as thus used it is evidently indistinguishable from pleasure as such.

happiness and mere pleasure is overlooked. It also implies misunderstanding of the essential nature of morality. As the universe is constituted, there are no conditions which must be fulfilled to render moral action obligatory. Morality is unconditional in a double sense. It is not a matter of choice, for man is an integral part of an ordered system, and moral obligation is in consequence an essential element in his nature. It is not dependent on extrinsic results; the moral end is desired for its own sake. The end which the individual feels obliged to realise, is the end which appeals to him in virtue of its intrinsic nature. Being what it is, it appeals to him because he is what he is. This signifies that the moral end is not dependent in any sense on the connection between duty and pleasure, for the moral end is not the attainment of pleasure, and hedonic results as such are therefore extrinsic to it. There is no room for the particular ethical postulate here in question; there is no place for any ethical postulate.

It cannot even be asserted that the coincidence between duty and pleasure is a metaphysical postulate based on the rationality of the universe. Morality is rational if the end sought by the individual is in harmony with the universe. On any other terms, of course, moral effort would be vain and irrational. It has been shown, however, that moral obligation is a manifestation of the principle of order in the universe. Accordingly there is neither metaphysical nor ethical justification for the demand that the moral agent should receive full

hedonic compensation for his efforts. The discrepancy between virtue and amount of pleasure is not a vital fact either for ethics or for metaphysics. The human being is content if he can realise the end which is worthy of his capacities. He may sacrifice pleasure in doing this, but he gains happiness.

The general results of this inquiry into the principles of human conduct may now be briefly summarised. The psychical individual as such has a definite character which expresses itself in a multiplicity of primary reactions. These reactions are directly conditioned by the constitution of his nature; are not determined by pleasure-pain; and are themselves the sources of hedonic results. They also give significance to persons, things, and events. When this significance is recognised, a peculiar reaction of feeling takes place which is called 'emotion.' The various emotions are different feelings in reference to different objects, and give rise to special impulses. All these particular tendencies assert themselves as opportunity offers, and if left to themselves are perpetually at variance with one another. The psychical individual, however, is an organic being, and there is a principle of synthesis in his nature. He has an ideal of worth, and feels obliged to act in accordance with it. What the individual regards as worthy of himself is the realisation of his distinctive nature. All his particular impulses must be brought into the service of this end, and regulated according to its demands. In other words, there is an all-inclusive end for the organism

as a whole, and this end has a necessary reference to the essential nature of the organism. Man is of necessity a moral being, for the moral impulse is simply the effort to systematise all particular tendencies by reference to an end which possesses intrinsic worth. The moral impulse in turn conditions pleasure-pain and affects the emotional life. Finally, it must be recognised that each psychical organism is not self-contained, but is part of a wider whole. The content of moral obligation, therefore, is defined by the distinctive nature of the individual and of his environment, that is, by his place in the system of things. The moral law is thus an expression of the fact that man is an organic part of an organic whole.

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

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